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PREFACE
The original plan called. tor

an exposition and

critique of

Professor Simon's entire theory of authority, thus including a
discussion of the instruments and forms of authority, its
transmission, and its relation to demooracy.

Since this project

,

proved to be too ambitious, the presen't thesis has concentrated
on a more restricted topiC, that of Simon t s philosophical theory
of the nature and funotioM of authority and its relation to
progress and liberty.

This is a subject of fundamental importance

in the liOrld today.
Special. thanks are due to Professor Simon himself and to
Reverend Panl A. Woeltl, S.J., for their understanding and
helpfulnese.
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-CHAmR I

In 1940 the Aristotelian SOctety of Marquette UniT8rsity invited 'bes
SimoD, then _ociate protessor of philosophy at the University

ot Notre Dame.

to g1ve its annual Aquinas Lecture. Thi8 address, later published b7 the
1

SocietyI

set forth the then current st,ate of Professor Simonts inve8tigation

into the nature and functions ot authorityl

modem attitud.ea toward author1t7
,

were S\lIIImtJ.riBed and the problem raised by

tnem c1ear17 stated. a

proY1aional

definition was given and explained, the functions of authorit)r were then
distinguished, analyaed. and demonstrated, and pr1nc1ples for a 8olution
derived.

This

was a philosophical study

of authority in general, rather than.

ot merely political authority. st. ThOlNUl was

cited trequent17, especially in

the SuD:ma Theoloeca, and conclusions were then reached in the light of' the

principles of ethics, epist8llolog, and rational pqchology-the whole being
bued upon Thomiatic metaphysics.

Eight years later, after publishing HTeral articles on the subject,

Protesser Simon, now at the Uniwrs1ty of Chicago, gave tt. Charles R. Walgre

1

2

Foundat.ion Lectures
theory of aut.horit,..

or 1948, in whioh

he presented a .rurther development

ot his

Thes. lecturee were published in 19S1 b7 tile Univerait,.

'tJ.Dder the title PhilosGP&

!>! Democratio GoYemme~. 2

As the title indicates J

this work deals chien,. with d8JllOCrU7, but ita tirst chapter otters an

expanded analysie of the tunctions of authority, together with a more complete

treatment. at the ram1tications

or the

theory: the instruments

am

fOlWl of

authority, its traD8ld.aion, and its relation to liberty in a democraq.
The subject ot t.he present t.hesis is restricted t.o Preteuor Simon' s

general theory of the nat.ure aDd functions of author.1t,. .. presented in the_
two basic works.

Tb.ey

are the chiet sourou qt the theory available at the

present time, refentnce will be JlBde, however, to SimonIS other books and
articlu which c1ar1.f.y hia basic po8itiODB.3 A discussion of the instruments,
torms, and traum1.sion of authoriv w1ll be included wb.eDllftr 10heae rud.t1.ca-

tiona shed sigJdticant light on tm primary principles.

Finally, a critical

analya1a of tile theOl'7 1dll be presented •

.,

. prot_or Ive8 ReD8 Marie Simon . . born in Cberbovg, France, in 1903,
aDd pUrInlfId higher studi.. at. the Catholio Inatit.ute

ot Paria arid the

2nenoetorth to be known as n.tocratic GO'ferraent.

3J:t should be noted that Professor SiJIon haa not ;yet completed hi. !me...
tigatiOD of authorit)". He 18 at present; .finisbiDg a aeries of twenty-one .
treatise. on philosophical subjects, of which one is entitle4 General Theo17 ot
containing Ita number of thinp which are not in P!!ffi& Ql
Goyerment ......FrOll a letter of Prof. SiJnon to the
ar, tuTy S,
1 9. ct. bib11ograp.b)r tor artio1es by Simon touching on the present question.

if. rJf;

,
Univers1t7 of Paris from 1920 to 1929.

Be taught phil08opb;y at the Catholl0

University of Lills from 1930 to 1938, aDd then, having come to the United
statea, at the UniTeraity ot Botre Dame trca 1938 to 1947. At preeent he 18

protessor of pbilosopbT in the Committee on Social Thought, Uniftraity of
Chic~o.

A frequent contributor to political and philosophical joumala,

Professor Simon i8 also tbe author

or

the following books.

1\

-----

IntroduoUon ~
......
.......--

!! Co~tre (Parls, 19)4), OntiS!! !!.!! Conna1s88Doe JIlOrale
,.
(Paris, 1934), !:! C~ d'lthiople !!. !! Pens.. Politique francais. (Paris,
19)6), Troia LejCOU !!t!! Travail (Paris, 1938), !!!.!2!!..!2 ViS (New York,
1942), March !! Liberation (HUwaukee, 1942), ~o1r !!. savo1r (Montreal,
I
1944), 0cImluni:R: 2! ~!!'!! (New York, 1947), ad !ra1te 2 Lib" Arb1tre
L.0nt010J!!

(Wge, 19S1). He contributed to Pb1l0833;.S: Mature by Jacques Mar1:talll

(lew York, 19)1), aDd one of his _qa, "The Doctrinal Iasue Between the
Church mi

DemocraGy,. is

contained in

I!!!. Catholic

Church

!! _WGr_l_d Affairs,

edited by 'Waldemar Gurian and M.A. Fituimm.ons (Notre Dame, 19S4).

He is also

-

translator, together With John J. G1ami.l1e aDd G. Donald Hol1enhorst, of The
Material !51:c

2!!2!!!!!! §!.

ThOSl'lU (Chicago,

19S5).

As the tttlu of hi. books iDdieate, S11Ion is both a phUosopher and a

care.tal obsel"ftr of modern political and social problems.

tradition of Maritain, be is
fotmdationa

ment,

or

vi~

A Thom1st in the

interested in both the philosophical

democracy and such problema as colonialism, expanding

and the laok of community in modern society.

g0vern-

The gravity of these and

other dUemmaa of our day has not on17 led Simon to carry on his 1nTestigation
into their cauaes, but lends to his inquiry a s1pificance which aus it

wort1\Y

of st11d7.

--The problem of the nature and. tUDctions ot authority li•• at the root of
many modem dil8JmQU.

Colonialia ad the .fight against paternalism in Ana

Africa, the difficulti•• at federaliaa-trapentation

Te1"8U8

centralization,

increasing governmental powers in democraci•• despite ideological tendencies
deep4r rooted in the put, periodic revolution 11'1 maJJf republica, ad of cours
cormmmism, which parada:d.cally promi.e. the wither:l.Dg away ot the State while
imposing the most t71"&nn1cal authority-all of theM problema in the political
sphere derift tram the problem ot authorit7.
social

unit,

the fam1l.)r, faces a breakdOlm

widespread j1.1'ftn11e delinquenq.
added to

the list

of

'Within the state, the basic

ot authority

which is one cause ot

World government and aP8!j':h!id could be

current problema which can 'be traced baek to the tuuia-

mental question ot the nature and 1'w.'lC't1ons ot author1t,'.

The im'estigation

conducted by ProtesSOl" Simon is, cODSeqUently, not only timely, but vitally
important in the modern world.

Oitation of the.. Taried problema dou not, however, am.ouat to the more
fundamental desiderata: stating in euec1Dc\ tenu the buio probl_ of

It is the tuk of the preeent thesis to

authority at the philosophical level.

state and then cr:1.ticiu Simon'. 1mrest1gat1on of the problem at this
fundamental leYel of analysis.
Simon approach.s the statement of the question in ...
Na
....t.Ul'e
......

!!'! Functions 2.!

Author1;tl in two different wqs, one more speculatiTe, the other more practical..

He begins with the obaerYation that almost all 80cial thinkers haft

accepted the relation
of authority
aDd.
liberty
as
__
.•.
, _•.
• ,_ ...
_'.,
•. _••
~-~-.'~

~'

_~, '~'_."

"_~

.,._~.

~_~>._._

,~_,-_n,_

CD8 of

inverse proportion,

.... ____ >v-,~.... _ _ _ _ .,,,_ _ ~ ... _~,,,_, _ _ ._~,, _ _ _ _ ,~_ ..... _ , . .... ~_ _ • ___ - . _

Bedioal anarch1ats excepted, no social thinker ever questioned the
fact thBt. social bappineu 18 based upon a telicitoua combination

,,,.

of authoriV and libert7. HO'nV'er vague and ill-d.fined our concept8
authorit,.- and liberty may be, we realize at once that authDrity
aDd liben,.. are at the same tu. antinomic aDd compl_11tal:7 terms.
By sa} ing that they are antinadc terms, I do not mean that their
8JltillOldc charaoter is absolute and unqualified. I mean onl.7 that,
in a certain sense and to some extent, those terms are undeniably
opposed to one another. A. to the1r complementar.y character, it is
quite clear that authorit7, when it 18 not fairly balanced b7
l1bert7. is but t~, aDd that liberty, whep it 1s not. fairly
balanced b.r authority, 18 but abuift lice. . .4~

liote that tor 81aon pure author!t,.- and pure liben,. are impoes1ble.

Therefore i t "unrestricted liberty aDd boundless authorit;r are fictitious

conceptions I each of which implies ita own negation together with the ann1h:1lation of soc18t7 • • • the e ..ent1al question i8 that of combining r1ghtq tJle

toroea of authority and l1ben,.• ..5
Baon s.,.s that in a particular case th18 t.lioi1;oo combination depeDd..

upon the prudence ot the bud of soct.V, b1:rt since uniftrsal ....nca aft~(
involTlMl in the cont1.Dgenc188 of a:ietential occurrences, this head. needa

.

fJ

principles to guide him. in determining tlw proportion of authori't7 to liberty
which the given situation demaDd..

This probl.m of proportion aceordiDg to

principle. 1. what Simon saya determined hi. reaearch: the prinCiples

them8elvea are the object of the 1nYestigation.'

But, he continues, the general problem Jllight be atated in a more concrete
~.

Modern political and social consciOWlnes. "erldencea an obscure belief

>:eWe,
6xbid.,

-

-

p.

2.

p.

4.

6
that the progreS8 ot :treedom is ~ou with .ooial progress • • • • _7 EYeD
cODSel"Yativea admit this beliet t accusing liberals only ot going too tast in
the quest tor a degree of liberty which society 18 not yet ready to as.1a11ate I
Tbua tlwy admit, no le.s than libera18 and progressi"'., tbs baai.
assumption that sooial p:rogress 18 identical with the progress ot
liberty. Now this proptess 01 11be1't7 .i8 ordinarily conceived ..
implying a decay of authOrity, so that three tenne, social progress,
the progress ollibe1"t7, and the deoay of authorlt)", are ~
identified. liIhat are the implications and what is the value of
theae id.enti:t1cationa1 This 18 a quution that _ shall be able to

solve insotar as .. shall be able to point out the principles
involved. in the noti~8n of author! ty and libert7 ae oppoa1te ud
complementa17 forcee.
In his later book, l'hilosOJ?!V!'!. Democratic Goye:rJJrr1ent, S1mcm. 1Daugurates
the discussion of authority in the :t1rst cbaj,ter with the following dnelopmeJlt
of the second approach to the problem.

The Marx:lat view 01 authority is one

which aeea ita gradual elimination as a concomitant of the march of progress,

a view which hae reached ita apogee in the CC'aIIIWl1Bt thaor,y of tbe state. The

state is ult1mately destined to wither awqJ it 1a not, as in the Fuciet
conception, an absolute good, albeit caused by the enl in men.
hand, the tttotalitaria increase of the powers

ot the state ia a

On the other
tamporal"T

measure necessary to bring about a social structure that will render the state
u:nneC8SS8l7 and

-

7Ibid., p.

establish forever the brotherhood of men. ,,9 Yet, Simon pointe

5.

8I'bid., p. 6. This was written in 1940, and subsequent references to the
optimi'itiC v1ew ot. progress in Simon's works re1'lect the partial disillusionment
01 the optitnists due to the outbreak ot war and the realization of modern
barbarity. ct. ~~ot. t!!!.
trans. Willard R. Truk (New York, 1947)
pp. 84-103, 'Where '"llii !>iiIli'iitni 0
s1llusionment i8, bowYer, pushed back to

yeai'

the First ltJorld

war.

9nemocratic Government, p. 3.

7
oft, CCIIInuniama did not originate tb1e theory that the state. \dll d1Jtappellr whe

erll i . finall7 td.ped out and pe_ Natored to .oc1et;t.
cJemoCl"l\CY which tiret worked out the

Simon neall. to our m1nda the

~

~.

t..

It . . rather libe

1Ihat wU makes

ot Toa Paine: "Sooie1l"

va. UJd IO'ftInWb'lt; b7 our 1d.olcIdneeel tt. tOl"lm' promct.u

State neOM

ill prod.uoed by

0Ul"

bappiDNJe

positivel)" b)r uniting our attecti01'.l8, the latter negativel,. by rutra1ldng
vi.. • • • the .firet; 18 e. patl'Oft, tbe

0Ql"

1e.n • pun1aher. ulO

T.b1a claM10 statement of liberal. d-.oorae: neat1J 8lBUAri_, aeoord1nc
to S1aon.. tba tbeoJ7 that IClgemraent 18 nmdered J38018111lt7 DOt

b¥

ctet1~

....JJ.

!hi.

the0r7 which he calle

b7

~ deftcd.enC7 ~

tlleor7.. ..,.. S1mcm, is not. to be oontueecl with

the

~re,

but

at IO"Iftw '"
theol7' de-

eeri.b1na gfMIl'lIII8JJt .. • neeess8l"1 m.l, 81noe • Fuc18\ held. tbe state to be
_

ab80lute pod,

altboulh _de . . . . . .rr

by

t_

...u in an.

Nor

ie it to be

oontused with a e:yateutlc dAttttnd.nati.OIl to prcmtnt avergonnl'l8llt baaecl on the
'belW tut -\he

~

eoe1al happineatt reaulte :hut the operetlO!1 ot lnd1-

"f"1cba11a1Uat.1....., aed CD the

~_

that theN a1.atft . . .

--rtnc

tOlW in _ture which 1noonap1CMOUl.y d1recta cbaft. OCCNr'Jl9nceatward

det1n1te pal.12 1.'b18 _tura11eti. epUldsm

Oft

vhioh earl)' 11'bere11a tJlr1W1d,

. , . S1mon, baa beoaae ou.taoded . . to '\be compla1t1..

-

12Iblct., p. 6•

sa.

or modem l1te.

The

8
liberal of today consequently favors more·;overnmental activity rather than
less, on the grounds that it has become a necessity for the preservation of
society.l)
Simon cogently points out that in tems of the det1c1enq theory this is

a. bewildering s1tuation.

It evil alone makes govenaerrt necessary, then "a.

demand for increased government aotirlty means either increased evil or better
awareness

or evil

cases it is

the taR of the attar ia that in

or both.,.14 M

pro~,

mazor

especially teebnological progress, Wich aeems to call

for more governmental actiYity.

Simon wUl deftlop thill idea later on, when

he di80U8aes essential functions

at

author.l.t7" and sbow:.sthat walth increues

the choice of means, renderinl authority more necessary than ever.

At present

he is content to draw the conclusion that i f progress demands more government,

it i8 more necess81'1 than ever to check the d1aorder17 growth of the .3tate
"by the power of clearly defined principles."lS

Up to this potDt, the etatemeD.ta of the prGbla de'temining the nature of

the inYeatigation have been entirely those of Protessor Simon, drawn from the
opening sections of his two prlnc1pal works.

No critical analysis has been

given, since the final chapter of the thesu haa been reserved for that

purpose. It would be advantageo_, b.oweYer, to sUJI'm18.rile here the state of
the question as Simon eventually presents it, but to accoapllah this task

-

13Ibid., p. 6.

-

15Ibld.

9

adequately it will be necessary to go beyond these opening sections and draw
upon material "Which he presents under the consideration of the functions of
authority.

The puxpose of this briel coupectus of the irIV'est1gation, which is

not Simon's

CMl 88

regards organisation and therefore repre.sents a statement

0

bow the writer of this thesis understands the problem, is OM of achie'9'in&

greater clar1ty and precision in the treatment of Simon's theoJ7 as a whole.
Simon baa said that the general problem is to find principles for the
right combination of authority and liberty.

raced

by the

state alone,

but

This problem is not one which i.

bJ all societies. Therefore the problems which

Simon deals with are not purel,. political, although
th.,. apply pre-em1nent17
,
most

C8888

to the state.

Since author!t7 and l1ben,., acoordiDl to SiIIIon, are at the s _ time

ant.inomic and oomplemental)' terms, it is to be expected that two general
principles, antinomic and complementar, in character, will emerge from his
i:r.rteatigation.

This is in fact, the conclusion of _NB._t_u_re_

!!!!. Functions 2!

Author.l.n 111 80 I!VIlIl'lJOrda, although the same principles are not exp1icitJ.y

repeated in PhilosGp!\!

2! Demooratic

Government.16

Again, the preblem of authority is

-

-

cally-the problem of who shall rule.
of

pol1ti~

questions I

-

not-and Simon sqa this very emphati-

He states that "throughout the history

literature there is a tendency to identify the two following

!.>

whether society needs to be governed and

16c.t. Democratic Government,

pp.

140-141,

given which pSiiJ1el t& two proposed earlier.

!!)

whether it needs to

where three principles are

10
be governed by a distinct personnel • • ••

The constituUon of a distinct

governing personnel has to do with the modalities of authority, not with its
!unctions and the ground of its necessiv.,.l7 For Simon the true problem of

authority, in the sense that it is prior am more fundamental, is whether am
on what ground.s

s~

should rule and others obey in general, not in particular

whether there should be arJf authority at all, not whether this or that person
or group should exercise it.

This is the problem to which Simon addresses

himself.
S1lIon hold. that author.l ty baa substitutiorial ad e.sential functions, a

distinction which is extrenely important to ¥-s lIbole theory.

If authority 18

substituting for a delicien., 1.e., the lack of something which should be
present (a privation), then autherl. 't7 is not essentially playiDg its own role
it is makiDg up tor a deficiency which in the natural, unimpeded course of
human progress (whether in the individual, as he approaches maturity, or in t

SOCiety, as it deY810pa the ab11i\7 for self-gOYermaent) will gradually be
supplied by trul.7 natural. -ana. Tbws he sap I
The inabUity of the minor to goyern himself, to pursue his proper
81_ by h1maelt, is always bued upon SOII8 deficiency. This
deficiency mq be UJlDatural am abnormal, as in the case of the

inaane or feeble-mimed, and then it is a privation in the strongest
88.e of the term, m evil. It may be, on the contra17, natural and

l7Ib1d ., pp. 37-38. Maritain, in his book Man and the state (Chicago,
1951), j)iiTses Simon for this distinction: "Professor sliOn his rightq
st:resaed the fact that the basic problem of authorit;y (as a right ot people as
a whole) comes prior to the problem of the necessitr for having authority
entrusted to a distinct governing personnel. "-F. 127, note 11.

u
normal, as in the cue of the child, and then it is no evU, but onl7
a privat10tl in the broad Dense of the term. In any cue, the notion
of minority alwa,'8 refers to the lack of a quality which should be
possessed if one is to be a parsen in the full "nee of that 'Word.
The gOV'erning reason of the father is substituted tor the reaeon of
the child 'Which i8 not yet fully developed. and laben the worldng of
reason is pathologically hampeftKi in an adult, an officer repree.ming society subetitutu his reason for the deficient reason of t1'11s
iraume or feeble-rd.rded person. ltJ

The dew that authority haa only these substitutional functions 1s
precisely the deficiency theory.
'fbe impcrtant question which arises in connection with these two claa_

of functions is the problem of their limitation.
exerc1eect in its aubatitutional functions

s~hov

Should authority
provide for its

88

01m

liquida-

tion b;: educating ita subjects out of their need lor it? Is there some
prinCiple of autonomy ..mich postulates that man should rule M,msell it he is

able, or that smaller cO'IIaunitiea should be free from larger units insofar as
tbe)r are able to gOV'em theuelvu'

'fhe other min claas of functions is called eeeential, this group i8 made

neoeaaary by the very nnture of :man

88

such, as a contingent being, a social

being. an intelligent being whose own knowledge is, hC1W'8Vl:lr, limited in that
he cannot know tree .future

events. Do such essential functions exist' The

de1'ic1ency theoty would deny that there is

an)'

such funct1on, and would go on

to poatula.te the gradual dec:reue of authority insofar as the deficiencies

whioh slcme make it necea.al)' graduall)' decrease •

•

~ature and Func't:lons, p. 1.3. The example given refers to individuals.
but the' sa:m.tJ wOu'rd hOld true of Q wale people in a state of minority ~'ith
regard to the ability for detemining their own affaire.

12
The assumption that autbority has but substitutional functions
bae far-reaching consequences, for i f authorit7 is made necessary
by deficiencies alone, it 'Will be deatined to disappear insotar as
the deficiencies which make 1t necessary disappear. This UtN'lllPtion doee not mean that authori t7 will ever vanish complete31': 1t
is clear that the child will never be able to accampl1ah self..
lovernaeut;" and that there will alwqs be feeble-minded. and v1ck:ed
people. It neans that the amount of authority necessary in a
society is inversely proport.ional to the perfection reached by that
society and by the persons am the elementa17 groups which compose
it. At the ideal term of human progress, the field of autbont,
would be limited to the go9'8l"1'ft8nt of the youflieat dlildren. '!'hu,
the law of progress 1IlOuld take the fODl of an uymptotic CUl'Ye at
whose unattainable term there would be a complete elimination ot
authority .19
On the other hand, i t there are ....ntial functiona of authority, then

authorit7 might remain the s.e, or

eYen

increase,
despite the elimination of
,

detic18Dcies. Notice that one can hold the gradual dieappearanoe ot authority
wich is eubet1tutional,
will increase, but

OIl

am

at the . . . tile hold that authorlty as a whole

entirely dUferent grounds, grou.nds lIhich are 1DUmatel7

linked to the nature of man h1.uelf, and will thU8 never decrease or disappear.
Can a principle of authorit7 be deftloped trClll auch enential .tunctiona?

Tbi. manner of stating the question 18 not Simon' 8, but it has two

advantagelu

that of unifying Simonis presentation and that of linking each of

the two m.ajor d1rlsiona of functions of authority to the two antinomies and
oomplementariti.s of libert7 and authorit)r.

is deriYed a principle of
the grounds

au~

From the substitutional functions

which limits them--net being justified on

or their own essence, they have need of 11:m1tation,

!! ...ext
.........ra
...

From the eS8ential functions is derived a principle ot authOrity which

19~., pp. lS...16.
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jUBtUi&S th.......being based upon nature itself, they are 11m!ted. by their "

-

essence.

'.l'h1s would seem. to be 'Wb.at Simon set out to dO in Nature and.

Functions

2! Authoritlro

.

aDd the same approach underlies his investigation in

hie secoDd major work. 21
One last consideration seems called for in this diDCU8sion of Simon. 8

research. Han arri somety can be conceived either staticall,. or d)rnam.icallyeither with de.t:lc1encies which are a given fact, or with defi'3iencies which can
be overcoue.

Since man aa an 1nd1'f'1dual certain'17 overccnes deficiencies on

his wa,. to adlllthood and as a social being bas certainly avercOllft many of them

since the daTs of primitive society, Simon'a
eonoeive

maD dynamioa11,.~

~heor)"

18 valuable because he dou

He relates the qUestion of authel'1ty to the

question of progress.
Granted this importance of progre.........md it is both good history and good
metaph\Ysioa, since all beiUgs seek their per1'ection--it follows that useful
results can be obtained .troa considering the fUllC'tioions of autborit)r in a

community of pertect.1,. intelligent and virtuous men. 22 Here there would be
place for essential functions onl7.

This ia what st. Thomas doe. when be

considers whether in the state of innocence man woUld have been master ewer

man.23 His answer contains bJpl1e1tly both of the principles which Simon aeeka

2Opp. 46-47.
2lpp. 140-l4l.
22Nature and Functions, p. 16. ct. Democratic Government, p. 19. where
Simon potiiES outtlid suCh societies are ver,y rei! at tower levels. A famil7
of this type can and dee. exist.
~.!., I,

96, 4, quoted

in Democratic GOV'emment, pp.

59-60,

note

23.

to demonstrate. The problem oould be stated in this tUhion, but s1nce modem
secularists do not bold Or:Lginal Sin, S11n.on posits instead
ideal term

or

busnan progress, whicb they do hold.

ot

1Jmocence an

It is an excellent 18tbod-

ology for distinguishing the authorit7 made necessary by man's deficiencies
from the authority demanded by his nature, and for formulating prinCiples which
take into account mants dynamic thrust toward tMt state of perteetion.

Simon's ill'V'estigation of the nature and functions of authority, then, 18

an inquiry into its
liberty.

meta~8ical

grotmds

This is his great contribution.

length on the origin of authority without
still

mote

88

the

anti~

and complement of

other writers have expatiated at
sh~

its essential. functionaJ

have discussed the instruments ot authority and the fol"J!J8 which it

may take in society J but very few baTe treated of the basic grounds of
authority itself.

One can search ltmg hours in vain for anything similar to

Simon t s research, though elements of the solution are certainly in Aristotle
and

st. Thomas. 2h 'l'hroughout the history ot Western politioal thought the

de.t1cienc1e8 of _Dkind have been taken for granted as the justification of
authonty • But with the riae of communism. and secularistic humanism, which
claim on the one hand to overcome man t s defioiencies by changing h1mIan nature,

2UUSing these elements, u well as other Thomistic principles, Simon has
oonstructed what this thesis therefore calls a "Thomistic theory of authority."
But there is no unified theory ot authority in st. 'rbomas, just u there is no
ttpolitica" of st. 'i'h01lla8 in the sense of a 8)"8tematic treatise. The De
PrinCim has little to otterJ only the tirst book and part or the
se
are cons ered authentic. The most important material is in his
philosophical and theological works. Cf. A. P. dtEntrevea, ed., A~naat
Seleoted Polltioal 'hi"iti!1J8, trans. J. G. Dawson (Oxford, 1948), p : t t .

Re"

15
but are forced on the otber--by their own deficiency theo1'7-into still greatex

totalitarianism, it becomes imperative to examine more profoundly, as Professor
Simon has dODe, the deepest roots of the nature and :functions of authorit7.

CHAPTER

n

THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY

Sim.on does not go deeply into the nature of anthonty b,. wq of phenome«

nologioa1

ana1)"'818~<or

a1'l historical study or the tera.

It is rather by way ot

a complete analysis of its tunct1ons. he says, that a satisfactory det1n1t1on
can result.1 Nevertheless, he gives a prov18ional definition bued upon CQllooo
JI.OJl

conceptions a.t the beg1nn1ng of h1a inquir;r in _N4_t....u_re_

!!!!. Functiona !!!

,

Authoritz:_

"Authority 1s an active power, residing in a person and exercised

through a c01mlSl1d, that is through a practical judgment to be taken as a rule

of conduct by the tree-v.Ul of another person. ,,2
In diecussing the elements or this def'1ni tioD, Simon does not spec1t';y wba

he meana by an active power, but beg1na

h7

~-ing

that the seat of authority

must always be a person. Authority can DeTer take the form of an impersonal.
necessity, as Rousseau would have it.

IlWhen Rousseau urges the educator to

have his pupU taught h7 nature rather than by men, to baTe him dependent on
things rather than on persons, to have him led by Wlex1ble law rather than
by the edicts of any human 'Mill, when he

2Ib1d., p. 7.

16

Sa.YS

that the ehild must act b7

17
necessity ami not. by obedience, we realize that he establishes the formula of
every anti-authoritarian

pedagog.,.3

A dieression on Rousseau and other adversaries ot Simont s insistence on

the personal source 01 authority se_ to be in order at this point, in order
to briDe out more clearly and by way of contrast the nature of authority in
Simon's theory.

In Philosop&

!! Demo~ratie

Government Simon take. on his

principal adversary to personal author11,J'.

S1mon explains that Rousseau was determined to do away with obedience to
persona and to find instead a tom of association in which each person, while

uniting himself with all, mq stUl obey
be.tore.

Thi8 he .toUDd in the theory

~

only and remain as tree ..

ot the General 't-.'lll, whiCh is not a
I,

person at all, but an impersonal being which a man may obe7 without 1..8 of

fre«tom.

S1mon rejects thiB theory, of course, but savea hiB greateat oriti-

c1am far an aspect of Ro. . . .u.s political philoaopl'q' which va deYeloped into

what Simon, tollowing a suggestion of one of its adherents, Paul-Lou.ia Courier,
calls the "eoaob-dr1verlt t.heory of gove1"l'Jlll8nt.
in Rousseau u

in ethen,

)'"81;

'l'hi8 theory i8 not so o1:tt1.ous

"Rouaseau bas probably done more than anyOM

elM to spread the 1dea1 of an organisation capable ot doing awq with the
ethical substance of autbortt,. and obed1ence • .4 In briel, this theory holds

'Ibid., ct. J. J. Rousseau, Imile, eel Flammarion (Paris, n.d.). I,
quoted~Simon in the note to 1#h1s section.

~rat1e Government, p. 148. This exp'lanation of
theor,y

18

Gken frOOI

is;

79-81,

the "coach-driver"

Chapter on 8O'f'ereignt,. in demoC1"&CJT, pp.

146-1S4.

18
that the govemment is like a coacb-driver
case by the people.

who goes

where he is told-in this

Insofar as the governing person is oonaidered a leader,

his is a leadership w.1thout authority, the people obe7 th. . .lves &lema.
This doctrine, which looks

80

deceptively like a theory of sovereignty ot

the people, seems to explain the operation not only of direct demoerac1ea like
New England town .eU ngs, but .....n of representative foma of government.

realiv, it 18 maaked

anarcl\Y, for both

In

of these forms are endowed with real

1001 o'f authority. Even i f the people do not transfer authoriv, there is

still a qualitative d1tterenoe between

ot the oitiHDS taken u private

8J~

~embl)r

indirlduals ami all of them gathered. in an

af£a1rs 8l'1d rul1Dg by majority vote.

moral person, which
who vote 1d.th

law

1"'Ul.e81

obe7

In the latter case, it 1s the

authority is earciaed by this person.

b0d7, a
'1'rue, thos

the majority u;y seem to obe7 oDly themsel..... When tbe7 obey the

the7 voted for, but wbat of those

they

in charge of OCMIllun1.V

for utilitarian 1'9UODS

in the minorit)r? Some would reply that

onlT, but

tbi. approach to goveft'JDJent not

only weakens the unity of .oc1Hy--it oannot explain the universal eonriction
that law bind in conseience.

In a direct dellOOraoy 88 _11

a.a in I1t'ltT other

s,..rtem, Simon oonolude., the nature of 800iety d8ldllda that man should obq

JIJBIl?
In Nature

~

Functions

!?! Authoritz,

Simon

l'8StmleS

his exposition

ot the

provisional definition with a second observation, that this insistence upon

SIbid., p. 154. Simon points out that the "ooach-ciri'Yer" theor.Y
influer;;t the French Revolution and its followers, particularly in Latin
.bleriea. It is . .11 described in Jacques Mar1tain, SCholasticism and Politics,
(New York, 1940), p. 93.
---

19
personal exercise brings out the difference between author.l:ty and law.

Law

be conceived in a state of 1mpersonal1ty-we oan speak of natural laws blnane
in the impersonal course of wents.

In a lengthy note to tb1a explanation,

Coneidering the civil law

Simon expanda upon the point.

of a _ries of Ian (which it ii, eoad

!!!), we see

88

the pr:llle analoga

that thie positive law

participates in a higher law, the natural law, found first in human reason, bu:
onl)r because recognised

u

immanent in human nature.

If we stopped at this

point, nature would be an irrational ult1-.te, not itself an ordinance of

reason; therefore we must go beyOlli and see that the natural law participates
in the eternal law, the

:ntUOD

of God.

Ul~te17'"

IIl'Iilf!rt arrive at a person.

But wi th authority-, on the a\ber band, Simon hold. that _ 1Jmnecliate

reference to a personal intellect and a personal will is

appare~

essential

to the notion of authority. r.• cannot conceive authority without it, although
we are able to conceive law without it, due to the state of impersonality

enjoyed in nature by the natural law, one of the analogatel in the aeries.
pr1.me analogate of law qUoad !! remainl, of course, the eternal law, which
engratts participations of itself in created :naturel, ldlich participations are
then recognised ~ human reuon and either promulgated al obligationa (in the

cue at bUllUUl nature), or expressed. in scientific law (in the cue of non-rational beinga).6
It law and authority are taken in their most lomal sense, Simon deClare.

then they are opposed just

88

md:vereal necessities are opposed to the ccmere

-

6Nature and Functions, pp_ so-S', note 2. Simon points out that the
definiUon ofTaw iilnn by st. ThCIWJ in S.'1'., I ...II, 90, refers properl:y to t
law issued. b)' state society .--P. ,0.
- -

I

I

20
and contingent

aspects o£ the real. This is not to say that Prar.!len.ce has

nothing to do with laws, however.

In the issuance of those positi.... laws

which are not mere deductions from the natural law (E!! modum deduction1s)
but are positive determinations of it (Ear modUlI determtnationi!,> p1"Ud.enttal

reasoning is certainly called for.

B7 means of this two-fold derivation

of

positive law from natural, Simon contiJl\18s, st. Thomas accounts for the
traditional. distinction between the 1_ of nations (jus ,entia) and civil law
properly so called (~us ci"ne)~

!be former, because it can be deduced from

natural law, is established by danonatrable sc1ent1f'ic reuoning and thus

pertains to moral science rather than to

p~ce

and authortv, i t authorit,.

is to be identified with governing prudence; the latter, because it cannot. be
deduced from natural law, is elaborated by i.nc:lemonstrable prudentt91 reuo1'l1ng

and thus pertaine to prudence and author1ty.

'!'he law of nati ens is above

authorit,-, the civil law is issued 'by it.
'lima, in Simon's view, authority does have

_11

8.8

the executive power.

Ii

place in the legislative u-

Nevertheless, he says, when taken in their mest

typical torms, law and authority are said in contradistinction to one another"
se1.t~ aJXl

demonstrable principles (natural law md law of national

realise more completely the ideal. notion of law than do prudential determinations (civil lava); authority, on the other hand, reali ... more completel7
the ideal. notion of social prudence when it deals with particular and concrete

circumstances (executive decrees) than when it deale with more general and
lasting situatione (civil laws).
of law

Thus there is almost an inverse proportion

to authority u one passes trom natural law to particular e:xscuUft

2l

deareea.

7

By stating

that authority is exercised thro!;!&h ! command, Simon wishes to

emphasise the distinction between authority and coercion, a distinet#ion 'Which

is important but frequently not made.

"A common mistake is to identity

author1v with coercion, which 18 but the most conspicuous of its instruments.
In the system of Simon, author1t.y bas two instruments a persuuion, in which
authority is les8 apparent but n<methelus real, alI'1 coercion, in vihich it is

more apparent but often le8s effective. Persuasion is a moral force, a causal
process 'Who. proper ei'tect 18 the origination ot a certain disposition in the
will

~

persOl18J coercion i8 a physical force,, a causal process whose proper

effect 1s a mechanical causality exerted. by man over man.
the functions of coercion in a note in
point

or

Natu~

Simon expanda upon

!!!!. F\mctiOM,

taking as his

departure the articles in the S18na Tbeologica (I-II,

91, 1) where St. 'J.'homaa discuss.s the raiaon dtetre of the

9S,

State~

1 and I-II,
Simon s878

that although st. Themae understalds the power of coercion to be the distinguishing feature

ot state society, th1s implies neither that

ethel' t;ocieties

lack sene power of coercion, nor that this power is the .scance of the state.
The state alone has the power of unconditional coercion, but this power is

0

7Ibid., pp. 70-73, note 10. The reference to st. Thomas i8 to §/t", I-n,
9$, 2.~ conclusion ot inverse proportionality is based on a statement by
Prot. Simon in an inteJ"rlew with the writer, July 11, 19$9.
8nemocratic Gavemment, p, 7. (The italica are in the original.) In thi
book SliOn dtscUsses a!£ 1iilgtb several probleme related to the instruments ot
authorit7, such 88 the borderline between them, threat, psycbieal coercion, t
right to coerce, use of violence, and the distinct!ve stand of democracy
regard.i.ltl the instruments. ot. pp. 108-127. These questions remain out.ide t
scope of the present thesis.

i
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a characteristic property following from its essence.

9

The third element ot the definition, continues Simon, is that the comma.nd
18 to be taken ----..............
as a rule of conduct.
,

Authon. t,- is not essentiall)" a principle

meant to determine a theoretical judgment in the subject, because such a.
3udgment depends ideally upon its object as the "only sufficient principle of

its determiDation~.,lO It tbe subject believes a proposition because of the
autJlorit)r ot a teacher, or, in the cue ot supernatural faith. on the

authority

or

God, then this authority is a substitute for tbe evidence of tbe

truth t4 the proposition.

The acceptance of this substitute 18 provisional,

until the student or belifmtr can aet.ual17 see
, tor himself' the truth of the

propoa1tton. which aloae necessitates the intellect, he must be satiaf1ed with
author1\y. When tM. truth is po••eseed, howeYer, ita substitute ia no longer
n8CeU&r1.

A Iftate of perteet10 baa aucoeedecl to a state of' imperfection.

"Faith 1s the be,1md.ng et eternal lite and it will no longer be necessary or

possible when the eternal life will be tul17 possessed.

In other words, the

autbor:t:ty of Qed md tie Chvch, lfhich determines the faIth-assent, substitute

here below tor the e'Y1cience of the div.1ne Truth which will beatify our

9tiature and Functions, p. S3. Of. also Democratic Government, p. 109.

theory ia the 'wIe ot COerCIon tor ji;di!igogical
purposes which he thea cites from St. !homas. This, however; is not .saential
to Simon's theory ot nature and functiOns, except insofar as hie emphasis on
the pedagogioal character of substitutional functions influenoes his later
statements ot tll9 relation ot authority and liberty. It. is more important to
the problem ot authority in a democracy_ Cf. Demoor!tie GcYern1llent, pp. 115-

Import.i for""Yrm'Ojii s iiGr

122. .

.,

lOtwature and FUnctiOns, p. 9.

Simon says here that the theoretical

jud~.' 3ure thoroughljr determined by its object) otherwise it is not

perfeo\.

-

23
11

intellect. in the promised vision."
lie

In the case of a reliable w.ttness, whom

believe, the term authori;tiy is taken in a less rigorous sense, sinee he is

not empowered to oblige us to be1ine him.

tilt i8 clear, on the other hand,

that this authority improperly so-called, is but substituted for the evidence .

12

of facts Which we are unable to s" for ourselves."

Simon baa little more to s81 explicitly on the nature of authoriV.

As

he ha.e stated, a complete analysis of ita functions is necessary to derive a

sstisfacrtory de.f1nition.

In Democratic Govel"l!lll8ut Simon make. the statement

that ftauthorl.ty, aocording to the diversity of its functions, calla for di'ftrse

interpretations i.ft tenu of toundationt duration, relat10n to progress,

aDd rel etion to freedom •

.;u

Since he doe.

s~ this,

it might be wll to list

these functions as he pl"fJ8eD:ta them in Democratic Government.

or the functions of authority set forth in this
chapter does net cla1m to be complete J a complete list wuld
comprise (1.) the substitutional function exercised by authority in
the order of theoretical truth <mansteri't; 1ft.aching authorityft) J
(2) the substitutional fUMtion exercta8a
authorit7 in the
guidance of iJlI'IUlture aDd deficient persons or soc1et1e. toward. their
proper good (patemal authority) J (3) the substitutional f'lmetion
exercised by authorit7 in the unification of action for the common
good 1ilen the :means to the common good 1s uniquely determined (so
that there should b. unanimiV)' (4) the essential .func't1on
exerc1aed by aiiE1iOr1ty in the unification of aotion for the common
good when the mane to the CGJIIIOD; good i8 not uniquely determined
(80 that there is no ground for unanim1V)n'$} the most eesential
function uerc1sed by authorit)r in the volltion of the O<mm1on good,
aDd of the 1ihol. of the common good materially consideredJ (6) the
'l'hus the anal7811

n Ibiel.,

-

p. 11.

--

12Ib1d

l3nemocratio Gcmu"nment, p. 7.

perfective function exerciSed bJr 8uthorit} for the imprO'Vl!ll1ent of
people ""ho nre already good. 14

Thwt Simon Btq. that authority has three substitutional functions, of 'Which
one is in the oroer of

theo~t1cal

truth, two essential functions, of lI,ilich one

1. more essential, and one perfective funct10n.
Sinee the nature of authority ia under O1n8ideration, it is important to

consider whether author1t7, in Simon's a,stem, is an analogous tel'Sll. !be

etat.e!wnt that it calle tor diverse interpretatiOns in terms of toundat1on,
dUl"ation, relation to progress,

am

relation to freedom, aocording to the

diversi:,,. of its .functiona, might. seem to indicate that the use of an analog
,

is evident.

yet this requires careful clarification, for the requirtNJnts for

an analogotJll use Il1US't be stated.. Simon says that the criterion is vbether or
not tta d1tterent1a is extraneous
I

am

added to the common g1"cund; it it ie,

there t.e uni'V'oc1ty, am if it 18 noto, the" 18 analogy. In his theorr, u 1t
has been presented in vr1tten works, the question of whether authority 18 an
artalogoua term baa not been made per£ectly clear, he admits, but it is a queation 1fhlch he is currently investigating; tor the present he 1s willing to stat.
that there 1. certainly an analogous

U88

of the term when speaking ot the two

orders of truth, the thecret10al and the practlcal.1$ Fl'Q?l this one 'lI'l87
cODOlude that Simon did not intend an analogous use of the tem u conring

15Theae statements coneemins a.:.nalo~ were made

intel"9'1eW 'With the writer on July

by Professor Simon in an

11, 1959. He said turthenaore that he ,,_

preparing an article on analO§ tor publication in S&'V'eral monthe.

all the functions, but rather preoc1Dded frem the question.

The instruments of authority have been mentioned ilUJofar as they

light upon its nature.

the

S8I18

reason.

out

A word shou.l.d be said about the foma of authority

tor

Simon says that authority can be exercised in various forms,

but that there is a basic divi.elon ot tbeee forms into two kinds:

I refer to the distinot,ion made by st. Thomas betweea the so-called
dom:5n1um, ~ serv08 and the so-called dominiUlll sup!r liberos, let
us
CioifiiIOn ot servitude and dOldnion ot Sedam. 11il8
distinction is taken from the ends pursued by the authorl:t7
exerciHd by one an O¥'er anot.ber. when a JI8I1 is governed for b:le
own good or for the oaamon .good of the society ot which he is a
m.mer" thia man is said to be tree. On the contra17, one who 18
governed tor the private welfare ot a master is said to be a slave.16

8.,.

l

Simon points out that this is not the same a' the distinction between the

::!I!!!n Eo1iticmm and the

t;eE!!P d;e!£e!iCNmt

which 119 based on a d.1!terenoe in

efficient caual1ty, i.e., whether the subject bas the right to resist. Nor
does the distinct10n between substitutional and essential .functions correspond
to the distinction between the two great kinds of dominions which constitute

17

the basic divisions ot the forma of authority.

.

This vhole quest10n 'Will be

considered later on in the disCtl8sion of authority and liberty.
One last consideration concerning the definition proposed by Simon should
be mentioned.

the word

~,

He s8J8 that autboriv 1e an active power, but be does not \18.

a term \18ual17 employed by Thomistic and other Scholastic

16Jfature and Functions, pp. 33-34. ctt. Democratic Government, p. 74.
iO"'"SE. 'l'tiomas ie to S.T., I, 96, lie

The reference

--

17Ibid., pp. 34-37. Simon questions whether Aristotle b1mself perceived
the disl.!nction between the dominions and the regimina. Of. Nature .!!!
Ftmctions, p. 3" and p. 74, note 12.
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authors to denote a moral power, a legitimate claim, to exact obedience.

18

yet Simon does ..d.sh to include this notion of obligation in his provisional
defi.nit.ion, as is shown b)' his use of the words !2!!!. taken, words which show
19
that the command ought to be obqed..
Add!tiomU evidence for this interpre-

tation is hia stateJrtent tha.t the authority of a mere witness to some truth i8
really only authority improperly so-called,

unleS8

he baa some power

to oblige

us to believe him. 20
Does this obligation to obeyauthori__ bird in consoience' 8imcm would
say that it does.

In Ph1losOS>&

!! Democratic Gover.maent

be sqs that "thinp

talce place in civil relatiOns, not ezcepti0llll1y but regularly, as i f some men
had the power at binding the consciences of other men.

The factual behavior

of man in soeiety testifies to the regular operation of an ethical moti.,.. of

obedience ••21
But, be continues .. it is not true that a man can bind the conscience of

another man; God alone
the fact of

80C1&1

call.

And

80

a paradox ari..8.

How can we account for

life without us1llling that a an can bind the co_clence of

18ct • Jacques Maritain, Scbolastie1sm and Politics (New York, 1940), p.
92. "I shall mean by tauthorIt:7' t& rIiJitTo dlrect and cOlJD!ll.U1d, to be
listened to or obqed. by others. ADd I shall mean by 'power' the force, which
one can use ••• (to) oblige others to listen or obq." Cf. als. J. i)onat,
8.J., Ethics. s~. (Irmsbruck, 19.34), p. 64: "Auctoritas est iue membra
etficaii!ter in !iiii soc1etat1s dlr1gen41.

19This statement was confirmed by Prof. Simon in an interview 1d.th the
writer, Jul7 11, 19$9.

--- - -----,

20Nature and FUnctions, p. 12 •

......

2lDemocratio Government, p. 145.

21
his neighbor?

He then dUCU8ses the coach-driTer theory, which proposes a

solution to the dilemma by de~ng that man' s conscience is GTer bound at all,
only to reject it as false and ecmduc1Te to the destruction of socie.

secession.
God I

The true 8l18W8r, he

b7

sqa, lie8 in the nature of man as created by

"It gf1f'emment, as d.18tinO't 1'rom unamJdt,., is ade necesaa17 by the va

nature of thingS, the obligatioft to obey has its roots in the
. very.......nature of
... ---.,~~-

,

-

things, 111 the ver,:__~~~~ of man and of human

resol'Nd.

8ociet7~ It

~

The paradox is

only God can bind thecouoience of a man, but God can bind a man

to obe',y another _n.

"This he did by the oreation of the human speCies, which

is naturally social and political, for the neoessity of gove1"!'llll8nt and obedi-

ence follows from the nature of CODIl'IlUD1ty life. ,,2)

-

22Ib1d., p. 154.

2.3S1m.on t s use

of this pared_ led to criticism, however.. In an otherw1.se
faYorable review of PhilOSOf& of Democratic GOTermnent published in The
PbUosORb1oal Review LXI ( pan~2),
entItled NAn Amb1gu1tY"111

1,e:m,

PrOl:'essor menls ~08()J>l'ly of Democratic Government, tt Professor Arthur E.
MurJ>b¥ of Cornall cteC!;u:;a:that §&(in ill s\ateieii'G a'Sout binding in CODSc1ence
allowed of a very unf'aYorable interpretation. He thought Simon might be understood to hold that God tranamits to men in toto His own power to bind consciences, so that officials haft a kind or polltical authority over consciences
which men must acknowledge on the author!ty of the officials, making it immoral
to disagree with the governiiiint.. He seemed to doubt that Simon was avoiding
the pitfall of delivering the source of the obligation to obey into the hands
of thoBe to be 0'be7ed. Greater familiarity with the SCholastic tradition,
plus a mere careful. reading of the lines quoted above (which establish natural
law as the ground and limitation of obedience), might dispel this doubt. Yet
Simon himself, in an interview with the writer (Jul,. 11, 1959) admitted that
his own presentation was not entirely clear and thanked Murphy for his interest
aDd his cr.!. tic18J11, which, he said, had set him to consider the process of the
binding of conscience more intensely, and ask whether Ood alone can aetuate
the spiritual faculties of nan.

28
By way of conclusion to this presentation of the nature of autborit7

according to the theory of SiII'lon, it should be pointed out that be does not in
'h'Orks

subsequent to Nature

~

Functions

!! Authori'V

give any further defin1-

tion of authority or elaborate specifically upon the elements of the pradsi
al definition which this wert contains.

The student must follow Simon's word·

of caution and derive his own complete definition from an analysis of the

functiOns, and hope that Simon himself, when his investigations are complete,
will provide that finished definition 1hicb it is the task of philosopbical
research to achieve. 24

24S1mon says that he carefully refrained from giTing a definition of
Quthorit7 in Democratic Gove:rmnent, since he was considering it in act.u
exercito. He QIeves i~ Getter not to give a complete definitiii
all
problema have been solftd.. -- IntormatiOJ1 from an interview with the writer,
JUT 11, 19S9.

unm.

CHA'PTFR In

'l'1tB SnBSn'l'UTIOIAL F'JNCTIONS OF AUTHORITY
The substitutional lunati.ons of author1t, are thoee 'Which are _de

neces8a17 by some detic1enc;y in man. Simon elaborates on tte concept of
detioieDCf in ftl'i 0U8 place8 and

way..

He says that the concept adm1Us of

degrees, but it alwq8 a1gni:tiee the lack of a perfection that a eubject

should poues. in order to .atisfy ful.ly the dernanda of ita natul'e.
,

l

A

d.ef1ciency 1187 be an eril, as is the abno:rmal condition of a teeble-miDded

adult, or it may not. be an evil, as the 1Dnatu:re condition

of a child i.

not,

in the former ClUJ. it i8 a privation in the strict sense end in the latter a

pr:1:rat1on only in the broad sense of the tem. 2 More spec1f1ca1ly, a de1'1c1e
C1 mq be the lack of intelligence in a ohild or student. who cannot greep the

evidence of a demnstraUonJ.3 it

mazr

be the lack of maturity necessary

••It....government in a child,h or in a 8ocd..etyJS it m&7 be a lack

genoa, knowledge, or information, or

~ratic
~ure

,

-

GoverJ'lJl8nt, p. 8.

!!!! Functions,

Ibid., p. 10.

p.

13.

eYeD of

tar

or intelli-

requ:1.site virtue in a no1"rI18l

';0

person.

6

To sum up, a deficiency 18

Ii

privation either in the strict sense,

:,hen it is an evil, or in the broad sense, when it is not.

By privation, Sim

means libat Aristotle and st. Thomas understand. by the term as it is explained

in the Meta;e!lYsics and the Ct'llIBften:!:!I.1
Since S11'llon's

do~r1ne

of the

f1rn substitutional function

of authority,

the teaching function or mg!8terium, has alreaq been presented, and since

this function dou not play an important role in his general theory, the
follow1~

S\BII!lsr.y should suffice. Teaching authority is exercised. in the orde

of theoretical truth when the authority of the teacher substitutes for the
evidence of facts which the subject camot

g~.up

erldence of the object is the only caus. which
of the intellect.

by himself, although this

C&Il

S!. ~ure

determine the as..

It is authority in an analogous senae, since it is not

exere1sed in the order of practical truth, and i t the person belierved has no
power to oblige the subject to believe him, then his authority is onl:y 1mB
properly so called.
Although the teaching function does not enter into the general tbeo17 of
authOrity of Simon, he does call attention to the connection between the mode
struggle for liberty frOlr1 gOYernJUent and the rejection of author!ty in
intellectual matters. He says that the "histo17 of the modem struggle for

-

6tbid., p. 28.
7Intol'DU'ltion from an interview with the writer given on July 11, 1959, b7
Professor Simon. Simon rejects entirely the notion of metaphysicel evil, he
sa;ys, ad denies it exiate. For him mere absence of a perfection cannot be a
privation.

.31
liberty is to quite a large extent made up of a rebellion against the imposition, upon the human mind, of any definite way of thinking.
is above all a claim for the freedom of thought • .,9

teaching function is constantly

neoe8~ary,

Modern liberalism

And yet, he continues, thi

for the "most learned treatise of

science contains mlatively few statements that are fully evident to the
author:

around this nucleus of personal scientific certitude'is organized a

buge complex of statements which are simply believed on the authority of other
minds.;O The liberal refusal to accept map.sterium may be a tribute to the
ideal of objective evidence, but it is also a proud refusal to recognize that

for the htDUn mind the acquisition of truth

~s

a slow, progressive and alwlqs

precarious achievement. Most of all it is a "monstrous spurning of the moat
invaluable g1tt that the div:ine generosity could make to man, the revelation

of the secrets cd divine life • ..11 Thus for Simon the teaching !unction is a
necessity in this l1fe, both in mattel'B of human knowledge and of Faith.
The second substitutional .funct1on of authority, says SilIlon, 1s paternal

authority, that authority exercised by one person over another in the practi
order on the ground that the latter 1s unable to rule himself.12 He continues.

9"L1berty and Authority, ff Prooeedi§lS of the American Catholic
Philosge!lical Association, XVI (19&0),
• --

-

l~d., p. 101.

l~ature and Functions, p. 12 •

.......-

... - ......---
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A minor is a person supposedly unable to govern himself, that is, to
provide for the right order to be assured in his actions, even within
the field of his personal aims. A minor is supposed to be incapable
of knowing what is good for h:i.m-..th1s is why another person has to
guide him in the very pursuit of his proper good • • • • This is
the case wi til child ren and this is also the case witil the insane,
the feeble-minded, or the criminal, who are legall)" considered, as
well as children, to be minors. • •• The inability of the minor
to govern himself', to pursue his proper aims by himself, is always
based on sone deficienq.13
Note that paternal authority is exercised over a minor, and aims at the
achievement of his E!:2P!r good, apart trom any common good which m8f be
involved.

It is bued on a defieienG7 and is therefore substitutional.

Lastly, adds Simon, it is pedagogical and aims at its own disappearance, which
,

follows from ita substitutional character.

ifIt is wholly good tor a child to

be guided by a JIlature person, but the main purpose of this guidance consists

in the attainment of the ability to exercise self-goyemment.

It paternal

authority remains neoe8sary put the earliest possible date tor its disappear-

ance, it hu failed to a degree, it it intends its own maintenance and manages
things in such a way as not to have to disappear , it is gu1lty of abOJ!dnable
abuse.,.14 This pedagogical nature of paternal authority, so obrious in the
family, extends also to ita other fields of exercise, which take their name
from its tamilial use, "following the good. usage that extends to the whole
genus the name of the most familiar species • .,l'

-

l3Ibid ., pp. 12-13.

~atic

The order of sentences 1s changed..

GoYermnent, p. 9.

33
Simon gives some examples of these other situations were paternal autho
ity i8 exerc1sed.

First, it used to be thought that all women were in a

pennanent state of Jd.noriVJ consequently the law gave the husband, rather or

t,. over them-until the feminist movement challenged

guardian paternal authori

the tradition, but mista1cen1yargued for an end to the lmabandfs essential

authorit,,- in the man and wife communitY as wen.16
SecoJ'ldlT, a sul1er 1000rmaental unit such .s a city may be subjected to
the paternal authority of a larger unit, i t it i . not able to govern itself.
This illustrates Simon's statement that the 2rOE!r good of the subject to be

achieved by paternal. authority 1s not

nece88~ril,.

an individual good.

case of territories in the United States is well known:

The

their legal status is

one of 11nrnatur1V. until they are ready for statehood, the federal government
subjects them to guidance

!! their

~

..
a:tf
....;.,;;a1;;;;;;;,l"8
... by means of patemal authority.

The guidance is substitutional because it supplies for the defieiellC7

to which

a new area of settlement is nomally subjected, and it is pedagogical because
it aims at the temination of the state of minority and the confem.ng of
statehood. once the territory has achieved DIIltur:1ty.

The same principles shoul

hold in the caae of colonies being governed. by other powers, but Simon says
that; the extrea frequenc.r of abuse gives an appearance of dishonesty to IitJ.'1'
interpretation of colonial rule in tenu of ethics.

Yet the concept is

intelligible, and the conditiOJUJ under which it finds expression are by no
means fictit1ous.17

-

16Ibid., pp. 9-10.

:..nYOLA
""j

"IE" ".1 iTY

)

Simon here adds that the ground. tor patemal authority have not alway8
been _de clear in the cue of colonialism.
,,"hen European nations, for exanple, subjected to colonial rule the
tr:i.be, ot ECplatorial Africa, their action was rendered suspicious
fran tbe beginning by the tact that these tribes were not, prior to
the establish:meut; of power by conquest, contained in th.e nations.
Pla:ialy, there is no grOtUKl tor the patemal author.lty ot ODe
community ovel" :..,-ther unless the latter is contained in the tormer
as Ii chUd in nis ta.mil.7. The colonization of African tribe8 by
European nations had an ethical title it, and only it, the
colonizers aoted as agents of the human COIIIIWlity, then entire17
unorganized. With such attempt;s at the organization of the human
co1lll1Un1ty as the League of Nations and the United Nations, things
became definiteq clearerJ the character of colonial rule 8S
paternal a~hority was proclaimed and to SOllIe extent sanctioned.
!he very substitution ot the words "mandate" and tttrwrte.hipft for
the word ftcol0tJ7" signified that the juetiticat.ion tor the rule
over primitive peoples resided in duties of paternal authorit7 to
be discharged by mankind toward 1mmature societies .18

It 18 interesting to note that Simon repudiates any ground tor paternal
authority in a specific cue \U'lless the subject is contained in the rulinC
cOlll'!1Unity as a child in his £amil7_
of authority, tlB que8tion

be.

In the sale wq, then,

ot

-

Here he 18 diSCUSSing the second question

-

whe shall rule and 'What his specifiC title mq

OM

could speak at a lather's specd.tic right to

patemal authority OYer his children becausethq are his own progel')7.

But

this is not the same .. the jwrti1'1cation of paternal authority in general, and
he does not descend to this secondary level very often in his il'lVes1iigation.

Thirdly, Simon cites the ex.aDt>le of paternal author:i:tq eDrcised within a

country by an upper group over a lower one, as in IIorth Africa, the southern
states, and the Union of SOtl'bh Africa.

This i8 usually based upon the

as8'l.Jmption that the lower group 18 incapable of majority, and as a result it is

-

l6Ibid ., p. 12.

contained 'Within the cODlJl1Ull1ty (ideDtified with the upper group) as a ldnd of

permanent guest under paternal rule. lJbile this sort of authority has opera
widely for centuries, in our time it does not work eitller harm.onious1y or
silently.19 'l'h1s colonial rule at home is related to the consenative the017

of the common people, says Simon.

The few men of wealth, property and educa-

tion identify themselves with the nation} the many are like an inferior race,
and _lee up a distinct community inside the

state which is gO'lerneci by the few

t.b.ey are in a clas8 with children, the feeble-m:1Meci, felons, primitives, etc.

This feeling of paternal responsibility by the few may be sincerely motivated
by conoem for

tm common man, as it seems

t.q be in the caae of the Marxian

theo17 of rewlutionary leadership which declares that the proletariat is not

yet a matUl'e person:
CMl

the few ma7 sincerely wish to turn out from among their

mmaber an ell te capable of gcmtrning the _S8e8 for their own good.

Simon

remarks that there is nothing particularly JO'sterioua or perver.8 about sueh

an ideal, but it 18 not a democratio
ADd ;yet, baTing concluded

}:de

0_.

20

example. of' paternal authorit7, Simon s&78

that all paternal authority i8 animated with a d7Damiam of aut.onaq--1ts very

essence as substitutional entails ita being pedagogical and it must aim at it.

own disappearance I
It is impossible to posit the prinCiple of paternal authority without
positing simultaneously a principle of autonomy. With :regard to the
proper good either ot the individual or of the group, the possibility
of eelt-gOYernment makes it obligatory for authority to d1aappearJ
and the possibility of progress toward selt"goverl'lll8nt makes it

-

19zbid., pp. 12-13.

-

2Ozbid., pp. 13-llt..

o'bllgatoJ1 for authority to follow tbe ways of such progress • • • •
Insofar as goverrlWlnt &Dreis.. paternal authority, it is J.iJ,.ainly
true 'that the best Icwernment is the,t ",'filch goYe1"D8 lea.st.21
-

Nor is this dynamifJll 0:£ al1tortolv cont1ned to democntlc gcwe1"flB8nt &lODe, in

Simon's vi..

tIThe ann1hilat.1on of patemal authonty lnto

autonam:r,

wber.laver

possible, 1s an affair of justice, not an affair of dPocl"8.07• .,22
The thUd subetit.u\ional functlon

or

BUthoritJ is the Ufli£loat1on of

aO't1on 1'or the cc:mrnon good when the mee.na to the ooamtOn good 18 uniQUttl.7

determined. Note tbat tbi• .t'UDat1OD a1m8 at a
good of tbe embject.
~o~

In his

2! A~hor1!Z:t

CflImI\!lOD

11m statement of

goad, not the e3?!r

-

S1aon did not distirwuish between tb1a f'tmct1on and

the one whiOh follaws, the urd.f1oat1cm of HUon for the

-

.

the theo17 1n Nature tmd

~

good 'When tile

means 18 not unlquelf cletemine4. C<msequent17 1.t appeared as an euent1al
t'\mction in thi. work.

S1mon :N'I1sed b1a

As a Nault. of a mt1c1_ by Mari:\a1n,23 b.o'we'nlr,

the.,. ad 1D Pb1l!.!!2!2 !!!. Democratic

~l"J'lII8n,t

made tblll

tbbd tunot1oa fJUb8t1tut1ona1, isolated fl"OlIl it a fourth, ueent1al tunct1on.
ad added
Q

a fUth, eII8eI'It1al tu.nct101'l which

well as the sixtb, perfecti". fUDct1on.

he bact degeloped in tbe

~,

It reu1ns true, hoWeVer, that the

third (substitutional) fun.c1;1on and the fourth (.asential) function remain

closel,. oonneeted, since both haft to do with the unifica1i1on of action for t

~t. 1nt,...., p.

10.
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eaanon good.
Let us suppose, 8a)'lJ Simon, a society made up of intelligent and virtuous

persona. This 1. not a utopian fiotion it
sucb u families.

'We

restrict our view to small

Even in such a COIII'Iftr'!lt.y unity of action for the

tS---y'

CCIfIllOn

good cannot be taka. tor granted, it haa to be caused, and if 1t 1. to be

ateadi.v, 1t baa to be aGorae! b7 a ateacty cause. If the members of a fM117
cannot agree and each go their aeparate

~·I

wtQ'8; CQE)rI

ute ....., at

leut

there 18 no caamon aotiOlkt24 811:\0n then CO!lt1mleat

Now unit.y ot action de~ upon unity or judgment, and tm1t7
of judgment can be procured either by WfJ.T of unam1m1:ty or by wfq
of authority, no third po$Sib1l1V 18 ~vable. Either we all

th:J..nk that _ should aot 1n a certain way, or 1t 18 uncientood
that, no utter how dlwrH our preferences, WI eball
all ~ 1;0 one judpeDt anj foll_ the line of action that it
p~. i-,'hether thi. j~ 18 uttered by a lead:f.ng person
or br the majority or by a majority within a leading m1nor1ty
makes, at thi8 point, little
But to nbmit . . .11 to
a judgment which does net, or at least 118.7 not, express D\V 0IIl
v1.ew at what. .hould be done 1. to db.,. authority. Tbue authority
18 needed to ueure unitJ of q\1or.a it, and only 1£, unanimity 18
~. 'the quution 11 1Ihet.ber UDel'dldtJ CQ be eetabllsbecl
1ft better tban cuual fub10u _eng the pertect17 cileYer and _11lntent.ioned 1Q8IIJbers of a 8OC1eV which 18, by ~1a, hee froIl
det1e1enc1u.2S
amo1'II u

ditt.,.....

Simon baa thuaJ pointed out the real quest101u
COft'll()J1

1f unanirdty oonceming

actions to be undertaken can somehow be steadUr aaured, then there

wU1 be no need tor authorlt)r.

He poe1ts a society tree from defic1enc1.. 1n

order to elimiMte the poa81blli\w that tmanim1ty fl11ght be pl'e'Vented by them,

1f' the problem

Can

be solved in this ideal society, then tbe solution will

.,
~iO GoV'e:mmant, p. lS'.
25xbid•• pp. 19--20.

--

apply a fortiori to societies whoae meJJi)ers have deficiencies, 1n lihich

..............

\ll'18trl1l1 ty 1s all the more ditticu1t. to obtain.

Simon begins his attack on the problem by considering unan1m.ity in
scientific _tters.

"!!!. Jure,

it is always possible to necessitate wvm1m.ous

assent to a scientific proposition, unfolding the demonstration is all that

to be done. Let it be said that a gem:d.nely scieatitie proposition is,
jure, communicable without 11ndta ...26 Be adds that 2!. facto. of course

needs

2!

communicabUity aq be limited 1>7 the accident that only a fn people can
understand the tenu and tollow the demo1UJtratlon. But this limitation is not
caused by the object of knowledge itself,
thought, uatrlmitr 18 guarautee4,

!!!. ~\U'8,

si~ce

"in the field of scientific

by a process of ratioal camnuni-

cation whose possibUity results necusar1ly from the nature of so1ent1t1c
objects. Faultless scientific miDis, no matter how many, would be unanimous
with regard to scientific truth. Q27
Does the same comrmmicabi11ty held. for practical propositions? Do they
posse.s the power of commanding unanimous asMUt when comitions are entirely

normal? This is the next step is Simon's questioning, and he tums to the
Aristotelian theory of practical cenainty and practical trnth as the next

step toward 8Il 8.lJ8Wr.
in the Posterior

-

26:r'bid.,

He 881s that the vexy exacting definition of science

~iC8

seems to make hopeless the case of certainty in

p. 20.

27 Ibid., p. 21. On the conrnunicabUit;,y of scientific propositions, cf.
Nature 8i'ir""F\mctions, pp. 18... 20, where Simon uses the term irrtersubjectivabU.
i'6', an~ blbilography on p_ 62.
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practical matters. 28

IIIf t.he certainty of science dema.ndlt

that the scientific

object shou.ld possess the kind and degree of necessity that is found in
universal essences alone, it seems that practical knowledge admits of no

certainty, for human practice takea place in the universe of things that cam
be otherwise than they are. ,,29 The werld in which we live is a contingent

oneJ events constantly give the lie to our prudence.
1s the man who care1'ully planned a trip for hie
and a child vas kUled.

Simon's example ot this

t8l!d.17. A train

wreck oocurred

Yet the father had a right to believe tha1i he had

selected the beat course of action, although his belief that the trip would be

a good thing wu contradicted by events, his wact1cal judgment was the right
conclusion of a properl,. eODducted deliberation.

The judgment turned out to be

faln, it wu at variance With facta and was not in contormiV with the real,
not certain.

yet it was what 1t was npposed to be, the product of love and

devotion. its agreement with the demanda of a good wUl was certain.

The

conclusion 18 that the "conformity ot a practical proposition with the real
cannot be perfectly established. but such conformity is absolute truth,
theoretical truth, it is not the truth that belongs to the practical proposition qua pmctical.

Practical truth is a relation of conformity between a

j~t or a proposi t1.on and the requirements of an honest will • ..3°
28lbid., p. 21.

~.!., I-I~,

-

4-6}

~1mon refers to Aristotle, Ethica, 6 and

56,~-5J

6;, 2, II-II, 41-56!i BOte 29.

st. Thomas,

29Ibid •

JOn,id., p. 22. Simon cites Aristotle, Ethica, 6, 2, 11.39a21 am
st. Thomai;"!.T., I-II, 57, S ad. 3, he alao says that Cajetan t s commentary i8
ver,y enllghtinrng.
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Simon states that so far as its cause is concerned, the practical judgment possessed with practical certainty is an eDJ!!ple of artectiye knowledp.
In rational knowledge . . do nat. tind the answer to a theoretical question by

being docile to the inclinations ot the heart. But practical knowledge is
different:

On the com.rary, when I am concerned with the question ""'bat do I
baTe to do, here and now, in the midst of thie 'lmique, unprecedented aDd 1I!l1"eD8wa'ble cougeriee of c1rCUJl18tanoea, in order to make
a good use of my freedom, in order to preserve tbe good of
I know that no deduction, no induction, no argtIIJltmtation,
can supply the final 8'lswr. The scienee of ethica, i.e., the
rational knowledge of morality, would supply an initial a.nner but
not the final one. Between tbe last rationally established
conclusion and the entire17 concrete l'Ul.a that action demaJJ1a,
there is a gap that no argumentation can bridge. Doubt cripples
action, or 8I'l uncertain rule i8 isneci, unless the will a.Di the
heart. are so dedicated to the good of virtue that their inolinaUcms Cd be relied upon • • •• Unlike 8cientific judgmem,.
practical judpant, for the wry reason that it is ultimatel7
de'tenniD!Ki by the oo8oure forces of the appetite, doe. not admit
of rational communication. It is, as it were, a secret.Jl

v1rt.1:le'.

Tlms the practical judgment depends upon the inclinations of the

appetite.

More than that, says S1mont

the virtue llhose act is certain

knowledge of practical truth preeuppoees all moral virtues,

am

that virtue is

practical. wi8dOlll, or prudence, the virtue 'Which arrives at deedsione uu.ttainable

b7 scd.ence &10118)2
In Nature

31 Ibid.,

!!!! Functions !! Authorttr

Simon points out that in the

p. 2h. On affective knowledge he cite8 st. Thomas, S.T., I , l ,
ad 3, t:!r, 6S, 1, 2) 9S, 2, ad 1" II-II, 4$, 2. John of st. rhoiai and
Mal"itain are also cited.

6,

practical .1'\111g:rreut, the prudential deoision, there i8 a twofold truth.

bre

is 80me theoretical consideration refer.ring to the reality of thing..

in tbe

example of the man planning the trip the theoretical oonaideration was that the

trip was to be a good thing. This prC'.)'ftd to be untrue J events
was not in oonformity with fact.

t:;:},owed

that it

'l'h18 theoretical consideration implied in the

practical judgment -cannot be established with an entire certainty' because we
are unable to overcOJI!8 the Jq8teri.s of contingencyJ because we are unable to

see the future with certainty • .,33 But there is another truth in the practical
judgment: ita conformity with right appetite-not the truth of
but the truth of a direotion.
ma;f

Ii

oognition,

'h'hatever the factual consequences of a decision

be, there can be in tbat decision

III

steady prinCiple of indefectible

truth. nO't theoretical but praotical truth. That pr.i.nciple is prudence.14
Simon goes on to sa,. that t:lere is thus

III

possible d:iscrepanq between

the pract.1cal Talidity of the prudential .1udgmant and that of ita theoretical
implications.

No _tter how careful the deliberation preoedil'll the prudential

judgmeat, it cannot demenatrate it8tbeoret1oal oonolusions.

Continpnq

at W&JS leaves room for possible 1aokof oontormity with reall't7. If it were
possible to demonatrate the theoretical conaidera:tions darivad. f:rom tbe
deliberation. then the practical or prudential judgment would foUow

-

34Ibid..

pp. 25-26.
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necessarily am ahare their erldence.3$

_-

As a result of this train of reasoning, SimOD. concluded in Nature
.............. and

Functions

.2!. J.utbori:t?z

that the prudential judgment is never communicable, or,

to use the tern he then mnplored, 1ntersubjectivable. Bince the theoretical
conclusions upon which it is baaed carmot be demonatrated, it can never be

shown that this or that practical judgment, to be taken as a rule tor

action, is the 'best poasible

0JIe.

COIIIIlOn

Therefore Slt'J member of the cOlmllUnity could

object that another course of action 18 better.

Therefore all members must

submit themselves to one prudential decis1on--..,hich is to obey authoritY"

Authority is always necessary, i f CCDmOZl actioD is to be agreed upon.
an essemial function of authority band. upon the nature

or

'I'his is

the prudential

judgment..36

In a review of Nature

!!!! Functions 2!.. J.uthor1:2,

Prof.ssor J acquea

Maritain praised Simon's work in general, but took issue with h.1.m on the
qUestion of the communioabUity of the prudent1al. judgment.

Simonis positiQl1 as follows:

He

SUlftS

up

even in a COIlIlfttnity of pertectl;y intelligent and

virtu0'U.8 men the necessity of a ruling authority .1.s required by the nature of
things, since in the order of prudential. judgment no agreement is certainl:.r
and

!!. ~ure

to be expected even trom such

1Affl1:J1

Then be 8878 I

.'36n,id. ...

3>Ibid., pp. Zl-28.

pp. 28-30, Thie paragraph is a SUJlma17 o! the argument and is
not comple""ii:' !be argument vUl.. however, be ginn in greater detail, ld.th

qualifications, in the following chapter.

---

37Review ot Politica, III (April 1941), 2$2 •

.......
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Now this seems to be certainly true even of perfectl;, intelligent
and perfectly well-informed _n. But it they are at the same time
fifrteotlLvirtuous, what must .. say? Prudence as such is
iiilIIb J therefore, i t ,. suppose two na11 pertecUy intelligent,
well-informed and v1rtu~.t placed in the same circumstanou, will
not the prudeniril. 3uClgment; or these two men necessarily b. the same ..
since in both of them i t is taken in conformity with an appetite that
perfect v1.:rtues cause to be right toward. the em? If such is the
ease, we should say that in a eCllll'llUmt)r made up of perf'eotl.7
inten.~p,ent, well-informed and Tirtuous huDls.n beings, there will
surely be agreenent _ong t1iiii !ii the prudential judgments concerning the good of this cOl'llllUnity,-an agreement which ie not due to
~ demonstration, but to the common rightneu of their appetite for
the end.l8
Simon ac1c:nowled.gea the val ue
Democratic Govel'lDnt.

He

s~,

or

this

enticism

in Philos!!'hjt

!!!

"In an earlier writing on the subject of
,

authOrity I stated that, on account ot the incOJtlllmlicability ot the prudential
judgment, unanimity in practical matters is always precarious or casual.

I

wish to criticize this view, in which I nOW' recognize a serious error • .,39 He
adds in the footnote, "! was assuming that rational C01'I'IDlUnication alone can

assure unity of judgment. For the correction ot this error, as _11 as tor
countless greater blessings, I am indebted to Professor
H01iItI'V'er, Simon qualifies Marl ta1n

Maritain.~O

f" criticism when he adds,

of the plurality of the means is not coD81dered here.

"The problem

Plain17, 'the

CCImllOll

rightness of their appetite tor the end, t which causes unity tdth regard t.o the
end al'¥i the 'necessar;r means, does not cause unity with regard to a particular

39DamocratiC Government, p. 25.

-

40Ib1d ., p. 2$, note 15.

h4
means in no necessary connection with the end. n41

Simon then giyU the example

of a nation attacked or threatened by another,. when fighting alone can presene
the common good. Yet it is never possible to demonstrate that whceftr 1ewea
the common good mu.st support a poliq of war.

war is risky, al'¥i abstention mq

not bring about the supposed mls. .A single policy is imperati'ft, howewr.
Now even i f all the citissens of the nation _re rlrtuOUB and enlightened, unity

could not be acbieved. by ratiODal cammunication, b.T demonstrating a proot. But
there is another possible cause of 'lD'WI1mity, for "the analysi8 of practical
judgment, which rules out rational cODIllum.eation as a stead7 cause of wwdDd:t7
in these "'litera, shows also that a steadJ cauee of unanimity is found in the
inclination of the appe'liite, whenever the means to the common good i8 uniquely
detemiDed.

If, and only if, there is only one .means to the co.mmon good 18 the

proposition enunciating this means the only one that adldte of practical truth.

It is the only one that conforms to the requirements of a properly disposed
appetite, a.nd a properly d1aposed appetite cannot make aD7 other proposition

42

win assent. fit

In the example giTen, the nation whose common good de.ms a

policy of 'War, wwd.m1ty can be caused h1 the Tirtuous inclination of the
appetites of tbe c:I. tisens. What of those who might refuse to fight, even
though the common good demands it? Simon says that they might do so because
they lack intelligence, information, or Yirtue--but that in any case "their
error is det1n1te and traceable to a deficiency, l!lh1ch mayor m.ay not in'V01ve

-

41Ibid., p. 26, note 15 continued fran p. 25.

-

42Ibid ...

~
pp. ~27.

bJ

guilt."

Unan:1m11;y must tollow i f all the citizens are virtuous.

fhis happens not rarely, sqe Simon, 'When the means to the cammon good
is

un1que~

determined.

In the da11,. life of small cGlllllUnitiea unanimity pia,..

a great part as a factor of un1t:l.ed action.

In larger societiea such as the

nation, the surpr1a1ng thing i8 not that complete una.nim1ty is never realised,
but. that sit.uations closely resembling it frequantl7 arise when them is a

seriGUs threat to the

COItIIlOn

good.

In such 08S88, unanimitr' _eng the

substmtial major! t7 of those interested-mo are perhaps only a minority to
the nat.1.on in themeelvea-sutfioes.

It mq be doubted wether a Heiny withou"

this ability to achieft unan1:trdty in the hour 9f peril still retains the

character of a cOl'lllllUn1ty, tor disintegration has gone so tar.

Its hopeless

plight bears wi 'brutss to the nomalit;r ot unanimou assent by _au of affective
community to the uniqueq determined _ana of cCIIImOn salvation. Authority,

then, i8 normalJ.y required. in such cases only inaotar as w1Us are weak
intellects ignorant or blinded.

and

1,,4
Ita function remains nbatltutlonal.

In a later work, however, Simon adds something to his consideration of
this substitutional function ot authority.

He s478 that in most cues there

ex1et mare than one means to the common goodJ in tact, i f one takes into

account all the particularities and modalities of the meana avdlable, this
uniquel.J detexmined _ana to the common good in never fOUnd. 45 1'0 apply this

-

43Ib1d.,

-

pp.

re-29.

44lbid., pp. 29...30.

4S "!'he

Doctrinal Issue Between the Church and Democrac;y, It in !he
Ca.tholic Church in World Affairs, ad. Waldemar Gurian and M. A. F1ts'il'imnona
(Mm ~ame, !9S4j, p. 10'.
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statel'lBnt to the example given above, aDd derift the conclusions which follow,

Simon 'WOuld

~

that while a policy of war was the uniquely determined means

in general-a _ana which would obtain unanimous support through affective
communiV am.ong virtuous and enlightened men-this policy would neTer be
uniquely determined in all of ita JIWI1 details:

how m~ troops should be

employed, what strategy should be followed, etc.

!here is alwa)"S room for

disagreement on the detaUs of any mums, even 1£ the
uniquely determined. 1'biB possibility of lack

~

means

as a whole be

unanimity points the way to

the funet10n of authority which ie required in such cases, a tumUon 'Which 1s

essential.

CHAPl"RR IV
THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF AUTHORITY

After determining that authority bas substitutional functions, Simon

qs in Nature

!!! FI1nctions 2! Authoritll

"The question is now whether

uthoriW has any essential tlmctionJ whetber the necessiv at authority alwqs

sults from some deficiency, whether author!t71 when necessary, is necessaJ7

olel7 on the ground of SOIlle defect in the one who is subjected to it.,;t He
,

n begins bis malysis of the prudential judgment and finds the ueential

unction of anthonv in the unification of action tor the common good.
1 - - - - -......

o the

of Democratic

~

In

GoYermnen, on the other hand, hie theory has deYeloped

where he couiders authority as a cause ot united actio1'l in two

: tint, when the _ans to the common good is uniquel1 determined, a
tion which he shows to be substitutionalJ _conti (1)7 ... extension of the

sae argument), when the _ana is not unique17 determined, a function which be
hows to be e8sent:tal. 2 The latter function is concerned here.

In this demoutrat1on, all that has been said of t.be prudential judgment
1 applies.

Simon says that i f there is mont than one JJW98llS

cammon good, there 119 no to'llDdatlO1l tor unardmit;y;

1\
.......
_ __
lNature
and _
Functions,
p. 14.
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arl)"01le 'If1If1

ot procuring the

disagree and

48
preter another means, and this 18 true eYen in a small societ;,y.

He gives the

example of whether tratfie should drive on the right or the lett side of the
The common good demams that one course ot action direct everyone r S

road.

driving habits, but it does not, prior to a decision, demand that a particular

side of the road be chosen) itdemalJds onl7 that one mean. be decided upon, but

turnishes no help in the decision.

there is no foundation for

Since both pe.sibUitlu are practicable,

unan~m1ty

in the matter, Sftd the question must be

decided by """'&'¥ of authorit7. 3
Let it be asked, continues Simon, whether this function ot authority is

substitutional or es.ential. But this invol"., a more basic question:
the plurality

ot the

IB8.ll8

since

is really the caue of the need tor authority, the

real question is whether this plurality is itself caued by a deficiency or by

the good nature of things.

0nJ..y- in the latter case will this tunction be

....nUal."
The

schools

or

SaJJII

queation was asked. and answered, he decla.rea, by various

scientific anarchism, which de.cribed the 1ndeterrdnation of the

means as but an appearance, due to our inabUity to identif)' the proper meana,
if we knew more, i t our lnfornmtion about these possible means were complete,
we should reaJ.ise that only one mean. wu really the appropriate one, was
really uniquely" determined.

As 1t is, authority has to substitute for thi.

determinate knowledge of the situation.

-

3Ibtd., p. JO.

-

4Ib1d., pp. 30-31.

Its role remains substitut1onal.5
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Simon presents a similar argument f or the de.t1cienCT theory in Nature

!!!! Functions 2! AuthorlW,

where he discueses the argmnent of P:roudhon that 11'

we knew all the laws of social. science the7 alone would suffice to operate
society md authority would

CODMqUen't~

be unneceuary.

Simon writes.

I want DOW to consider the fiction of a society ruled by laws 0Dl7
and which, on the basis of ita being per£'ectly ruled by laws,
should be able to do without .,. authority. This fiction, familiar
to may liberal. IUd to some anarchist., il most clearly' described
in the earliest writinge o£ P. J. Proudhon. There, we find the
idea that there are objective laws of social behaTior which are as
determined and neCU88l"7 as pb¥8ical lava, and are :t~ 111 the
COl.1rH of social events just as pb;fsical lava. previous to m.v
consideration by the humaa understanding, are 1mma:rlent in the
course of phpical events. For the la ck of a sufficient knowledge
of the social Nature, for the lack o£ a: reuon .uffic1entl7 aware
of the objective laws of society, we seek a precarious salvation
in our J"8liance on the vi_om of a kiag, or, what lJIIounts to the
same re8\llt, on the wisd.cmt of popular soverelgnty.6
Not only the objective laws of the real are truly reliable, but continue.

Proudhon, and therefore the true

SO'Dl'09

of

sO'Uereign1;y

18 not a human will,

whether it be that of the king or of the people, it is reason alone, as an
impersonal i1'lterpreter of laws deri'V1ng from the nature of' social things and
finally identical with it.

The progress of social sciences will graduall,.

establish the rule of laws and do a'WIIT with authority altogether: the reign

of reason wUl be the realization of anarctGr.

7

Simon retu:tes this contention in Nature

.!!!!! FanatioDS 2!. Author!;tl when

he shows that the contingency of existential occurrences prevents the precise

confonn1ty of the prudential judgment in its theoretical aspects 'With reality

~ture and J'Wlctions. pp • .30-)1. Simon introduces this discussion by
referring to his preYloua comparilon of authority to law} cf. !!Era. p. 17.
7Nature and ~tionsJ pp. )<>-)2.

-
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as it turns out to be.

The laws of the social world, insOfar as tbey' are to be

discovered in things rather than made, express only the universal am necesaa17
aspects of social beings J they do not and cannot take into account contingent

events. Even it we were to kntJv thaae laws periectly, they would not proride
us with any demonstrable rule o£ conduct regarding our behavior aid the

contingencies of existential positions.8
In tel'mB of S:lmon's theory as presented in his later work, this
anarehist· theol)'" has alread7 been refuted. in the consideration of the pruden-

tial jurlgment., which baa been explained: 9 !'he laws of social sciences, being

scientific propositions, would be truly

co~cable and

would thus furnish

II.

baais for unanimity, but they would never furnish the baais for unanimit)r in

practical matten UDl..s the mellDll under OO!l8ideraticm were tmlquel.y determined-and trren then affective community liIOuld be neoeesary to supply tbe

essential foundatlon for urtan1m.ou asaent, since the practical judgment is
simply net the same as a scientifio judpent, it has a double truth.10
Bu.t the more re1'1ned theory 'Which Simon pre.ents in PhU08!p& !!

Democratic Goyenmant, whUe etfeotiru7 refuting his earlier statement of the

6Ibid., pp, 32-33.
901'.

!!Era, pp. 38-42.

lOSimon shows that Prou.dhon came to realize the impossibility of unreatr10ted liberty when be realized that social science would never admit of
infallible applications. In Du Prine!E! 1'~ratif (1863), Proudhon
acknowledged the permanent neCiss!\7 oraUUiOi'i£y as a prinCiple ot arbitration
in particular cases, due to conting.nq.-..
Na....t...Ul'e
....... .!!!!. Functi~1 p. 69.

argument. of anarchism, i tseli' suggests the further 00 jection \fhi ch Simon haa
brought up for coneideration:

perhaps the greater knowledge of social soience

envisioned by anarchism would lead to complete knowledge of the means to the

common good and thus make eYeJ7 means uniquely deterrdnedJ authOrity would then
be unnecessal7 11' the virtue of the citi.eu provided. affective oommunity.

Consequently, Simon takes up the quest.ion of the cause of the plurality of

means.
Simon giTeS the example of a fam11,. deliberating about its 8U1!I!ler

Tacation:
and

SOlIe

SOlIe

would like to stq home,

to the seuhore.

SODe

would like to go to the hills,

Here is a pluraUty:of

.au.

Wbat

CtI1U8&S

it?

ODe

reason for staying at hCDIJ is the high coat of going elsewhere J thus pOYerty

makes for aique determination.

II\-Jealth, on the contrary, makes fm' cho1.ce,

this is what man of property know 'Very well, and poor people still better.,.u
A reason tor not staying at hale might be tbe health of one member of t.he
family J t his would rule out the pOHibil1ty of stay1ng home becane. that

person needs a change and a rest.

'1'be choice between the hills aDd the

seashore might be dictated by the restlessness of
seashore tends to 1ncruae reetl.s. .s..

S011e

members, since the

It nd.gbt also happen that a fud17

feels obliged to go away for its vacation in spite of financial strain because

e. young man is going through a period of moral uncertainty and needs a change
in enrlro.nment.

If all the family, on the other hand, are robust characters,

then it makes no difference where

the,. gOI they haTe a larger choice.

short, "sIeal th, heal til and strength are factors

llDemocratic Government, p. ,32.

th~t

In

cause independence from
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particular courses of action. • •• Destitution, Ul health, uncertainty,

wealmi.ls8, are factors that cause dependence upon deteminate means.

Plenitude

causes cholce, poverty leaYes no choice • .,12
iilrthermore, although a deficienq such 88 lack of knowledge might make
the genuiDe means undi8tlngu1ahable and cann an apparent plurality were there
W8JJ

nOlle, a society of enlightened persona wood, other things being equal,

enJoy much more choice than a. society of the ignorant.

An enlightened society

would not need authority to rule out 11111$0%'7 means, but it would need author1t.

more tbal ....1' to procure united action, for, thanks to more knowledge and
better lights, tlB plurality of the genuine _ ..s would have increeaed aoneid1

erab17. .3

Thus, ••• Simon, the function of authority 1ib1ch procures united aotion

when the means to the

C01IIIlOn

good Ill"e eeveral, does not disappear but grows,

deficiencies are made up, "1t orlg1lultee not. in the detects of men and.
societies but in the nature of society,

It .i8 an essential function • .,14

Simon ellPlains that this 18811e is otten beclouded by a confuaion

ot

freedom and indet.e1"JBinatlont
In tact, freedom is indifference, and there are two !orta of 1DdUterence. There 1s the passive indij"j"erence of the Imleteminate

-

·14lb1d •

a8

subject 'Whim. can receive 81y ot several determinations precisely
because it is indeterminate. The highest degree ot such 1nd1fterence is reillze4 in pr.lme m.atter • • • • Not.hing is turther
removed from treedom. than the indetennination of matter, for
freedom is maste17 and. proceeds not from. a lack of determination
but fran a particularly full and hard kim. or determination. A
free cause is a superdeterminate cause. The trouble comes freD
the fact that theae two opposite realities-the indifference of
indeteminatiOft, passivity, inachievement, and the :1nd1tference of
auperdetem1nation which 18 freedom-have in comm~ the property of
being distinct fran sheer determinate causalit,- .1;)
Be goes on to explain that there is in the human wlll a oombination of acti'Ye
and passive iId1fference, i.e., of freedom and irresolution, so that psycholo-

gists, when they do not altogether del'\Y freedom of ohoice, generally trace it
to an uncertainty or imperfection of the

will.~

In the same way, social

thinkers, confronted by a seeming plurality of means, trace it to lack of
knowledge--not seeing that plurality can be caused by excellence of knowledge
and

power.

In both cases the lIliInmderstancl1D1 of ind1tference results from an

insufficientl, elaborate notion of cauality.16

In conolusion, it i8 interesting to note toot Simon gives credit to
Taparelli d'J.zeg110, wbo as early a8 1840 emphasized the function of authority
as a cause of united action.

However. he did not to Simon's knOwledge distin-

guish the substitutional funetion of authori

t,. when

the meaDS i8 uniquel7

jdetemirad. Taparelli wrote:
In short, being endowed 1dt11 intellect and free-wU1, the membera
ot a society JI'ltlSt tend by serveral means toward a common end J they

lSIb1d., p.

3L..

Simon refers to

st.

'l'bomas, C.G., I, 82 arr.i John ot

st. Thoma.s~t18 philosoph1cus, IV, q. 12, a. 2J C'Ursua theo1op.CWS, I, diap.
24.. a. 4, I-tt, d'iap. " a. 2.
l~atic Government, pp. 34-)$.
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can choose between those meana. Since diverse and opposite means
'WOuld abolish social unity and d.estroy the essence of society" it
is necesea.r.y to baTe an intelligent principle regu.l4te the mind8 and
impress the sarile tendencies Oft all the wills. Now.. call
authoriV this power which bind8 all members .of societ7. Thus
authority is an essential elemnt of soc1ety.17

The problem of united action just considered has to do with meane to the
common good.

'!'here is, howeyer, a more basic operation upon which this depends

18 Eridentlyt there would be no action
the volition and intention at the eul.

to be unified i f man had not prev1ousl7 agreed upon a good to be pareued
through this common action-a cammon good. It i8 with this more basic operation that the HcoDri essential function of author!. ty is concerned. The ques,

tion is whether the proper intention

or the eoimnon good requires the operation

of authority.

At first glance, it would seem that i f all the members of a soc:1et,. were

enlightened aJIl vil"tuou.s, the.Y would spontaneousl1 1nt.end the common good.
Authority would be wm.ecess8l.'7.

Simon remi11ds us of the words of 81#. Thomas.

"But a man's will 18 not right in ldl11ng a pa.rt1cular good, unleea he reters

it to the

CGIJIIWn

good as an end, since ..,..n the natural appetite of eaeh part

is ordained. to the common good of

the whole.,.l? Of course, i f there were

17Lu1g1 TapareUi d' A_glia, Baggio teoretico d.i drltto naturale
(Palermo, 1840) .. il, 67-68, quoted i'ii""l5iii'OCrailc l1overnment, p. ~.

'W1 tb

l~cratic GoVal"lltllent, p. 36. Simon says that vo11tion is concerned
the eii3' co.asl1.red absoiutely and intention ld th the ana considered as

term of msana or ..t of mans.

I

19s•r., I-II, 19, 10, quoted in Democratic Government, p. 37, note 19,
from Basii triti!!is ot st. Thomas, ad. Knton
'eils (Nev York, 1945), II,

348.

--

o.

ss
stupid or vicious members in the society, they would. have to b. directed or
compelled toward the common good, but good people, by the "Very operation of

their virtue,

88

st. Thomas 8qs, aim at the common good and subordinate to it

their priva1ie advantages.

'l'bua all conceivable .tunction of authority with

regard. to tne "I'Olit10n at the commcn gO<Xi would seem to be subatttutional.

At thie point Simon warns againn the possible contusion of tw questionsr 'Whether soc1eV need. to be governed

am

whether 1t aeede a distinct

goyerning r»r8onnel. 2O For purpose. of the irlYestigation, he say., it is
helpful to keep in mind Itp1cturea of gOYermneut. without distinct gOYerning

personnel, as in the ua. of a New England towr), a SWisa canton, or a nation
dec:lding

aft

1s. . by wq of pleb1acita. !he entirely ditterent problem of the

neceas1ty of a distinct gOYerrd.lJa personnel will be diecussed in another part
of this book •

..n'

How it is entirel7 true, continues Simon, that virtuous people love the
common good and subordinate their choiou to itl
Thus, in a certain val at 1east, the w11t1on and intention of the
ocmmongo'&i aN gua~rtue itself', independently of all
author!
or this !'.!Z we do not knew# 8.8 181$ al\Y'thing, except
that it is esaential aM bUie • • •• The problal, acoordinal7,
18 to de'termine whether the virtue of the private person regards
the whole of the OO8on good or merely some fundamental aspect of
it. If, am onl11t, the latter 1s true, authOrity may haft an
e88e1ltial part to pl.,. in the volition and intention of the eamtlOIl
gocd. 22

t,..

2Oot. !'1W!' p. 9.

2lDemocratic Government, p. 39.

To find the answer to the question of the way in which the virtue of the
private citizen regards the common good, Simon .elects a few tJpical instance••
fhe first i . from

st.

Thoma., and the question

),B

whether the human will, in

order to be good, ought to agree w1:t.b. the divine will.!! '9Olito, in other words j
whether it ought to desire the
divine will.

'Y81"1

thing which is desired or pe:naitted 'by the

23 st. Thomes s8,7s that

wh_ a thing ia good in one respect and bac

in another respect, there 18 nothing wrong about ita being desired by one and
hated by another, under thoee two aspects respectivel,...

Thus the judge has a

good will in willing a t..h.1ef" to be put to death, because this ls just, while
the will of another (l.e., the thief's w:U"e) ~o wishea him not to be put to
death, ina8mueh as killing is a natural evil, i8 also good.

Simon commenta on this e:x:snple u follcws.
Thus the w1te of a murderer bates the prospect of her lmaband' s
being put to death} sbe is normally and virt.uousl1 oonaemed with
the good of her £-1l7, and, from the standpoint which i8 mxi
ought to be hera, the death of the murderer ia an evil. On the

other aide, tbe jtadge, who artands for society, ...a in the death
of the murderer.lamenta of the common good J justice uw:l
d.eterment .tram or:t.me. The common. good, of course, shall prevail,
but, .1gn1ticantlr, Aquinas considers altogether sound and honest
the oppOGition _de to the requirement. of the common goad by the
person in charge of the particular good.24

Here is the :1mportant point which Simon l'rl..hes to draw from the d1seue-

siona

~

Jaarticular loads

~

Jarop!rlz defended

~

erticular

~rsons

matters matlZ !!! ~ common .i.!S! i tsel! ••2S In otbar word., by .fighting for

--

23s .T., I-II, 19, 10.
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the lite of the man whom the common good wants put to death, his wU'e does what

the common good wants her to do.

"It is in a merely material fuhion," aqa

Simon, "that sbe d.iaagrees with the requirements of the common good I

by doing

what the common good wants her to do, she tolW:l1ly desires the common good.
The eanmon good. formally understood is the

concern of e'f'e17 genuine 'Y1rtue, but.

it is the proper coneern of the public person to procure the

COIImOD

good

materially Ul'Jderstood.. wh1dl the private person m&7 v1rtuoua17 oppose.tt26
'When Sbson uses the terms material!l and formally here, be 1s using them

in the

8eD88

emplO78d by st. Thomas in the article of the SUmma'l'beolopca

concerning the agree1I8nt of tbe hurIan wln wi'ttl the diviDe will
which 18 the chief source of SiJaon's demollStrat10n.

define the terms uplic1t1:r, the example. which be

!! _v_ol_i_~_o.,

Although Simon does net.
giftS

are sutficient to make

their meaning clear. This is important, beeause thq are the k87 teme in the
exposition of the moat

88. .nt1al

:t'1me1;icm of author1t:r. 27

Since St. Tho. . 1s d18CUaing the

agre~

of tbe humul will 'With the

divine, Silfton gI. ves a practical. illustration ot the solution in this order 1dliel
is taken from John of

-

26n>id.,

p.

st. fht.llll.a8. 28

SUppose that God told me

by

means of an

42.

21Simon quotes the body of the article (I-il, 19, 10) in DemocratiC
Go'ftrnment. pp. 40-41, note 20, trom }>egis, II, .347-349, and note. :'£bi'£ John ot
M. 'l'fi(i;is explains these views with great thoroughness in Curna tMologicua,
I-II, disp. 11, a. 4 (Viv•• , VI, 4l-5S).
28Cul"SUll tbeoloATheus, I-II, disp. 11, a. 4 (Vives, VI, p. 48b), cited in

Democratic'rravern;;nt, p. 42.

S8
absolutely certain special revelation that He wanted rq father to die tomon"OW
at noon. despite the fact that it was the definite will of God that be should

die at that time, it would also be the will of God that I should struggle
against the death of my father untU it bad become an accomplished fact.

Simon

explains that Aquinas states that the only cont'ormity required between the
human vill and the diT1ne 1d.ll

!!! ....vo1
__i;,,;;;to
... is

formal oonfomity, which mIQ" wll

be COD1patible nth material disagreement or even dalBand such disagreement.
tfGod, who takes care of the cODllCIn good of the universe, holda . . responsible

for some particula1" goods and wants .. to diacbarp IV respcmaibllit7. God mq
VUlt rq father to die tomorrowI but he certa.1.nf1.7 wants me to do all I can to

prolong the life of . , father • • •

..29

Simon gt..... zother 8X8.lIple ot his own. drawn trOll lIIilitary lite.

A

camman:d1ng officer ie ordered to hold. a position at all C08ta. He i8 an
intelligent am virtuous II8B who intends the CCJJImOn gOod of the

a.rm.r and

the

nation, na.mely Tl0t017. Coneequent.ly he a1u at this particular good, holding
the poaitiOD, becaun of the OOIIImon goOd, on the ground. of the

under a dete:rmi:ns.tion supplied by the cammon good.
of virtue, volition and intention of the

CCRIlO1'l

COIInOD

good,

There is here, as an et.tect

goed foraallJ understood.

Nov

whether or not the orders are ablNJ'd in the situation :is a question that does

--

not concern the otl'icer, but rather tbe over-all strategy board. This material
1uue concerns the stratea board, which 18 in charge of detend.n1ng . .t
operations over-all strategy demaJtda. The officer ie supposed to refer hie

29DeIlOCratic GoYernment,
, p. 42.

act.ione to Victory, but, so far as rMterlal. c;bjects of intention are concerned,
the gOt'Xl .1ioll he 18 to intend 1s the holding

or

the position end nothing

e1...30
Simml goes on to explain that i f the high ecrm.rotmd fails in its taek and

sends no further orders as the situation deteriorates, then the officer 1. in
an

~ng

no new

tt'O'm

position.
abOV'e.

~ing

ordere \dlll.ad to armihiliat1on, but there 1s

those Wh088 job 1t is to

__riall,.. com1dered have vanished.

C&l"8

tcr the

CO'IM'lOn

He becomes increaaingly dubious that hi.

ordtU"S are rull.,- what the COllII'.on good demand., until he then baa

thinga.. 1) deGide what is better tor the
~hl.oh
~0'I1te

good

~on

to do tvo

good, to hold, "tack

01'

with-

1ft taking care ot the common good _t.eriallr considered, and 2)

the decUion-which 1s taking care

considered. It is a ditficult th1nB.

ot

the 1!rt1oulq good materially

"When the private 1'81'8on has to eerp

ab... hi. capacity and substitute tor l'lOneldstent publio pereo., an aweinap1r1!J1 solitude . .ae him realile that the structure ot soc18ty hu broken
.
)l

cmm.•

.Ant7tber exlPp1e, where there ia no distinct 100000mlnc personnel, i. that
of a group of piOllMl'8 who 10Yern

theaelwa b7 majority rule. 'fhey meet at

111wrv&1. to dec1de _ttere of common interest, but w!'en they are prevented 1'raII
coming together eaeh private person baa to tak.. care of both h1a
and the public busine.s until the group oan again oonvene.

O'NR

businen

"'!'he same

perscme.

in tact, labored in 1sol.tttioo yesterday ard today act as one public character•.
,,,
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the:r

But, in isola Uon,

&l"$

goode alone, in aenmbly
~ 8Jld

noxmal17 que11fled

tbe1 are the

ror

the punsult of part1eul8J"

m1nd and will to ..mieb 1t pertains

to

tnt.em1 the ~ goocll thitJ dUterence of capuit:r 18 all that

es88n'b1ally metten • .J2
00ns14er a Latin teamer, ..,. Simon, who 1. abeolutel7 ded10ated to h'1e
subject, 1Qbo bu a. .ue

or the

tuncti.cm that be bee to tultiU in socie",

never tel.ievu that be overdOlNl the import,arl. of clue1••

'W'1t.b an~ Latin

t.eaeer

pan or

a baluoect

procraa,

who taela

'Who does not 1'eCOIIIt8Dd Lat1n _pt,

that ~it

1e hi&I dut7 to keep hi.

subject. well It'1Wn the li1I1te of ita l'Ul 1Ilportance.

other ttdnp

eqUll, t.he eObool will be better . .lWd by the fOl"meI", d)rnerdo

the latter, colorleaa Uldl"f1cb1al,
he baa ooftheecl b1e

0lIl

aueh a man

who is &1\11118 ~ftll to refroain hom uq"th:Lng that

m:lJht. lo* like t_tical Hal tor J.atla.
as

C~

*0 v11l

l'I8¥'el"

beirls

~

·tiban b)"

aeoompllah great thinga, aince

tur&et1Ol'l wi tb tbat of the over-all

~lon

of the

achool. Sifwm ooncludee,
No part of the LmI will be th~ tilled unle.. each labO'J."eJ'
baa .. d1et1nct t1el4 to plow. And no tunat10n wUl be exerc18ed
with ~
.t"uaet1«»-e.,., tAlat of teachi. .
l..stln-018 d1at1net. fIooa . , othlel" f'uact.1on end thenItrJ' parU...
l.ar:lIed.. But U IV ~ 18 a p8l"t1cular one, if. in other
.nida, the good 111\11 which I _ ~ 18 but a pctfticular
upeet of the 0QIII'!20D pod., then 11; 18 ---817 that t.here .,.,
. . . . _ , 8 pinson or a gJ'01JP ot peftONJ 'Properq concerned, not.
0Dl7 t~ but alISO ateriall,.. "."1th the ..mole of the CCl!lll1Oft
good.)'

unl_.,.

•

r

*0
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Simon notes here as well that a distinct governing personnel is not
thereby required.

The School might be governed by a board ot teachers, each

of "Whom in the classroom is concerned ldth his own subject, but who, IfSating
as a governing body, are all concerned with the whole good of the school.
Since shifting tram a particular function to an over-all concern is possible
but difficult, authority over experts is usually in the hands of nonexperts,
that is to say men who are experts in the good which is not speCial. 34
The theOl7 emerging trom these examples and their analysis is then

summarized b}I Simon in a set ot propositions.

Under the assumption that the

society in question is aiming at a common go¢, it is statech
1. That 'Virtue implies ICl'le for the COllm1OD good) willingness
to sacrifice one's own advantage to its requirements.
2. That the common good ma.r be intended formally withou1; being
intended ma terial17.
). That tt. 'Virtue of the private penon guarantees the
intention of the cammon good fomally considered, not the intention
of the common good materially considered.
4. That 80ciety would be har!led i f evel7'one intended the
cODITl.on good. not only formal17 but alao materiall;n that, in a
material sense, particular persons and groups ought to intend
particular goods.
S. That the intention of the comnon good, materially c0nsidered, is the business of a public reason and a public w:1ll.
6. That the intention of the common good by the public reason
am will necessarily develops into a direction of societyI by the
publio reason and will, toward the ccmmon good considere4 not onl7
formally but al80 materiallYJ which is the same as to aq that the
intention of the CCllROft ~ood, materially considered, demands the
operation of authoriV.)5
Simon then cClllIl18l1ts upon these propositiOns, remarking first on the

preliminary assumption that the society aims at a

-

34Ibid., p. 47.

-

)SIbid., p. 48.

COJDJllon

good.

He says that

62
although Man)' theori:sts take it for granted that without a common good there

no 8oo1etq, yet. the_ wol'tl 80cieN: 18 otten uaed of a partnership such as that 0
a bamicrattaan and a lftOneylendezo--a society ld thin which there is

authOl"i't7_ But, he argues, there ia no

onl.7 what.

he calla a p!!udo-CCIJIIlOD

ot the return.,

CODlllOn

1'.10

good in such a aooiety, there is

SO«!,..36 It each partner take a percentage

then the total amount 1. nat a common good, but a sum of

prl:9'ate goods. It looks ille a common good, but it is not.
the defining features ot

"It lackaJ one of

the common good, vis., the intelligible aspect. by

which 'the oommon good call.8 tor cOIIInunion in desire and common action.)7

It does not suffice, a8;Ys Simon, that

a~ good.

concern several persona, in

order that it be common; it mllst can.. among thoH who pursue it, aJ1d iDeotar

as they pursue it, a camnon lite of desire and action. At least it must be

o~

such nature as to cause such common life it it is to be cClIIIImOn. And it it is
a

CCD'I.O!l

good it renderJII authority

T8C8SSar,y,

am does nat adlnit of purel:7

contractual relatione. Just as the a:preas1ons "the greatest good of the
greatest number" and "the general interest" prevailed in the age of 1!IdlYidualism, so the thought of that age cherished, in varying degrees, a contractual
interpretation of the state or a contractll8l ideal of sOciety.

This was ve1'7

logical, for 1£ tie ground of SOciety 18 the attainment of interdependent
38
private goods, then no authority is necessary and contract su:rfices.
Commenting upon his first concluding prinoiple, Simon remarks that "the

-

.36:rbid.,

p.

49. The italios are Simon's.
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principle of the prima.cl' of the

C<IIDlOn

good, often misunderstood or denied by

the theorists of ethios, has, in tact, an extraordinarily powerful hold on the
oonsciences of men, so that even people of debased conduct find it natural to
die for their country, or for some substitute for their country, such as a

gang. And despite the theories of individualism men still recogniaed and
served the common good under suGb improper names

8S

"the greatest good

ot the

greatest nuaber. ,,39
Regarding the second statement, Simon mere1;y says that examples have been
given and repeata two of the.

the army officer obe;ying orders may not

actually be doing what is best for the

COIIImo~

good, and the son of a murderer

may want his father to live even though the common goad demanda exeeu.t1on.
0
both cases the common good is intended formally but not materia1l.y.4

In

The third statement _rely indicates that failure to intend the OOllmlon
good materially considered is not due to lack of moral excellence.

"If what

vioto17 demands is evacuation and withdrawal, it is up to the bigh command to

issue new ordersJ and it is up to the courts to see that SOCiety is protected
by adequate punishment of crime.

Any particular difficulty raised by this

statement :resolves into the difficulties pertaining to state_nt

No.4

('that,

in a mterial sense, particular persons am groupe ought to intend particular

,0.

39:rbid., p.
Simon avoids entering into the highly disputed question
of the ~ c4 the common good.

4O:rbid., pp. 50-,1. It is hoped that by this time Simon's identification
of the "COiiiion good materially considered with that Which is actuall,. required
by it, and the formal intention of the common good with the reference of an
intention to the common good, has become clear.

goode'), W11ch i8 tbe keystone of the 1i1ole tbeo17.,.Ll
The tourth st,ate.nt does ra1se apparent dUficult1ee.

It

BeemtII

that

eve170ne should int&M the commongocd bot.h materially and formally} at least

that should be the ideal. Simon adnits that bis statement seems to put a
restriction on love tor tbe oaamon good, u if too much of it might hann.

Ellt

it is indeed barmt'tal, he continue., to i,,..nore the laws of the one and tile
many, 1 _ lIhich transoencl hlaIum det101eneiea and human aftain because they
are _taphysica1. He uplairuu
GoodnN8 1mpl.lea uni__ , but the notion of unif,y, as div1decl iIM
SUnity of the individual" and rtun1t). of tbe multitude, If irlY01'¥'U
an order of uterlority and posteriority. The unity of a proper17
umtied multltude i8
or a unit.y than the unity ot an
1IId1v1dual. 'rbe decree of unity 'that. a aulttt.ude admits o£ 18 the
same thing sa the ld.J¥l of unity than 1t calla tor. /iii[ Although

1...

unitor 18 1m abaolute periect.ion, there can be t.oo muCh Of it. 1naamuch as, beyond. a certain measure, the inappropriate kind forcibly
displaoea the proper one aDd destruction ruulta. Such ls the
meaning,ot Aristotle's celebrated objections to the comrnuniam of
PlatoJa
stmoa quotes at length from Plato'. Reeablic and the reply ot Aristotle
the Pol1t1o. where the latter attack:a tthe preMile of Socrates that the greater

•

the

uni't1

the

state at,'taine tbe degree of

of the nate the better

longer a stat..

-

bllb1d.,

p-

it aut beJ Aristotle'. point is

that ODOI

unity of 8. f~ or indiridual, it 18 no

....aiTe unity

(te~ tbe

state by cleat.:roy1nc the plurali

Sl.

s_

42lb1d. The error in the text; quoted deprlvea the third sentence of
~~ context would se_ to call for either of two possible correatic_n either "fbe decree of unitq that 8 multitude admits of is not tbe
th1.Dg ae the kind of unit7 that it oalls tor," or perhaps "'l'he dell- •••
18 ot.bend... than the kind '01"tin1ty 1t cella for. rt

----

.................
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which is natural to it.43

Simon develops this argument by showing how uni-

formity can do violence to the nature of multitude and thereby cause waste:
The systematic extinction of qualitative diversity impairs the verr
ldnd of plenitude that it i8 the metaphysical function ot the many
to achieve J and i t the purpose is to affect the highest degree of
unity, a multitude, no _tter how thoroughly uniformized, is bound
to remain second to individuality, that is, one un would be nearer
to the goal than any CO!IInonwealth, even though it be made of puppets
all carved and dressed after the same pattern.Wi
Imagine, he continues, a multitude in which all intend the common good

materially as well as formally, and refrain from intending any particular
good-a society which has achieved radical uniformity by extinguishing all
qualitative diversity to the extent

t~,1'It

pe nna.nent grounds for love and devotion.
the particular are destroyed.

no man more a father, etc.

the JX)lmIlOn good haa a mODOpol,. on all
Permanent grounds for the love of

no 'HOman is more of a wife to me than atJ7 other,

In tiB order of final causality the co_on good

alone stands, and the causal power of· the particular has disappeared into that
of the whole.

And since the end is the form of the will, when the .018 alone

remains as an end, only one form is left tor all wills.
Such a construct, Simon says, results hen the unwarranted. exaltation of
the subordinating cause to the detriment

or

the subordinated causes.

In some

systems of metaphysics or theoloa God alone is the genuine efficient, cause,

43Simon quotes from R8tj!;liC v. 462a-L.63c (trans. Jowett) and Politice 2.
2. 1261810-15 {trana. JoWet~ Aristotle is also referring to iv. liM!,'
'I. 4S7 c. Cf. Democratic Government, pp. 52-53, note 22 •

..

44Democratic Government, p. 53.
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His sovereign power confronts a universe deprived of causality, life, liberty,
and perhaps of reality.

~ontrast1ng

with this picture of a waste land, the

God of the living, who does nat need to lay things waste in order to assert
his power, is powerful enough to cause ....ery thing am eve1'7 act and every
modality

or

every act in a world whose law is one of plenitude and superabun-

dance, in a world tu1l of reality, of autonomy, of actbdty, of life, and of

l1berty• ..45
SUch a society, "Where none intema a particular good 8ftn materially, is

like a dead world, in Simon-s opiniOft.

The COJIRlOn good, moreover, has beC0D8

a mre appearance.

ex18~

"Common good cannot

unless it does ex1at as the good

of a multitudeJ but there is no good tot a multitude' tmle88 parUcmlar goods

4

are intemed by particular appetitea and taken care of by particular agents."
On

the other hand, says Simon, Plato did percei". the need for distinc-

tion in soulet,..
~ood

For Simon a good. can be particular in two wqs.

either a. a

whose subject is but a part; of society, or as • good whiGh i. but a part

or an aspect

of the common good.

The welfare of • tud.17 is an exanple ot the

first, the public health of the whole society an example

or the

secom. 81moB

calls the tirst private, the seccmd. sE!c1al 1 and uses the tem homestead and

fUnction to stand for these two prinoiples of distinction.

The homestead of a

farmer i. particular as pri".t8J the !unction exerci.ed. by a public .ervant is
particular as 'recial.

45Ibid., pp. 54..5S.

46zb1d. ,
.

-

p.

5S •

~hile

Plato opposed the former, be emphasized the
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latter strongly; though most societies use both principles, he preferred to
rely exclusively on the division at social labor 1n'to functions, as i f the
first principle were dangerous. 47
If the fourth statement is established, oontinues Simon, then the fifth

am sixth statements hardly call for elaboration. It the oommon good should
not be intended naterial.ly by particular persons, then a nonpartlcular reason
and will should intel¥l

it, it is obT.l.ous that it has to be intended material-

ly by someone, and thia person or group should be obeyed, according to the

principle of the pr1mae;y of tJle eommon good, whether it be a distinct gwerning person or group, or the

..mol. multitucle

aD! 1411, 88 in a tom meeting.

~onst1tuted

as the public reason

''It is, in the last anal78is, as simple

.s

that.,.48
Simon then ooncludes with an explanat10n of the two ld.Dda of particulari
.gnd

their relat10n to author.1t7.

Bach kind suffices to make authorit7 neoes-

8&17, tor even i t the part1cular"!:t)r of the hamesteacl were abo118hed-aa in a
thor~

Cc3aumm1st state-the ptrticular1ty of the funotion would still

render authority indispensable.

In Platots R!JPUbll0 authorit7 is overwhelming

Even in a cabinet made up of enlightened and virtuous functionaries, each
intending his awn aspect ot the common goal, "the sheer ta.ct that each adminis

tration bas a !p!cial tuk to fulfil makes 1t necesss.ry that there be, on top
of all departments, a nondepartmental agent • • • an agent specialized in

47Ibid., pp. 5S-56.

-

having the point of view of the entire cOJllMon good prevailing over . . epecial

49

angle."

And.

so the proposition that authority i8 necessary to the intention of

the camnon good haa a double maning.

"It means, first, that authority i.

necessary in order for prl.:vate persons to be directed toward the common goodJ

it rreans, secom, that autbor1t,. is neeess817 in order for functional

processe., each of which regal'ds some aspect of the common good, to be

directed toward the whole of the oommon good."sO
This funct1on, sqs Simon. deserves to be called "most essential" because

it concerns the most f\mdamental act of social Ufe.

In a society of virtuous

enlightened, and full,. 1!Ilture persons, authority would have no paternal duties

it 'WOuld have to un1.f)' action only when the means was not uniqael,. determined,
b1.l't it U)uld first

am

above all have to intend the common good.S1

Thus authority is essential. to man.

thorttr is neither a necessary

e~

--

8iaon concludes that 88 such -au-

nor a lesser good nor a lesser eVil nor

the consequence of atV' evil or detic1enq--it is, like nature and society..
unqualitiecn,. good."s2

-

49Ib1d.,

p.

58.

50J:bid., p.

59.

-

The italics

are in the original.

-

5lIbid.

52Ib1d•

On the existence of essential functions J S1m.on here quotes at
Thomas, S.T., I, 96, 4 (authority in the state ot innocence)
and De Re~ Pr1n~ I, 1 (the need tor a ruler). In both texts the two
tuncU'ons are cons1d8
wus. Simon also quotea Leo .xIII, who u"
the argument at the latter
n ~rtale Dei, and here give. the complete
schema of .functions alre~ Jll.:esent.N Pi?
p. 2.3). Both the coDlll1ltJ'.d; of
st. Thomas and the function Of perfect ve att4i t7 will be taken up in the
tollOld.ng chapter at this theaia, however.

length

rra; st.

p!Lirr

an

I

I
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In reply to the assertion of Paine and others of the deficiency theor.Y

tba. t gove:m.ment arises because of our wickedness, Simon can now state fiaU,.
that authority. in its essential functions, is as natural as the association
of nen for a common good.

It ill not produced by our wickedness (i.e., defi-

ciencies), but by our wants (i.e., the tendencies of our nature). Yet the
ad'¥"ersaries nay hold that a 'Common good is not the object of any c1Yil associ

tion, that ciYU society has no cODIlon good fer ita objeot.
beUs down to this:

"'1'be question

Is it possible to oonceive civil society after tbe fub-

ion ot a mere partnership, involving no

OamJlOn

existence, no cOlIInon 111'e, no

common lewe, and no oommon action,.,3
Simon begins his reply by def1m.ng civil society as "the society wi thin
which all the tendenc:l..es of man, so rar as temporal life 18 concerned, can

normally find satid'action •

..su

He calls the society which bas a common good

communitz, and the societywhicb does not, !!!!!. partnersh1,e. examples of the
former are a team md an army and of tbe latter the handiorattaman and the
lIOD8Yle:nder.

His method i8 to diaengage typical features of a community and

then see if they are recognizable in c1v1l so01eV.

First of all, Sitrlon tims that in true communities there are

SOll8

transi-

tive actions perfOJ'lTil8d by the ooB1lJlUD1ty as a unit. there is oollective ca.uaali

ty.

In a partnership, hC»l'EM!Ir, eacb aotion is traceable to some partner, none

is perforned by the partnership itself.

Secondl.y, the transitive aotions of

the eo.arnunity are conditioned by immanent actions of knowledge and desire in

S~cratic Government, p. 63.

-

S4Ibid.
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which the members commune} each person knows and desires the common objective,
and is aware that the others do, too.

"OoramunioDl in immanent actions make up

the most profound part of social reality • • • there alone the individual is
freed from solitude and anxiet;y.

Mere partnership, on the other hand, does n

do a'lythi1'lg to put an end to the 80litude or the partners • .$> Lastly, this
commUftion is caused by oammunications which m.ake the members _tull, aware of

their common

striv1~.

Presiding over theae communications 18 one of the

principal tasks of leadership, it must insure the proper

now of _sages

at

all levels.
But thue criteria of a OOJRmUn1ty are e&fi17 recogniuble in civil

SOciety. Collective causality is wident in seeurit;y &gainat enemies,
treaties, over-all status

ot ownership,

of education, of temporal l1!e in its

relation to the spiritual; comnmion is certainly recognizable in patriotism,

cCllmltlUdom.-C4using communications can be seen in parades and the raia1ng of
the flag.

Although some of these features would not be necessa17 in a 8001...".

free from evil (e.g., security against internal enemies), most of them would

assume a more int.enee significance in a society made up of ideally perfect
people.

Simon concludes, therefore, that it is not lecws. of evil in men but

in spite of all evil and deficiencies that civil societ!.. have the character

S6

of comrmmiti.s.

56n,id.,
5SIbid .,

p.

65.

p. 67. Simon exPlains that the term civil SOOimeshould be
taken iilibroad sense, to include paller un1 ta of
me as well as
nation-states. strietJ.r speaking, he says, perhaps only the world is a civil
sooiet,..

reaeral sys
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The d81!lonstration of the most essential function

or authority is

complete, but Simon concludes his first chapter of Philosophy

t1m8

!!! Democratic

Government with a final warning against the tempting illusion that the good
will of eaoh person, if it "''ere complete anel enlightened, would suffice to

guarantee the intention of the common good I
Tb1a UIU8ion is stubborn beoause it is hard to muter the operation
of the principles lihioh, at the bottom of the question, seem to conflict but actually oondition and supplement each other. The common
good demands that particular persons should do full justice to the
goodnesa of the particular good} but, i f suoh is the case, an overall. direction towar4 the oommon good i8 neoe8sar,y. Thus the most.
essential function of authority springs, in the last anal,-s1., from
the autonordc goodness of t.be particular g0c4. The autonom.y ot the

homestead

ana that of the function matter highly tor the

common

good, but, without over-all goYermtant, the.. autonomies would _ _

the dia1ntegration of soeiet,-. Thus autonOll1 renders authoritr
necessary and authoriV remere autonomy possible-this is what we
find at the core of the most essential function ot gO'V'ernment.57

57lbid., pp. 70-71. '!'he latter part ot the quotation reflects the notion
of oomP!_ntarity between authority and liberty with which Simon began Nature
~ Functions 2! Authoritz.

CHAPl'RR V

AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY

The essential elementa of Simon' a theory of the nature and £uncti 0!l8 of
authority have now been presented, but not the general conclusions which be
drawe

~m

them..

There also remain for disoussion sorne related notiona which

should be included to give completeness to the theory.

Consequently, it 'Will

be the task of this chapter to draw together the loose ends of the presenta,

tion, as it were, ana. to give the general principles for the right combination
of liberty and authority which Simon, at the opening of his .Marquette lecture,
declared to be the goal of his il'lV'est1gation.
Reference has been made to the correspondence between the investigation
of Simon and the reply of st. Thomas to the question of whether authority
l
would have eJdsted in the state of innocence.
This article of the SUl'tItIl&

Tbeologica makes

8

good

point of departure for the consideration of authority

and liberty because it not only co:neidera authority as exercised in its two
basic dominions and containa in germinal fom the theor.r of functions already
presented, but also adds a description of perfective authority, and points the

wq towam general conc1uslcma.

st. Thomas says that in the state of innocence the dominion of servitude,
in which a man is governed tor the private welfare of another man, would have

12

, 73
been unknown. 2 Simon develope tg'1is point by explaining that tor St. Tbomaa

sen'itooe is defined by the alienation of human effort-an alienation which
does not take place when one works for the caramon good, but which does take

place men a man, no matter .free he may be to chauge his muter or his trade,
works for the private good of arother, and thUIJ remains an unfree man, a slave
On the other hand, St. Thomas holds that the dominion of freedom, in wMc
Ii

man is gO'¥'emed tor his own or for the

state

of

COJml'lOD

innocence, md that such a man i8 tree because, unlike the slave, he

'-----

~

these two forma of

3

Simon points out that
dis
authorit7. is
causality

has di8p08al of h1:msel.t (IDer est causa aNi).

tinction

good, would have existed in t

the

based. upon final

I

it is the emi of the action which makes the difference, i.e_, whether or not
there is alienation of
The

act1'riv.4

distinction is important, sqa Simon, because this set of opposite

notions haa otten been contused with two other sets of opposite notional

the

political versus the dupotic regime, and the substitutional 'Versus the
essential functions of authority.S

2S • T., I, 96, 41 "And since enry manta proper good is desirable to billself, md consequently it is a gritn'Ous matter to anyone to yield to another
what ought to be om'. own, therefore such dominion implies of nec8as!t7 a
pain inflicted on the subject, and consequently in the state of innocence such
Ii maate1"8hlp would not ha'ft existed between man end man ......Pegie, I, 922,
quoted in Democratic Government, p. S9. note 23.

-

3Ibid•

SIb1d., pp. 34...3S. This distinction haa already been mentioned under the
nature-or-author1t7. Cf. sppra, p. 2$.
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Regarding the two regims, political

am

despotic, from the point

of efficient causality I a free man i8 one who has some power

or

view

to resist the

orders he receives (regimen politioum or political regime), while a slave--in
another aense of the word fran that used abOV"e--doea nat enjoy this right

(ree-n derm0ticum or despotio regime).

But this set of notions does not

correspond to that of the two dominions either in comprehension or extension:
an entirel.y clitterent causalit,. underlies them, and it does not follow that
one who enjoys no right of resistance must thereby serve the private good of
his muter.

Take the classio example of the despotic regime, s.,.s Simon--the

dominion exercised by the father over his children.

Although the child bas no

right of resistance, the father must still rule for the child's own good and

the common good of the fami1.7. 6
Nor do the definitions of the two dominions correspond to those of

substitutional and essential functions of authorit7.

It does not follow, stOlt

Simon, that i f one 18 incapable of selt-government and need8 to be ruled b,y
anotmr (substitutional function), he JlU8t thereby serve the private good of
7
his master (despotic regine).

6wature and Functions, p. 36. Simon ucknowledges that he is using the
a~c in a sense sGnewhat different trom Aristotle's.
The 1a
I'
D1 is us;! '67 ll"istotle to COYer both the dcmd.nion of servitude
and the despoti. regime, while the former, usually- rendered constitutional by
most translators, implies in Aristotle a degree or democracy, which It does n
in Simone cr. Democratic aove~nt, p. 73, note 1.

terms

l!!iFana

7lbtd., p. 37. He explains that the essential :functions can be aercised
in eitlier'regime and the substitutional functions in either dominion, but make
no further distinctions.
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Both of these diatincti.ons are significant, since "the expediencies which
1'!JBV justity the despotic regime or the subst1tutlonal internmtions of author!
ty are sometimea wrongly taken as a justification for the dominion of eerri.-

tude • • • the dominion of ser9'itude cannot be justified by the principles
which justify the substitutional lnte1"Yentlon of authOrity or the noutat1lto17
regime.

It it is justifiable at all, it must be just1.t'ied by principles

8

proper to it.·

Simon is not willing to exclude the dominion of servitude _ entirely
unjustifiable.

It Might conceivabl;y serYe the common good indirectl;y, it the

good of society demanded a leisure clue 8npport.ed by the exploitation of
others.

Indeed, he says, the legitima07 of this dominion-l1m1ted and reape

ing ina] ienable human rights-is reducible to whether or not this demand :must

be satWied by explo1tation, and. he suggests that with the growth of m.odern
industry it no longer must-a fitting fulfilment to the statement of .Arietotle

that society could do without slaves it the shuttle could weave by i tsell' •

9

Now st. Thomas, having rejected the dominion of servitude, clear17 holds
that the state of innocence would baTe seen the exercise of authority:
But a man is the master of a free subject by directing him
either towards his proper weltare, or to the common good. Such
a mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between
lIIIID. and un, for two reuons. First, because man is nat.ural17 a
soe.ta1 being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led
a social life. Now a social life cannot exist 8JllOl'!g a number of
people unlesB under the governance of one to look after the common
good, for l\W'l7, as such, seek many things, whereas one attends

-

8Ibid •

-

9Ibid., pp. 39-40. The source of the statement 18 not given.

16
only1n one. Hence the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the
Politica, that wherever marr;y things are directed to one, we shall
aIWayB lind one at the head directing them. Second17, if' one man
sUl'pa8sed another in knowledge and justice, this wuld not have 10
been fitting unless these gif'ta conduced to tba benefit of others.
Simon explains that chilc:lnm are not considered here, since they would
certainly have needed piternal guidance cmtn in the state at innocence, and
than goes on to relate this puage to his mm theoJ71

Considering a community of adults free frcu eTil., Aquinas ahC'rHS that
government is needed (a) for the direction of the community toward
ita common ~cd-thi8 "Contra the two functions which we described as
essentialJ (b) in order that men who are free from evil, in other
wonia, ~ good, should benefit by the excellence of the best
among them. This refers to a functi on of authorit7 not incl uied in
our analysis, a function which 18 neither substitutional, since the
governed is supposed to be free from eTil and even from deficienc,y,
nor essential, sinoe the COIDOn good is taken care of by another
function) let, it be called the "perfective" function of author1t,..l1
The grounds for this perfective function, previously nentioned but not

explained, lie in the inequalities of reason, 'Will pOWl!r, and T1rtue which are
80

natural to men that tbq wmld have existed. even in the state of inno-

cence.12 It is fitting that those

ill" the more gifted, saye

--

leS8

endowed. with these qualities be guided

Si.."liOD, not because this guidance is indispensable to

the esse o£ the personal or common good, but because it 1s necessary to its

bene es..

Furthermore, the ps:ycholoQ' of those W10 are proud. of their leader

aM love h:i.m shows that he is appreciated not only for his ability, but also

10S.1'., I, 96, 4, quoted in Democratic Gove~nt, p. 60, note 2J
(COl'1tinieG £rom p. 59), from PegiS, 1, 922.
1ln.mocrat1o Govemme., p. 60, note 2.3 (continued !rem p.
12Ibid•

st.

3, and menlions

59.

Thomas proves t.be e:x:istence of inequalities in S.T., I,
them in I, 92, 1, ad 2.
- -

96,
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for the inspiration which he givu his subjects to lead nobler lives.l )
A case of perfective authOrity, says Simon, is seen by st. ThOllas in the
subjection of wonan to man in the state at innocence, 'When he states, "For the
good of order liOuld haw been vanting in the human multitude i f

governed by other Lii!,7 wiser than themselves.

SODle

were not

So by such a kind of sub-

jection woman 18 natural17 subject to man, because in man the dUcer:nment of
reason predominates • .,l.4 And this 18 independent of deficiencies and the
eS8el'ltia1. need tor d1rectd.on toward the common good of the fami17.

It i8 a

perfective .f'unction.1S
The investigation into the tunet1.Oll8 of

is now complete, at

~authority

least as far a8 its huic, philosophical element. are concerned. This study,
together with the prel.im1nary

a:nal:1sis of the nature

of authori. ty and certain

important statemnta about ita instrwnents and tOl"ll8, should prcn1d.e adequate

material for the desired conclusi0D81

the general principles tor the right

combination of authority and liberty in any giTen situation.

But before the..

conclusions can be dra1m, . . Siaon near the end ot Nature end Funatione of
I

...............

Authori.!z, it is necessary to re*," some equivocatiOl18 by ezpla1rd.nl brletl;y
the notion of liberty which 11 bad in "11...16

13Ibid• Simon is currently working out a theor,y ot perfective authority,
w.hich be now prefers to call "the communication of excellen(8. n--Infonnation
from an intemew with Prof. Simon on July 11, 1959.

14S.T., I, 92, 1, ad 2. The translation quoted by Simon has been slightly mod1l'ii'd by him from that of Pegia (I, 880), where f~ is toum for
:rmil.titude and othen tor other. It is quoted in Democracoovernment, p. 61,

now

23.

.

15Democratic Gavernment, p. 60•
•
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In h1a Marquette lecture, Simon refers to the philoeophica1 theory of
liberty developed by Jacques 'Hari tain in the first chapter of _F're_ed_om_
Modem

world.!7

!!! ~

Among the variO'WJ meanings of the notion of liberty, Simon,

following Maritain, sees a fundamental distinction between an initial liberV
and a terminal liberty.

Initial. liberty is the sheer power of chOO8ing good

or evU, freedom of choice in our eff'orte to improve ouneIT.. ) it now-a from
our rational nature and bas the value of a Mans rather

miJlBd

~rteot,ion,

than an end) it is a

a ertectio 1Id.x:ta, because it inYOlves imperfection, tNt

power of choosing evil.

Tenninalliberiq, on the other halrd, is the power of

choosing the good alone and thus appears at ~the term of our endeavor, when the
virtuOWl man has 80 interiorized the law that ita prescriptions are identical

with the

~iea

of his virtuous nature, it i8 an absolute perfectiOD, a

e,erfectio s!mPliciter 8!9>lex, which can be attributed to God in a formal
18
senseJ it means not ohl)" treed.OIIl of choice but also auwllOlllT.

Every being en.1018 a certain autonOll\f, sq8 SiMon, becawse every being 18
Ir1OY'ed to ita eDd. b:y the law of its ft&ture.

And the higher a being is in the

hierarcb;y of thing., the more all'to11om;r it possesses.

AutonOlDT both springs

fram the pertectiom of being and makes those perfections evident ani admirable; it 18 the eplendor and glory of being.

both freedom

or

And terminal liberty, since it is

choice and autonomy, is the kim of' autonomy which properly

1!Ib1d., p. 42. This English translation of
LibeI'te was first published in London, 193$.

E! Res~

!!!pore!

!! 2!!!

l8nid., pp. 42-43. Cf. Freedan in the Modern World, pp. 29-46, for
Marita.1li's development of these conCipti, ref'e:x;:;J to li Simon.

19
fits the rational nature as such. Terminal liberty is the glory of the
19
rational. nature.
In another work, Simon develope this notion of freedom more extensivelr.
After disengaging the true concept of liberty as mastery and superdeterm1natian t'rom the false concept of irresolution and indeterminatLon with which it
is often associated, he goes on to show that freedom of choice 18 not
destro,yed but exalted when there i. no longer a possibility of choosing

wrongl.;y_ Sime freedom is a power of choosing the means to the end, aDJ"th1ng
which jeopardises the end itself conflicts with the '"17 es.ence of freedom.
There may be no fomal freedom in the act b1 whicb the bluaeti in he8."f'8n .ee
God, bnt there i8 an eminent 1'l'eed0Dl, the act of beatific love is not below

freedom, but is above it, since the

!!!! _fi_n1
........
s is

perfectly assured by the

vision 'hhieh ellmi..nates possibility of deviation fraa the end.

Here below,

th1a irJief'ect.1billty cannot be attained, but the ideal. term of moral and

spiritual progress i8 a state r1 sanot1ty in which the freedom of mald.Dg
wrong choices is remored as tar as possible while the freedom of choosing

rema1ne tm.1.mpa1red.. The law has become interior to the will .. so that freedom
of choice and autonaq combine

to produce te:mdnal llbert7. 20

SimOn points out that, mutatis mutandis, what holds for the individual
holds also for the group I

20WLiberty and Author!ty, If Prooeedi5s of the American catholic Philos!.2hical Association, XVI (1940), Bg:~B.
- -
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JlI8t as the personal freedom. of choice is exalted bY' the remOV'al of
the indifference of potentiality, so the freedom of the group is
ual'Eild 'by tEe suppression of the disorderl,. forces that tend to
make impossible a resolute course in camnon action. Finally, it is
per£eoUy evident that the freedom of the group is not any more
bound up ~ th the possib:tllty of making wrong choices than the freedOJll of the individual. there is such a thing as an interioriu.tion
of the law by the social bod;y. Just as an individual person, through
virtue, protects himself against the risk of making wrong choices,
so a group, a society, a political body, mq effectively strengthen
its loyalty to the C<'ImI\OD good by the incorporation into it. legal
structure, its customs I uses and collect!ve beliefs I tendencies
spontaneouaJ:r agreeing with the camnon good. Such a 800iety baa
achieved the highest ldnd of common liberty. It has reached a
condition of genuine autonOlQ'".21.

From these matapby8ical considerations, concludes Simon, it is clear that
the prOgre8S of man and society implie8 the progress of liberty, provided that

As to whether this progress of liberty implies in

termi.:n.a1 liberty is meant.

'turn the decsq of authority, he says that "this ia a question that we shall
try- to answer by considering the foms, functions and instruments of authority
in reference to the idea of liber\y u meaning auto!lO.lll7. ,,22
In Nature

!!!! Functions !! AuthoriV.

Simon now make. f'our prel1m1nat'7

conclusions, before arriv.ing at hi. cardinal prinCiples.
the dOJll1nion

ot ..n i t . i. opposecI to the requirements

should be done aW&7 with.

Hl41ea

thgt

daminicm of

........;;;;;o;;;,;;~_

Thu, be 8aye, that

~

The first is that
of AUt.on...,- and

!! liMN
~ !2!!! .2! !

progress

deN !!:. authorig insofar !! authoriV takes

88mtude.
,,2,)
,

2lIbid., pp. 98-99.

22N
.....
a:t.:t1re;;;;.;;.

!!!! FunetioDS,

pp.

4L.-4S.

23lbid., p. 4.S. Simon sqs that this is true even it the aploitation be
legitima""'" All italica in the orig1nal.
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Secondl,., :regarding the instruments of autborl tw, a leadership exercised
through persuasion agrees better with autonOl\Y than one exercised through

coercion. Thus,

!!2!!!2! coercion

!!!! substitution 2! 2!1'8Uawherever ~ aubstitutlon ~ !?! reasonably re8111ed." 24

"!!!! ESP"sS 2!. Uberty;

implies

Third, he says that since the substitutional 1Unctions of authe1"1t7 are

justified

onl,. on tb! basis of some det1c1enq

!!! llbem

iptplies

!!:!. de!!l .2! author!;t.z

in the subject,

".!!!!. prgrot88

tz USU111Et8

insofar !! authori

subst1tuti. onal functions ... 2$
Fourth, he 8818 that since the .uetial functions contribute posit1vel,.

. to the perfection, happiMS8, and treedca ot!a soa1ety by uniting it in its

"!!!. 2roE!!s S! l1bertl 22!! !2! 1!T!l !!!! cle!& 2!
iDsotar !!. !!! ..aent181 tunction 2!. author!. V .!!. conoemed...26

(I)_on action,

authOr1sr

Autonomy also influences the relationship between l:!l>erty and perfective
autborit7.. Simon declares.

The innuenee of a nser superior is supposed to

liberate the treedCIB of the interior

trom possible irresolution and the danger

of choosing incorreotlYJ however, this il'lt1uence will not be tl"lily perfective,

but will rather impair the progress

or

liberty, i t the superior prw1des his

24Ibid. Simon says elsewhere that coercion fail. to achieve its most
~1evateTiiil1t it taUs to foster the virtuous dispositions lihich finally
!:!;llte it \lM8cus817--"L1bert)" and Authority, If p_ Ul.

2SIbid., pp_ 45-46. This means that as deficiencies are made up they can
no long'ir7erve as groUllda for authortv.
26nid., p. 46. In this earlier work Simon had not yet distinguished the
moat es'ier.tlal funct10nJ consequently he uses the singular_ The same
reasoning applies to both functions, however.
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subject with ready""lUlde dec1i lio!)8 atXl thus deprives him of the ability to

axerei.. hi. own judgment.

For this rueon, perfective authorl.t7 ~

gino ita p~ntl in the torm of advice rather than bindiDl preoepta.27
l<'1th

regard to the relation of liberiy and authorl.ty in the order of

iiheoretica.l truth, Simon hold. that jut ..e evIl can prevail in economic

relations 11 Clh8'loe occurrenou and ino:roinate clri....8 are left unocmt1"011ed,
80

error can and dees take bold in the minds of men i f truth 11 not prO'fided

witil some kind

ot proteotion

and pr.h1.1ege.

The libenal theory

lated _ rite-tplace hae tailecl in both epheree.

truth,

pruden~

cboaen alii established

liberty. since l1bert.7 1. a power

or

<it the

W11'egt;l-

New.... kind of protection of

b7 soc1eV, doe.

not oonf')ict with

ohooaina the proper _ana to the right

end, .. tm4 wh1ch mut ti.J"n be lmo\m proper17 before it can be intended.
A:n:f theol'eUcal enor concerning t.he great _taph)rllcal and moral truths

radicall)t 002'2'Upte the source from Which right action
arg'llnns hold.

aprl.n~8.

And. it th1a

-

tor truths ...i1,. capable ot eric.nee, it holds a foniori tor

thOi. whieb are either dU't1oul t to attain (such .s Hcomal"Y pre_pt.. of the

natva'l law) or wll1 ch ean never be eY1clant in tbi. lite (such u the truths o£

nwelation).28
From the.. conol uiona,

~.

Simon, it become. clear that the antinaq

be\'ween autbor1ty and liberty i . not abaolute.

Bet.ween authority and libertJ

27 "L1baX"tq and Authority," p_ 101. Here again penruaalon appesl"I aa more
consonant with autonomy than ooend.on can be.

-

~Ibid., pp. loa-nO.
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there exist two relations:

in the aubstitutional domain there is opposi tiOD,

in the essential there is supplementariness.

But the aspect which ultimately

prenUa and predominates is tha.t of supplementariness, since the essential is
primar.r.

This essential relation ie clear:

"Viewed in the purity of their

_tapbyeical goodnese, authority and libert7 fully agree with one another, and

their canplem.enta17 character de.tinitely prevails OY'er their opposition. ,,29
It now becomes possible tor Simon to state thoee general principles for
the right, combination of authority and liberty which were the initial goal of
the investigation.

Tb.e7 are the prinCiples of authority and the principle of

autoDoslTt

can be fomulated as tollows: Principle of Authority. '«,berever the welfare of Q. cOJI'II1Uni'!f rerree a cc:manon action, the ~tl
'OYtba.Tcommon acll'oii" must Se au~~ §: thi hillier 9MB-or
c~;tl. 'fInclji!e OTlUtOiiomy. l'!herevera 'tasli can tie siEislac, J aohieved by the initiative of the individual or that of
Sliitl socm unita,""lIie l\i11D1iiientonhai iiik tmls'£"'bi lettto
They

m; !J1tUa'Elve ol thi"'i'xiHilChiS!

_____

....... ..........

or

to lli'it or-ami!r""sOiiar-unfis.30

__________ ......

It must be noticed that Simon laid down

work, Nature

!.!!! Functions 2! Authoritl.

r

these principles in his earlier

B.Y the time he had ccapleted his

development of the theory of authority in Pbilos9P!V

2! Democratic Government,

tHo other essential functions of authority had appeared:

the function of

unification of common action had to be limited to the cases where the means
was not uniquely detel'fldned (the function beiJ.lt substitutional.

where they were

determined), and the function of the volition of the common goad appeared as a

where

29Nature and Functions, p. 46. ct. also Democratic Goyernment, p. 141,
tt; terms!emeiiGnness 1$ used.

-

30Ibid.., pp. 46-47. Italics in the original.

new function entirely, although it was foreshadowed by the principle of autonomy itself.

Simon could have revised his principle of authority to include

these t1lO functions, but he did not.

Instead, be gives three conclusions

which rougbly correspond to two substitutional functions and the most es.ential
function, although, in a Benae, the third include. the other two, and all
three make up a principle of autonoJltr.

He also states something like a

principle of authorlty at the end of his conclusions, but does not digni.t) it

with a maher.
book.

Thi. is in keeping witb the whole tone and trend of his later

th:1a work is less theoretical, le•• erstematic in

~

ways, more con-

cerned with the practical order, and written tor a DlUch wider aDd le••
Scholastic an audience than the members ot the Aristoteliall Society of
Marquette University.

Furthemore, these conclusioDS in the later book do not

appear in the chapter on the general tbeOl"¥ of gOYe:rmnent (vb!re most of the

material. on authority i . to be l'ound), but. from a later chapter on democratic
tNedom.

Consequent17, it must be concluded that Simon point.adly omitted

repeating, reviSing, or in a:D1 way reterring to his earlier twin prinCiples.

What he does 887 is this:
heR the previous analysis of the functions of authority
(chap. i) it results that there is opposition bet'W8en authorlv
and liberty men the function of authority is substitutional,
not men t he function of authOrity is essential. This basic
proposition can be dewloped as follows:

1. The progress of society and liberty makes for the decline

ot au1#hority so far as the paternal function of authority is concerned. Thus, for a com.unity eubjected to colonial rule, .freedaa
meaNI such a state of affairs that the foreign %Ulers can dieappear
'Without damage to the cc:anra.nity, and do di8appear.
2.

A community is capable of greater freedom 1.t it i8 capable

ot unanimity whenever the means to the common good is uniquely

determined; it is more primitive or decadent and le8s capable of
libertJ', if eTen when the meana to the common good 1s uniquel;y

,

a,
determin!ci, it rails to achieve unanimity and needs to achieve unit)"
by way of authority.

3. The progress of society and of liberty requires that at
every given moment in the evolution of a oommunity the greatest
possible number of tasks should be directly managed by individuals
and amaller unita, the smallest mmt>er by the greater units.
But, 'With regard to the essential runctions or authority, there
is no contlict wbaUJoever between authon ty and libert,.. The more
definitel,. a COlIm'IUl"lity i8 directed toward ita common good and
protected from disuni~ in its common action, the more perfect am
tha IIlOre tree it 1••31
It can be 8een that the seoODd conclusion is entirely mw, based as it 1s
upon the hitherto undeveloped substitutional function previously mentioned.

The third coneluaion 18, of course, the former principle ot autononw itself,
and wuld seem to be, in Simon's theory, intimately connected ldth the most

essential function.

Imeed., Simon says that the same metapl'l7sical law which

demands that a 'Pirticularization

at actiTities should be produced by the

function and the hOllBl.lltead, also demand. that no task which can be fulfilled

bf a lower

unit should be fulfilled by a higher.

Thus, he says, the principle

of autonomy is implicitly assumed in the argument for the principle of

authority.32
From. the usociation of the principles of authority and autonomy, sqa

32lbid ., pp. 129...130. The principle of authority Ileans the most assenti
f'anct1on:--He qu.otee Leo XIII in substantiatioDI "Let the State watch O't'er
these societies of citisens united together in the exercise of their right,
but let it not thrust itself into their peculiar concerns and their organization, for things 1I1ove and live by the soul wi thin them, and they mq be kil1e
by the grasp of a hand from wi thou~. "-Rerum Novarum (the source is not
given).
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Simon in his earlier work, there should result a hierarchical order in which
the autonomy of the lower social unit supplements arxi balances that of the

higher.,),)

In his later book he considers some practical d1ff1Cllties inY'olTed
Management by the smaller unit may not alwqs be

in thia balane1ng of foroes.

the lllOI!Jt effiCient, and the question m. arlse as to how much

au~

the

lower units should sacrifice in order to reap the benetita of greater production.

Not much, aqs Siaon.

He considers the abundance of life in all parts

of the communit.)r such m important phase of the common good that direct man-

agement by the whole is preterable only when the advantages are very great. A
slight increase of

mil! terial

,,'..l:t.h or

etfie~cy

does not. balance the loss of

. dignit7 which results when choice, initiative, and reaponsibil1t7 are taken
aW&7-

".ArJ:r institution designed to centralize deliberation, deciSion, and

oommand tenda to bring subordinate persona down to the level of the slave, u

described by Aristotle:

he is an int4tlligent instruaent, but his power

at

UDierst.andi1'll hardly e.xceeda what is needed to grasp an order and to execute
it • .34
v!hUe Simon does not. sq

power is exposed to the

tbat POWI' corrupts, he does say that fIVer:!

~t..tion

to extend ita rule over things which might

well be left some degree o! autonom,y end life.
is difficult because it demands the

etten

The organization of autonOll'l7

aimed at nondestructive simplicity

"It 18 • • • oomparatively easy to simplU'y things by destroying a good part

of their reality.

But it is dUficult to effe ct the ldnd of simplification

-_ _--_

33wature
.... am Functions,
.... p. 47.
.34n.ocratio Government. pp. l)().]Jl.
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'Which, under more ratiollal, loftier forms, preserves everything and tosters a

tendency toward plenitude J by virtue ot such simplicity, authorit.y is tully

true to its usence and &ssociates itaelt with autonomy in entirely normal
fashion • .,35

st.

Thomas also holds that the better government rules in such a way as

to advance the perfection of its subjects.

Simon quoties from the article of

the SUmma '1'beologica dealing with the question of whether all things are

immediately governed by God. *
But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by gOTel"fltQent, this govem.Jllent will be so much the better
in the degree that the things gcwemed are brought to pertection.
Now it is a greater perfection tf.'lr a thing to be good. in itself
and also the cause of goodness in others, than to be only good in
i tsell. Therefore God so gOVerns things that He makes some at
them to be causes of others in government J 8S in the case of a
teacher, mo not only impar'ts knowledge to his p~i18. but also
makes some of them to be the teachers of others • .30
In conclusion, it would seem i::bat the theOl'f at Simon can really be SUJmned

up in the t'NO principles. enunciated in his Marquette lecture, provided that
the prlncip1e of authority be revised to include the essential functions

developed 1ater.

In Philos2P& !! Democratic Government Simon comes V817

close to stating these principles at one point, ..men he says that "autonom;y

3SIbid., p. 131. For a concrete ilaage of social happiness founded on

author1~autonomy, and hierarchy, of. the selection from Jefferson's writings quoted by Sil1lOl'l in Natu:re
Ftmct
____i_ons
__, p. 48.

!!!! ...

I,

36S •'1' ., I, 103, 6,

958.--

cpoted in Democratic Government, p. 131, from Pegis,

88
renders authority necessary aOO authority renders autonOl'q possible. ,,,37 This
is perhaps the most concise yet comprehensive statement of his theory which
could be made •

.37peooratio Government, p. 71.

CHAPrBR VI
A CRITIC.A.L EVALUATION OF Sn'fON'S THEORY OF AUTHORITY

Professor Simon's theory of the nature and functions of authority is,
without doubt, an excellent contribution to political philosoph;y.

Its

timeliness in an age when authority, libert7 and progress are so misunderstood and misused , its solid grounding in the perennial philosophy of moder

realia, ita deep insights into the probl.. of autonomy, contingenC)", and
the one

am tt.

,

lII8.D1', as they affect man in

of these are marks of value.

a world of material.

progl"ess-

The writer i8 convinced, morecwer, that Simon'

-

theo1'7 is fundamentally sound, that it COITesporxls with the is of ex:Latential
tact and the opjht of ethical. finality, because it is derived from true
metaphysical. principles. And because it 18 sound, it has relewance todayJ
this application of scholastic principles to the modern context 18 Simon' 8

significant contribution.
Theories, however, are never perfect.

There i8 always

rOCll

for deeper

probing into problems, improved statuant of. conc1uions, and further inclusion

or

related questions within a stead1J.y widening ambit of investigation.

Simon's theory is not tru17 complete in 8'1Y of these senses.

revision and

extelI8ion, and in both, aPErofcmdisae:rreut-tbese are what he himself 18

engaged in at the present time.

Consequently, it is in a spirt:' of construc-

tiTe criticism as well u prai,.. for a s1gn1fieant contribution that ..

cri. tiesl eval nation of Simon r s wrk on the nature and !unctions of authority

89
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18 preaented. here.

Beside the tact that Protessor Simon is still conducting his investigation, there is another consideration to be kept in mimI. This tact is the
manner in which be himself has chosen t.o conduct. it, especiall,. in his more
recent book, Pbilosopl'g

!!!. Democratic

Government. ,,'11ereas his Marquette

Lecture of 1940 is a philosophical work in the scholastic trad1tioo, a first
step toward an integrated theory of authorJ. ty and liberty, this latter book

is out in a d1tterent molcl.

In it, the nature of authority (as an object of

investigation) is subOl'rlinated to ita role in a political pbilosopq of
democrac:r. This book mq be called a

"se~"

wO!'k in a double s8Me I

intended more for readers ou.taide the tradit.ion of

~am.,

aa

and as written

more from t11e empirical riewpoiDt of the social. scientist. than the speou1a-

tin approach of t._. _tapb7B1cian. Here Simon does not elaborate upon the
nature of. authority as ncb, he does not go more deepl,- into its usenee.
'1b18 was not his purpose.

OOlllMqu.ently, to expect such an elaborated

development of hi. earlier analyaie would be unfair to hill. True, be does
revise, extend J am d8'Yelop hie theolJ' of the fuaotions J but the whole pres.
tation 1s geare4 te practical end.e-so much so that his earlier prcwisional
definition, his comments upon the relation of authority and law, and hi. twi
principles of author!t)' and liberty do not reappear. This shift from the
8P8cu1ative to the practical, a8 it were, must be kept in mind u hav.f.na
influenced the whole course of Simon's investigation.

"'!hat can and should. be done, therefore, in a critical evaluation, is to
examine Simon's -.,rk f·Qr truth, clarity, and consistency u it stands, pointing out

the difficulties it

mar

be expected to encounter, and suggest.ina
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possible revisions and extie1'l8ions ef the theory to related areas of investigation.
First

ot all, it should be noted that Simon t 8

two boolal receiTed tavora

ble comments in almost all the periodicals in lI'hich they were rev1fMJd. l

lrhe tollowing reviews and short notices ot The Nntul'8 and Functions of
Author1~ were read! K~ D. Denne, Journal at Phi!iiopli, iXfftlf (J'anuar,y11>, 1S14~r '. 54.J David DalJ1l'llpl.e, CommODlleA"I:,"'f1ftff (Uoiember _~, 1940), 85 J
Jacques Marlta1n, Re"r1e'W ot Po11Rcs:S4ttl (April 1941), 25O-~J F. de Viana,
La C1encia TomJ.sta,
(~" Ji~- lJ anon. rev. Cathol1o ;Jorld, CLIII
'(I'pH!
19. anon. reT. DiYU ~'ham.'ls, mIl
5l3-5XliJ aaon. reT.
'l'be ThomistJd..III (.1 atllW7 19h!), 1'13'. ' Unavailable to the writer was the

r,tiJ.:),

at

(1m"

n

clctrial'f, m (Deoember 1940), 716- 1.
.
Rev1ewe 8ii3 alcea read of Phil08~ of Democratic Ooverraent: RudOlf'
Allers, Books on Trial, I (Ootobe:r l~T6j"'lt. ~!.!;u:;;t it
~ xtlX Qltli17":t'1, 1952), 16-48. John H. Hallowell,
POIf
!Crenae ltm.ew, XLIV (June 19S2). ,52-55,. FerditWld. A. lfirmena, '1!Cnswor
Pm9:ea !!'V. (October 19S2) 5S6-5S8, Louis Januene~ Rene ~~e
ere
LI (19S3).
J. w. II......" 0-_&1., LV
§..
D51), M~J Arthur E. Murphy, Pbi1
h1oa1 Redew, W (April 1952), 19
211, Kurt 'Yon Schuchn1gg, SoCIa!
(J'anU817 1952), 29-36. Kurt "lOll
Sch'w!lclm1gg, Modern Scboolmiii, lli (
1953), 242-2h4J Leo Stra:wJs, New
~ !!f! (JU!i 1~2), 319-383".. U.navdlable were tbe rev:tews'"'li' J.
,
ose&h;[ and PbeJlO1'fte!loloe cal Research, i l l (1951..52), 456-457, and
by PI! niiIe17,· -!1~!era,
(~pteifber 1~, 19;1), 106-101.
These rev:l$W8 aiii notice. were generally ve~ fayorable, 'With the
exception ot R1! Cumming'. reriew of Democratic Go'Ye:l"!1Mnt., wr.ich was critical
ot attempt,8 to apply principles of st. tiiomas to aeMar probl8DIS of modem
gcwemnant,.. Leo strauss, :reviewing the sane book, raised .&Yew criticisms,
but said, "Particularly valuable i8 what he sqs about the tnnct.iona of
authorlty ...... " (p. '79). Arthur t1urpb;y t a artiole concemed what he
called an ambiguity in Simon's treatment of obligation to obe7, but was
generally tavorable. (Ct.
F. Hersens also praised the book, smng
what criticisms be had tor
. as social scientist rather than as a
philosopher. Concerning Maritaints important critique ot Nature. and
Functiona, I. !,!Rra, pp. 42-43.
-

renew in

ncan

~.

6S3-6S4,
n

E).

g
&

RihOSO-

tee:.: Z;

n

!!:!. Nature !!2. Functions
MaritailU

~

"Here we have a

Authorl'!1: received high praise from Jacques

perfe~

clear and valid demonstration which showe

both the veq nature and the nece88ity of the essential function of authorit7

in every political aolll'm1l11ty_,,2 Tribute i8 paid to Pbi1OSOJ?bf ~Democratle
Goverrml8Dt. by John H. Hs11c:well of Duke UniTersit7 in th.se words:
Thia is an important oo:r.ttribution to the eurrent 11terature
011 democracy • • •• It is epeculative political theory in the
beat sensa of the lIfOl'd.

• • •Ii;• is
• • • • • • •
:impceJ81b18

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
to do justice to the suJ:rtlety and detail at

Profea8or Simon's argument within the limitations ot a review.
H. re1'era to tbt central problem of authOrity throughout hi. book,
and it is this concern which gives unity to !rl.a mal,-si• • • • •

ot the book 11e. in the use of terminology whioh
obscures rsther than ela.rifies the author's meaning • • •
• Despite theae oocuional. ")"l1nio obnaole. to clarity, the
book deeerYes a careful reading by all students of goverrment.3
The wealeness

SOIfeti..'IlleS

Since, therefore, most of the :reviewa and notices eDIllineci have raised.

no serious Objections to the philosophical theory of authority presented

b.Y

Simon, and none has suggested a possible point of departure for a critical

evaluation, the present writer will otter
critique.

One other Bouree will also

tation, James R.

SCi118

ideas of hiB

be 'USed, however.

0Wl'1

by way of

In a doctoral disser-

Fl.ynn of the University of Chicago has criticised Simon

seTere1y concerning his theOl'7 of the "VOlition of the camnon

good!~

Flyrmta

arguments will be presented and diBcusSed later, since they can oontribute to a

2t.taritain, p. 2$1.
-'Hallowell,

552, 554-555.

4J an. . Robert~, "Modern Thom.i..sm and Democraq," Unpublished.
Doctoral Duaertation (University of Chicago, Chicago, 1958).
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deeper understanding of that theory.

It seems to the writer that Simon I s theory is vulnerable to the charge
of lack or clarity in the use of certain terma.

r~cb

of Simon's terminology is

original, and consequently a real contribution, yet he avoids explaining his

net

terms in the light of others more traditional in ethics and political science.
Sometimes he uses traditional terru in a new wq, a1 though there are more Which
be dCllts nat use at. all.

'l'hus he MYel" speaks of

p!!cee,

dominative or

damest.1o J?!!!t1 for eXlllple, and aYoidll tor the most part the uaual categori ••
of ethics and moral science.

Thia is in atrildng contrast to hi. treqwmt use

of the eoholaetic concepts of _tapbyai88, ep¥temology, and psy<ilology.

Cer-

tainly Professor Simon a8 own intellectual backgroum ia abowing ita int.l.uence

here, and this, plus the temenoy to nl"ike out afresh in et.hical

&reU ..

otten

evckea a reaction of surpr1ete and cunOlity in the read.r.S
Not that Simon fails to attach content. to h1e terms, new and old.
the contrar,y, th8T are pregnant with meaning.

On

But one teels that the focus

fails at tine. to be sharp, that the broad st.roke, otten ot genius, haa omitted

details which. WL7 be of

COD8equarJ.Gf1.

lb:act detWtion and clear-out use of

terms are not alwqa to be found here. While it i8 true that preliminary investigation bene1'ite troll the employmen1l. of broad concepts which can be refined
and ch1seled out later on, and the phenaDIDOlog1oal method and traditional

scholastic insistence upon definition of t.erma can be used to exces., nevertbI....
1e.,. Simon is much more prone to neglect these useful _thode than to O'f'erwork

SSee Hallm...u'8

comment just quoted on the previous page.

them.

Tbe result is that Jl'Il!17 questions remain to be answered, much work of

integration remains to be done.

Perbapa a fn exanples will help to substanti-

ate this critiai_.
Fiat of all, regarding the nature of authorlt,.:

-

in The Nature

:FilnCtione 2! Authorltz Simon speaks of authority in such a

w~

-am

that the reader

mq very well conclude upon re1'lection that be is speaking exelusiYel,. of l:maan
au~ortty.

Yet Simon nowhere esplieitl.¥ limits the term to such a meaning.

Thia gives r.1.8e to H'f'eral problema.

Thus, when he

s~

--

that the HJ.aw of

6

nati0D8 ill abwe authority, the ciTil law is issued by it,1f he atSt mean that
I

1

the law of nations is above civil, not d.1"f'1ne autborl:t7--tor be aeknowledgea

God as the author of the natural law, from which the law of natiODll 18
derived.? Ju¥1 when he sap that authority Cae opposed to law) require. an

~ature

!!!! Functions,

p. 72, n. 10.

It&1i. in the original.

1S1mon holds that the law ot 118tiO'I18 (ius tentiUll) is that bod7 of
positive laws lthich are deduotJ.'feiL connecteclnt the natural law, a8 auoh,
t.heJ pertain to mcral soJaioe, ra r tban to author!tr. On the other hand,
civil law tor Simon is elaborated b7 ~al reaaoning, am thus pertai_ to
author1t7, Which 18 ident1.t1ed with go;:;;mng Prudence (Nature and Fu.nctiona,
p.71).
.Aa a matter of faot, the relation of the law of nations to natural law
is diaputecls the olcler natural law doctrine eubaUJled iU8c!nti- UDder huaan
positive law, whel"NtJ 80D8 JIlOdern writers prefer to chUa riae it as natural
law 1n a wider senNe st. Thoaaa etas.U1es ~ ~ under positive (human)
law. but de~area~ etonll what is urged ~ man by bia natu:re
belongs to Datural law 1n itlt etri~ sena, whitt i . urged upon all people. by
human nature u requireDants of sooial. order and utUity through the application of reason constitutes 1., entia (S_ theol., IIa lIn, q. 57, a.2,.3).-J. Me••ner, Social Et.b1cai;""trana. :3. J. Dohert.7 (st. Lout8, 1949), pp. 20.32Ob, n. S2. SriiOn 18 liiItIi.f.'1Jl. to st. !homes here. But the point of the
criticism here i8 not this, it i8 rather Simon' 8 l1mitation of authorlt7 (aa
governing prudence) to ciTil law. which eeems to exclude the role of divine
authority in pr-.ulgation of natural law.

\
i.lmned1ate reterence to a personal intellect ani will.

8

he must likewise exempt

divine authority from thia requirement, 'because he aeeu to saT elsewhere that
human reason can refer to divine authority onl7 :raedia'!llJ by !Deana ot the
naturall......first disoonred by reason in a state of impersonality and onl,7

later rerernd. to its personal author.

9

The same question aris_ with natural law itself, when Simon insiate

against Rousseau, Proudhon, and the school of Saint-Simon that the infl.exible
laws of nature would be. inadequate for the direction of aoc1eV. Authority, be
says, can never take the tOJ'm of an impersonal MONsity.10 This raises a

problem. God is the author of natural law,

noh,

Simon seems to say, is 1m

8lfature and Ftmctions, p. 8. II • • • yet the law can be conceived in a
state at liJii;rsOiia.llty. Ss is the war we speak of natural law immanent in
the im}:ersonal course at pb¥8ical events. On the eontra17, an immediate
refenmoe to a personal intellect and a personal will 1s ~parentl7 es.ntial
to the notion of authority."
9Ibid., p. 51, n. 2. "Thus" the natural law exists in human nature
betore eiGi1ng in b._an. reason. This is _,.. it is ne....ary to ge a step
further, ,and to acknowledge that the natural law participates in the '.ternal
law, which is identioal with the reason of God. Should .... not make this step,
the supreme law 'W01il.d appear to be the t which exists within nature • • • the
implication being t~t the rational universe would be ultimatel,. dominated by
irrational nature" (Ibid.). "In the di"lfine rauon, the nat,ural law, as an
aepect. ot the eternaI""!iw, enJoy. a state of personality, in nature, a state ot
~rsonalitYJ finall,." in the human reason, it enjoy. again a state of person.ality· (Ibid., p. 52, n. 2). Simon ..ems to be describing a psychological
prooess:""""'iYn aiscoyers the law and then reasons to its diTine authorship •.
This process can hardl;y be called an immea1aG r.reNiiCe to a personal
intellect and will, i f S1m.on is using the term in the scholastic sense at
Ifatta.iald without a reaeol'J1ng ~_ fJ
~
If he is using it in
other sense, tl'2n the criticiam. depends
he sense intended. But the poin'h
cO!'lC8ming the law t:4 nations as ftabcml authorit,." still holds, and thus tends
to reinforce the above interpretation of immediate.

<=0 •

SC11t8

10:rb1d., p. 7, and pp. 49-50. De 1. Simon is here attae1d.ng Rousseau's
statenBnt"tbat the child must be taught to 008)' thipgs rather than men, thua
elim1nating .!&. referenee to a person.

first in an impersonal state, i.e., it prcrldes no 1mm.ecllate reference to a

personal intellect and will. "'hen man obeys 1me natural law, therefore, doee
he

ooe)"

It seems to the writer that Simon 18 oonceiving

divine authority?

-

divine authority as 80l78thinl outlide his definition, as an "authority" not
requiring this immediate

than to

obe7 a person

ref'erenae~

1mmedia~

For him, to obe)t authority 18 nothing else
whereas obedience to nature, even 1n the

Rousaeauvian ..nae, would somehow be a mediate obedience to authority (in this

case to dlT.tne authoriv)-whiob Sim«'1 will not admit.

lfaman authority 18 the

only kind which fIts h1sdetIn1t1on, because only there does one find the

requinld imm.ediaq.

(It must be _ntiODeCl tba" God could g«ern the world

through reYelatlon alone, in whioh can divine authorlt,' 'Would ful1'111 Simon's

definition, provided the reference to God's intellect and. will were immediate
enough.

Bu:t this 1s not the philoeopbical problem considered here.)
The questiOM

author.l V does

an..

naturally, the :reader is surprised that God t S

nn sat1si7 the definition. ....!hat

is divine authorlt7? Is the

promulgation of the natural law thn>ugh Datural revelation in al\Y sense an

exercise of authonty' Siace Simon identiti.. author!ty vith govemiErg

prudence, oertainlT a virtue posse.sed by God to an eminent degree. il not
divirs providence therefore the exercise of

auth~r1ty par excellenee,ll

The answers to these queetiol'lS. it deduced from prami"8 proT.l.ded else-

where by Simon, all seem to be in the affirmative.

It is hardly conceivable

that Simon would deny real authori. to God. Thus, in his later work, he

22, 1.

llst.

Thomas holds that pru<1ence is a divine perfection.

--

See S.T., I,
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raters to God's govermoemt; of the world, as explained by St. Thomas in a disCWI'

slan o£ unity ln the ruler;

12

he indicates that God w111s the common good of

the universe materially, and even accepte Thomas's comparison of God's Tdll
with the judge's decision to coo:lam the thief' (in the argument; for the Mat

essential function) J13 and he citee God' s rule as a model of that non-destruotive .implicity by which authorit,. preserve. autonomy through the use or

14

causes.

secondary

Is 1t possible to reconffi1e Simon's implicit attribution of author1t)" to

God with h1a earller obserYstiona on aut.horiV' 8 1mmed1ate referenoe to a
person and the law of nations as abfJ'1'8 author.!..'

It aeema s1gnificwrt that

statellB uta from two d:1f'ferent works eleven 788rs apart are bere seemi.ngl;r

oppes-ad,

am

the writer believe. that the reconciliation would not be ditficniltj

i t Simon would JIlOdi.ty his distinction between authority and law.. the distinc-

tion whioh lies at the root of the ablgu1t,..

Thi. distinction sees authortV

as ftrealiz1rw more complete17 the ideal not1on of social prudence when it deals
with particular and concrete ci1"OU1Utancu (decrees of the a:ecut!'" power)

than lile it deal. with more general and lasting aituations (oinl 1_> • .,l5
~

did Simon introduce this distinction? The writer bel1eTe8 that Simon

12PhUosop!q'

-

2! DeMocratic

lJ Ibid •• p. 40.. n. 20.

-

14Ibid••

p. 131, n.

24.

Gcmtl'tlB18nt, p. 35, n. 18.
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preferred to emphasise the notion of social prudence in authority and oppose
authority to law in their most forma.1 senae "just as the concrete and contingen1

16

aspects of the real ar. opposed to tmiversal necessities,·'
theory in
bans.

!l!!. Nature

~

Functions

2! Authorltl

because his whole

is built on an epistemological

In this lrork, Simon has authority arise from the incommunicability of

the prudential judgment, which is incommutdcable becauae it deals with contin-

gent realities. In his theo17.. the exercise

of authority

E!! excellence is to

make a prudential, practical judgment when faced. 'With contingent circumstances.
Be considers au thenty opposed to law just as the prudential judgment 18

opposed to science I

aa inconmnmicable. al1thon.ty and the prudential judgment

necessanl,. require _ immediate reterence to a person, whereas law and
science, as demonstrable, can be known by the independent operation of reason,
i.e., 14 tbout an immediate reference to a personal intellect aDd will.

The

immediaq of the reference is required because of the iD.cCBlUni.cabillty of the

judgme:n.t,

am

this latter follows upon aontingenq.

between necessity

am

Thus the basic dichot01'll\f i.

com:.ingenq.

This analysis is what the writer understands Simon to be s4\V'ing about the
notions of authority and law in tbeir formal sense. Eut such

It

tbeor,y really

exe1ud.. aIV'divine authority, since for God (epistemologically speald.ng) there

are no contingencies J God knows the future perfectly-and He deals with both

16Ibid., p. 70, n. 10. Simon must be referring to necessities in the
present orair, not metaphysical neoesaiti... In addition, human law i l
invariably contingent. More clarity i8 needed here.
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particular and lasting situations with the ssme author!ty.

The theol'3" of

.

Simon, a8 the writer understands it, seems to introduce an alteration in the
notion of prudence, making ita eDrc1se depend so much on the confrontation of

contingent situations that it cannot be a divine perfection.

So much tor the

!!!! Nature !!!! Fanctions 2! Authority.
in Philos0p& 2! Democratie Government, however.

theory of law am authority in
A change is noticeable

Simon seems to have extended his concept of prudence. With the introduation ot
the argument for the most essential function, the volition of the eOlllmon goccl, .
he has turned to that other

aspect

of prudence, the ordering of things

to their

end, which st. Thomas uses to show that God hal prudence, against the objection

that God does not need prudence because He baa
conti~ent

situatiolUf.

11

Simon's

DO

doubta, i.e., fa• • no

-301" argument for authoriiiy

in thiS later

work no longer rest. on incommunicabil1t,.. alone, but upon: the need tor tbe
volition of the common goOO.

And 1n this theory he has included in hi. notion

of prudence, implicitl7. a tunotion lhich God certainl7 tultUls, namel7 the
prudential direction of the universe to 1ts end, \hiGh is called providence.

And so he is now saying, 1mpl101t17, that autho:r1 ty is ex.erued by Qed Ear

excellenoe.
thue the dl.fference between the two books.

It would.

SHIt

that the

earlier statements oonceming authority as oppoaed to law and its :requiring an

11,e.!., I, 22, 1. st. Thomas discusses the question ...'hether prOvidence,
by God. There is a parallel between the first
objection am the position ltilich Simon seems to take concerning prudence in GGCl
in his earlier book. st. Thomas pl'C'1V88 that prandence is part of prudence in
S.T., II-II, 49, 6.

part of prUdence, is exerc:tsed

--
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immediate reference to a personal intellect and will should be revised.

The

immediate reference should be dropped, and the distinction between law and
authority should be revised so that authority can be said to deal with lasting
situation&, even in the ideal order.
To the writer, a better way to express the relation of In to authori't1'
would be the following:

law is the instrument, the tool, of authority)

Eternal Law is tbe instrument by which the Personal Authority, God, orders the
universe) natural law is the instrument by which He governs its free, rational
creatures 1d. th respect to tbe Eternal. Law.

Nature i tseU baa no authority (as

against ROUBseau) J only the connection of natUre with authorit7 (the attribute
of a penron) can place obligation.

But this connection doe, not have to be an

inmediate reference to a personal intellect and will, it can be mediante

!!I!..

Ftrrthermore, there 18 no reaaon for seeing any difference between the authority
that COIIII1aJlCla a precept or particular decree, and the authority that

Cc.'ImIl&MS

a

1m,. the one orden tor a concrete and speoific cue, the other for tba
generality ot cases.
The existence of this prdllem means that Simon has not yet worked out a
theory of authority lbich explicitly includes that of God, something similar to
his elaboration of the supremaq of the eternal law (diyine reason) as the
primary analogate S!oad .!!. of all law" 'While the civil law is the primary

analogat.e S!oacl

!!!!~18 He

8__

to recognize the parallel implicltly in hie

later work, but does not bring it out clearly, due to the les8 specm.latiTe

l~ature .!!lE. ....Fun
.........o....
ti....o....nB
....,

p. $2, n .. 2.
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nature of that part; of his theoxy_

SUch a

devel~nt

'WOuld fit very vell with

his later use of the t:r8mmd.ssion theory, which holds that all authority comes

For God cannot transmit what He does not possess, or, more correctly.

from God.

man cannot participate in governing prudence if God does not. possess it.

And th

governing prudence so evident in the task of speoification of natural law vrl. U

then be

SMn

to be a participation in the providence of God. This tuk of

integration is, then, one which Simon might take up in future investigations.

It is also

OM

which will help to bridge the gap between the two separate but

related questlons of the necessity of authority in general and the deteminetio!
of the person who should . .rei.. authorl ty itl a particular cue.

Fu.rther wolk ot precision also remains to be done in the area of obliga-

tion, an area in which Simon is somewhat 1M.finite. To date he hu been
content merely to indicate that an obligation to obey authority exists.

He s&J1l

that the commands of authority ant etto be taken as a rule of conduct, n and.

consisterrtly speaks in a manner which ..SUJIl88 that authority demands a correlatift Qbed1e'l1oe.

19

Indeed, since he holds that men are obliged to attain their

end, and that author.L ty is essential in the process, he must hold that authoritJ
obligea.

The vhole tenor of Simon's thought is quite clesr on this point.

But

it 1s not so clear on how this obligation is to be COnceiYed in dU'f'erent cases.
Political autboriV,

it bind in. coucienee.

~qs

Simon, obliges to the axtent that laws issued

Thus he speaks

ot the oQlmOn oonYietion of nen that laWl

must be obeyed, and prooeeds to resolve the ptlradox of legal obligation (how
man can biDl the conscience of another) by showing that it is really God 'Who

-

19:rbid., p. 7 and pp. 11-12.

~

O!14!

\
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binds men in conscience t.o obey other men, by means of the natural la.w.
does not distinguish bet_en civil law properly

80

He

called and statutes, ordi-

nances, and acree., except to say, u has been noted, that authority realizea
1ts 1deal notion of goveming prudence in decrees of the executive power.

ene

has the feeling that the focus ia not sharp here, that all these species of
commands are being treated

!!! glebe without

ble d1atinctions between them.

any attention being paid to possi-

Simon has nothing to say about the 1'81a\1....

biming force of each, thus alao aY01d.ing the problem of wh.ther there exists or

can exist a purely penal law. In ahart, those who are looking tor a theol'7 of

political ob11gation in Sint.on will be disappointed, 8ince he simply dees not
treat the question.
The b1nding force

ot parental commands is alao

passed over, although it

. . . . eate to 888'U118 that Simon holds theae \0 bind in cOMcience.

A d1f'ticult1

arise., hOW"8Ver, when he goee be:y0Dd the state and the family I using examples
of voluntBl7' ...ociatiolUl in hie arg\lJ'l8nts for the neoess1'by of authortt1'.
These SOCieties, neither pertect nor natural (in the technical 8ense), dUfer
.from state and

tam117

in tha.t they can be quit at wUl.

Simon thus cite. the

football team Ed the crew of lIOrkera u examples of societies having a common
good as their object.

21

True, he is not in this con'teJtt talld.ng about the

exercise of authority d.1reotly, but is rather attempting to prove by means ot
t188e examples that oivil 8ocie"Y baa a genuine common good as its objeC't.

2Onemocrat1c Government, pp. l44-154.

-

21Ibid., p.

64.

Yet
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-

be seems to have them in mind as associations in which authority is exercised

,

thus extending such eDrcise to the broadest possible dimensions.

Furthermore,

SimOn

also speaks of the adminiatrationof a school in

connection with the problem of the volition of the common good, indicating here
a situation analogous to that of the gaverrmant of political society.22 On.
might. ask whether in his theory the analoQ may be carried to the point where
the heads of such volUlltu,- associations exercise true authority and whethel'

their COMmands consequently bind in conscience or entail some other kind at

obligation.

'W'hat about the binding force of compa1l7 regulations in 1oou8t1'1..

of the rules of religious orders, of the bylaws of a club, to cite on17 a , _

examples' A11d what of the kind ot authority which thrusts a vigerous, talented
person 'Without

an)"

title to authol"lty

i~o

the leadership of a group which

neeU direction and implicitly recognizee hi. ability to lead?

It should be

said, in fairness to Simon, that these are ql'llI.tioftS related to that seeolld.
and distinct question re,ard.iDg authority, one which he professedly did not

atteDpt to treat in full, namely the problem of who sball rule-a question
distinct t'raa that of whether authority is necessary at all. But a complete
theory will have to take them up eventuall)r, and their solution m. cut light
on the primar,y question

atI

...ell.

Simonts theol)' emphasizes the need tor authority as a means to tbs attun.
_nt of _

end, a good......either individual or common.

author!ty, in hi. system, ie not

80

The failure to obq

ncb an evil because of the moral tault ot

disobedience, but because without effective author! ty the very function in

-

22Ibid ., p.

47.

~

l~

question is frustrated:

the child i8 nat; educated, the camnon life of the

fa.m1l.y breaks down, the common good of the society is not aChieved.

orientation is the logical result ot his
moral approach to the probleDl.

llBtaP~8ioal,

This

rather than legal and

Just as he is not concerned. with the question

of who shell rule (by any particular title to authority), but rather with the

question at the basic need tor authority, so he is not concerned 'With the
obligation to obey this or that authority" (and the degree ot obligation involved), but rather with the fundamental reasons my authority in general
should be

o~.

In this area at obligation, a certain amount of vagueness has its advantages, particularly \!hen it is not the main issue.

The question of the nat1U'8

of law as primarily a product of reuon or of will, end the consequent problem

of whether tmre ex1sta a purely penal law, contain difficulties which Simon
did wll to

a"f'0:1d..

23 H1a task being to

~ust1fy

no need to enter into peripheral controversies.

authOrity in general, there was
For the sane reason, he could

avoid deliJdting sharply the dittenmcu between the exercise of authority in
the state and in other societies, ani the consequent species of obligation.

Nevertheless, he did begin a sketch of the nature and. funct1Ol'18 of
authority 'Which calls for ultimate completion and retinement as to deWl, and
such a project must eventuall,. reach out from the field of metaphysics into
that of all the soci.u sciences where the hitherto uae.tul indeterminacy can be

r8so1Ted.

Actually, the tuk Will be more one of integration than of a new

2lThe llterature on these questions is enormous.
S.J ., The Nature of Law (3t. louis, 1951).

-

--

See ThOlnas E. Davitt,

lOS
1nlreatigation, tor ethical theolY baa long been operating

Oft

'What Simon

hq

cot'Wincingly proved-the necessity of authority tor the aohi......nt of goat.

The two preoeding pointe

at critic1_ have oouoemed the

8ioo in Simon's theory of the nature or authoritT.

need tor pred,..

the relation ot huJum

authorit)' to d:1'Y1ne, indicating a possible area of investigation in the so1enoe
of ethic• •a related \0 natural theoloo. and the obligation to

indicatiJJC

anotmr such area in the

point. ant not, however, of

CIbe7 authority,

field of legal cd aoral stdence. 'hue

interest or importance 1n Simon'. 't.beol7J

~nmount

they are peri.pharal, euageet1ng fUture extensions

or the tbeOr1.

!here NIII&1ft

eome tundanetal point. of cr1tlc1s1t regarding the 1'unotiona, bonwr, whioh
reaob to t . wry beart.

Qf

the theo17'.

of UlO terIu Which are 1nterTelated..

fhe

first oenceme the

prec1ae -anini

da.fJ1cie!!!Z; and ~bst1t_loul.

Tbe taek

will be to detera1ne lIb.ther S1mon's Wle of these teme 111 8ut1'101eatl.7 olear
and exact, and llhether he baa drawn from them sll of the conclusione wtlich

att", hi. theOl7 to a s1gn1.t1cant degree.

"''l'Nn Simon speake of the authortty r4 God and tne Church u . .at1tutirC

tor the nidence of the diY.l.ne

trut,h which w111

beati1)' our inte1lecta in the

beat1t1o v1a1on, be 18 clear17 speaking of a dat1c1ener in the 1anporal. supernatural. order alone.

a..

nature, henee the laek
1ng

tn.

-

The "t'1sion OIUmat be called satething due to hvIum

or it

18 Dot

&

privation 1n the Mturel order. heao1Dd·

the oontrovertecl qttelltion of a natural appetite for the beat1t14 viaiOl"

it can be Hid that taith 1a eubetitutional here below in the

!,t1i!matural ....... ~
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when 1t 1a a quest10n of strict .ter1ea, i.e., trut.ha absolutely impervious

to human

l'688Ol'1.

In the natural (end thus the polltical) order, such authorltt

i8 str1otl.,. e.sential.

rus

18 the one cue in wh1ch authority in the order 01

theoreUca1 truth 18 not subst1tutional.
The authoritj c4 God and t.he Church can be aubatitut1cmal, however, in tl: It

net.ural arde:r-t.o the extent that it supplies tor the defic1eDC7 which reuOD

aperience. in the knowledge of natural t.rutba not impemoue to r_011, bu\
which are d1U1cult to 1eam without

din.

nmtlation.

And it iIJ Mn that

this authoJ'1ty 1. truly ped.agog1call the Church foners and guidea tblt dwelO}l ~

ment of philOflOJ1bT for the better underetenr:11Ag of

Sblon doea ftC tt

theM trutha.

nmtioft this aspect of the Churob's authorit7 tor it is not:. v.i.tal to h1a proof.
b1l\ it doea point out a limitation upon that indateotib1e propua of
poe1ted by tbe

det101encJ 1Ib8or'T.

!beology etep8 int.o the pictu.:re to point out

the _ral naeeaa1t7 of revelation i t men aft to know adequatelf

natural religious and 1IlOl"a1

~

tru1;be

8"f'8n

thea.

wh1eh the7 . .t know to aohi.,. the1r final

end. The autbcrlt7 of God and \he Chureh is thus pel\l1l\!l8ntl7 8Ubat.itut,icmal it
this

ill.,

GftD

in the ftIltural oMer atl! desp1te the future prCrgJ'UII of m- ft1n l'll!

The __ need tor nbst1t\$ional authol"1iiy due to def10itmeia w.Ul alao
:raa1ll 1ft tbe other oategor1ea of theoretical tl'ltth, aocording to S:l.moD.
be

8&)'8 ~

~

tbare vill

al~

be

cbUcll"8D

to educate,

and

rhua

it will alWllJ'S 'be

for .,. de futo to .....,. tba authority of experte in other fielda,

due t,e the sheer iJIIpQJsib11iV of JIlutering fmn')'th11'11 t.here 111 to

know.2S
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The 8MODd clause of this statement of Simon has 1apo:rtant Connquenou once it

is relat.ecl to the concept or progn.8 t a concept important to hill theory o£
de1'1e1encd.ea. But SiDOn does not make the illation, perilape because of the

1.nfluence ot h1a adYeraari.. 1'be writer analyHa the situat:l.on in the following manner.

Simon oppose. Proudhon's a1'gl.lllente for anarehi$m by examining the

posllible eftHta of prograu almost ualueive17 in the practical order. AD-

udl18Ja auppoeee t.be e11mination

or

all iDtel1eotual deticlenctea and hence all

lIutbor1ty _eng ad.ult. tl'lJ"ough progreu of 1moT4edge, 1t eeek8 sal:va'tion in tlw

theont.1eal order, neglecting the pn.ctical al1'lloet entirel7.

tact

th...~

practical

contingency will atill render authoritJ neoeaaary in the making of
~udpent..

Simon naturel17 attaeka Proudhon here, at 1'..18 weakeat

the practical OM....

point'

It overlooks the

And he doe.

haft bMl'l pose:1ble to do battle

011

80

brilliantl.T.

But 1t would alao

the ...,'e own grouJda, the theoretical

onIer.
Simon d:l.d not elMt to co this.

In reacting againat Prrouclhon's concept

of a .oe1et7 ruled eoleq by the objeett. . laws of 800141 behm.or .. 1moMn

bJ

all adult c1tiaene, Simon ..... to brmt iapl1c1tl7 .accepted. P:rowlbon's

uaUlllpt.1on that ifttellec\ual. prog:rus _ana tbe decreue of c.ief101enc1ea 1n the
theoretical order, unt.U acme irradicable 1Il1nhwm is reached. At fint eight,

th1a . . . . a reasonable uaumptiOlu a. knowledge in each individua1irlereaMa,
the commoa tad. 01.' knoWledge alao illC2"euee, and therefore the lntelleotual

datic1eno1es of men will deere.... But the conclusion of the assumption provo

to be tal..

upon a more

thoro'oah imreet1lat1on ot the concept of detic1etlCT u

:l"8l4ted to p:rogrue in the theoretical order.

The point which Simon rd,ght have made 18 that as the

~

fund of
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knowledge increases, the defic1enciu in each indiv1dual will also increase, du

to ha own de taoto but 1neacapable lack of ability to comprehend the .....1"1....

11

••

inereuing 'Whole. As technology inoreaae8 and the education necun.rr to umet"o
stand ao1ent1!ic judgmente b900ma greater, the number of

ble

j~

!!!. .fa.,.oW
...·.. ~ca

aleo increases. It b.C01• • 1ncreas1nc17 ditfioult.

ble, to educate

eYe170JW in

8'NIl

1mpoui-

every field, wen in those f1elde which pertain

direotly to tbe phen<:I'IIfmA of social bebaY1w.

Onl.y a few speo1a1iats b.aft t.he

ev1denoe tor soUmtitic judgmenw in their respective branches of kncMledpJ al ~
others are det101erlt in th1a categOl7. Thu with progress !!!..facto,;;;,,;;;,,;;;.;;;. detic1tm-

cd.aII, Nlatt'f'8 to the quantit,. of matte to b. lmoIm, actua1l7 immtue in
ind1vtduala.

It 18, of course, true tbat tbe.7 deere_ in

aoc1ev taktm •• a

'Whole, bltth1s argues in favor ot s081.1 a.1oft to ezploit truth, . . againn

the aDal"GbUt dream of int.lleotualq CllJld.CClI1Q)etent ind1viduale.
Such an -al7sie of the etteota of increased knowledge . . . . reasonable :1J
the light of present

.wente. Certa1nl7 modem science 18 developing toter thai

the capacity of any single h1maD intellect to compraherd it..

states, "!'he Ol"gm1ution cC the
plaoe,

b7

.~ent,1tio

Micbael PolarJ7i

process 18 detem1nad, in tt. t1.rst

the tact that lItXlem ac1enoe 1e so van that any single person ce

properly UDdenrt.and.

cml1 • ..:1.1 Motion

of it • • ••

It 18 a

~

aatheIIIati-

o1.aD-w. are told-who .t'ull7 unde1"Standa mON than halt .. clOUD out of t'1ft7
papel'8 preaented. to a mathematical congreaa••26 Tbe universal an of the
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Rena1.eflN!mCe is no longer possible. !Ten t..'1th increased le1nre tor education,

it doea not. .eem that the gap 1411 eYer be bridged, although th&xe 1'81JIine •
theol"8\1cal pouibU1ty that knot4edge might stop 1ncreaa1ng longenougb

edu_tion to catch up-obU't this 1a contra,.,. to

p1"Og1'88S ••

tor

known in the world

of 'bor:iq, .ui even posits an . . .ntial change in h'uman natUl"fh

It rema1ne in-

conceivable that in the oOll'lplex society of the tuture e<.'JJI\e point might be

reaebed at which all adult. would know enc•

to make ..,.n pu.relr speculat1....

authority auper.t'luou.
fhu the buio aaaumption of anarchism i. shown to be false beOause

it

doee not take into account the soe1al nature ¥It: kncwleclge, because it oontuse.
d

i.Dereue of knowledge in aoeiety .. a whole ,11th the removal of deficiencies

in the indiVidual.

deftcl.., ltHlt,

IrJdeed, tbe buio oontwdon . . . . to be in t.be oeaoept of
1'10

ciistinction be1qr made bet.ween that, of the indiv:Sdual and

that of eoe1eiW-two de:t1c1enciM 1Ihioh do not co1no1de, and which must conti.

to tiift•

..,. mora, due to apeotaliaUon.

It fellow that this pawth of deficiencie. in indlYiduala vl11 lead to
n~ere

aubat1tutioD8l aut.hOr1t.7 in the order c:£ theoretical truth.. !h1a .....

elusion in itMlf does not. direft17 contradict ~ in

fwlJ:iaaumtal ooeel_ion that

p~

Simon'" theOl'Y_

Ria

1apl1ea the decq of nbet1t.uUOMl. au-

thori:. appli.. to t.he ardel" of Enetioal; truth, .. 18 clAal1l" frau the contA!lt\.
HI dees not

that authority in theoretioal

uttera vUl cteoli. with pro-

Aai yet be . . . . to apw thet it will, since be I'l8'V'8r oballenges the

gl'$88.

,

-.v

1

---

no
~Oft. and

ann 'builds upon it later on, in his lQ'pothea1a of a society

per.teoUyenlightenaci individual•• The uaumpticm alao . . . . to
Simon to

~aa1ze

the dichotom,y 'between law and autnoJ'iV,

ODe

nave

whieh

or

intluencec

for bia

reate upon another yet more fundamental-the d1chot<:a1' between the tbeofttttcal
tmd the

practical order.

ntn.

for en1.1ghtened lndlv1dul.a in the theoretical order and dill hold

t.

n~

In thl. vq be oould adtdt that law 8l.ona Dd.gltt

for lmIrdJld.ty in the practical, where oontingenq holde 1IJW87. Th18 i.

palma:ry U'p!1ent of

!!!! NatUl'e !!!! hnct10ns 2! AuthorJ.;t.z.

w111ing to conoede the pon1b11ity of

Ii

Simoa 18 1;hu

quul-ccaplete eUm.:S.na.tion of det101fm-

cie. in one O1'Cler because the other crder ia .uffio1ed to gua.ratee t.be
l'l8C8Ul. of author1t1y.
'l'hia implicit oonceeaion of the anarobiat ...UIllpt1on of intenenual. p....-

:reae sbOWS 1tMlt in
tbeoret1cal order.
inab111~

tbe way in which SiMon ..... the \em

On the

one had.

8'QOb

¥ioia!!l

-

a clet101ftOJ i8 for hila tfIff1 de ta.

to undel"8ta!d the demonstration of a scientifio judgment,

j'tl1gmente are

in the

a..1!!!. OOIIIWUdca'ble witbout l1rdta.26

tor nob

t'h1. lI'IQ8t mean, therefore,

tbat a puwoa . . \le det101ent in a certain t1ald of knowledge Emm though he
appa~

bne no

h. no obligation to aster tlut.\ field.

net1~

here . . . . to

.weal oormo'taUoJUJ J 1\ ia simply an intellectual lack of perfeotion

(oUlpa'ble 01' not) ar1aing from the tact that the theol'e'tlca1 j11Ciglllmt 1. not

pertect u.n1ese the intellect 18

tb.oroug~

determined b)t ita objeft. Its objllc1

is, of oour.., 8Yiden__far whiCh authority 18 only a 8ubetitute in the

111
apeculative CIrCler.
On the other hand, significantly, Simon does net seem total17 satiatieci

w:1th tfd.a

~ _~ioal

augguts abnormality.

natue of theoretical det1c1enciee. The V8l"1

Thue he emphasises

out that in science, "lack of unan1m1ty

~

wore

jure communicability. and po1'Jl't.

al~.

has the character

ot

an ••c1dent~

BDd tJ.lere 18 ecmething ecandalou about it • • • ._29 He,,8 that the Nla-

tift i.nearaun1cab1l1\y ot some tully demODBtrated philosophio propositicna 18
purely tactual, it is

terma

or

~

accident" that; 0liI.7 a tew people can umerstand. the

-!?l

tmd follow the demonetraticm.'O It 'Would . . . tb&t be oonsiders de

t . . . tbllont1cel dAttio1lmtd.ee

ao.mewhat abno1'bBl--aaaeth1ng to be

~

progreea, net ita logical ,result.
~

aie:a

ant

leav.. the reader i_Ill a c1Ue!rna. It these intellMbual. detioien-

true det1c1eno1ea, ttan progz ... abould el1m1rllte them.

progren aO'tual.l7

But lIlOdern

ttn_ to increase
, them. Therefore the7 are not true c!et1c1en-

'the solution d...med. . . . . to be as tollows, in the w1ter'. opinion:
p~

of la10KLedge dcea eliminate theo.retical. c1eficienctu. bit by bit, and.

yet. it ....te. more

IJIJV

ones than 1t

~..

intellect, wherebr the proper objeot of hie intellect ill

....1b1l1,31 1t 1. 1mpoea1ble tor
I

h1a in th18 lUe

f

29n.oorat1o Govenaent. p. 20.

-

JOn,id.,

p. 21.

t.

BecaUS8 of the natwe of Jl'IlU1's
~1ddiU,

.!!.!!.

to oomprebard tbe 89'1denee

112

tor all speoulat1ve judgment.. Thent
And "

is simpl,. not eJ'1Ough t1me, tor one thi••

man must depend upon other ..., relying on their find1ne.rs in a social

effort to muter all trutb-tlae object

ot the speeulative onler. He mot accept

tl'l!dr aubstitutional ·authority aa an intrinsic xequirement of this social

effort.

The world in which be 11v•• and hi.

ow finitude PlWVent each indiv1d...

ual man from attaining to the knowledge of eU being, the adeqtUlte object of

l2 The V81"7

tda b'ltellMt.

of

his intellect as

:f.Dg the

seal tor

way in which man knowe in this life, t.be very nature

part c€ the

AUlUUl

which hi. intellect

co:mpoe1te, tJiua prevents him trom acb1w-

",88 r:\8de.

Tbis

oaft

be acoClllplished onl)r it

the next 11fe, in the Tision of Oed.. This is; 1n a sense, the tem of "n+.n ...
tusl progreee here below.

""bat efteot does thi8

8rgtmIiJ.

tor the growth or

~it.ut1onal

authority

1n the theoreticel ord8r due to protreU haYe on Sblonts theory .0£ authority in
tbe praotica1 crder? It ahould be noted that tor hill autbor1_ in the two

orden 18
that

1ft

analogmas conoept,.'3 It cannot, theretore, be 1.tmned1ately _urGed

~ftU

1411 bring abou1i a parallel inereue of substitut.ional lmthorit,.

in the practical order.

Neve!'theleaa, once the above mentioned pro. . . baa beer:l

eeta'bl1abed u intrinsic to intellectual progreall, it becomes necessary to reexamine Simon's theo17 of authority in the practical order in the light of this
new correl,.ion.

It -'1 be pea.ibl. \0 detect a relation between the two omers

and determine what efted, it

8.'l'q',

an increase

ot substitutional authority in

the t.heore'Ucal order mq ba'V'e on authori.tr in the practical order.

--

32S.r.,

I, 86,

2,

III, 10,

CertainJ.7

3.

33Intomation from an intemew 'rltb Prot. Simon, July 11, 1959.

ll3
tbere ie

connection between lpeeuiative knowledge and practical. deOia1<ms,

Scm8

between ideas and action.

And because Simon t s theory is hued eo largely on

the nature ot the practical judgment, tliis question has important ramif1eatiOll8
Fint
juO~nt

to

II

em

~

all, it sbould b. noted that Simon's theol'1 o! the prudential

practical truth, wt-.ich i.ntluenou a large segment of his thought

great degree, ia baaed on an interpretation

Tl'wlldst.

tai~.

at st.. Thoroas not held by all

Thu interpretation has been challenged,

tar

eD~lple,

by

Father Crowe of tbe Jesuit 8elninal)' in Toronto, lila 1s conri.nced th.et Simon'.

sharp dietinC\ion between speculative and praotical knowledge (and thUs 'between

-

the two oftklra ot truth), thCftJgh 1t may be der1'1f'84 from one
5't. Th01ll88

.w

i.e

aert.ainlJ

taught b)r John

ot st. Thomu,

sene.

of text. in

is not tru17

consonant 'Wittl another equally important ••r.Le. of tats or \.1.. th the Angelio

Docter." Oamplete teaohtng on the Dature of \be intlelleot.. Speaking of the
practical judgment, Father Crowe 1IlIlint.a1ns that intellec$ t... intemal praous.s

are to be aplail'lJC1 in intellectual tama, and
though the \hint ud proper

atap

~ ~,

not by

recourn to will, that

act of prudence 1.8 tbe eraeo1p!!J. thi. 18 not a

but a 8tep tCJwarcla action, it 1. not an act at further

knowing.

I do not . . that It.D7' other 8OurcII811 or explanation 8ft required for the
tl"tlth of pract1.eal intellen than tor that of epecu1atlw. Speculative
1ntelleot att:lraua that aOll8th1na 18 01" 18 euoh, aDd ita truth dependa
on ~enoe to the ob3eotive t . ., practical intellect a.tt1J.-.
that ~ing 18 boftUJl, cOJ:Jnniene,
and ita: tru\b
l.1bw1ae a.pent88 oft cornlpo;r;;:;;;; ~Im O1>3.ot.1veeitwaticn. To
apeak of to. ,tru1',b' of. paoUoal intellect .. it it we~ in •

rrnmdum,

especial clue b':t itself imdt.. the suepia10n that thIt question 18
no longer ot truth but of Something else altogether.3la.

The eontroveI'sj" is a tundernenta1 one, obviously, and could euilf provide
material for a

le~ st~

in itself. but the writer has elected to make note

of it ";1thout prolonged disCU88ion tor two reesons: because it conc&mI
Simon' S theo17 o£ knmi1edge primar11y t rather than hi. theol'7 ot autborl1:.7
(although the close oonne<rtion of the tw is by no n1eana denied), md because
the

theo:r1

oritieUma,

of authorttl' 18 not seriously underro:1ned in :I.te substar>.ce by tbe
.~

perhaps 'When the means to an end 18 uniquely deter!n1Md.

18 t3"lMt that Cl"OWtS conclusions etteeUft!y refute Simon's theory of the
,

It

judgment to be 1ndemOnatrable (Simon 18 not clear as 'bo bow J1uoh demonstrabil1-

ty he would adJrdt, even of the theoretical considerations invQtved), tor the7
pJ'OVe

that it 1a

al~
. ~~

...

demonatrable that such a judgment 1. a prudent one,

,-'

i t the ~~"'un1q"ly determined, that it. is the

doee

n~~1a, ~~r,
\

onll pnw.tent

Crowe

that it ..,..nl equally valid _am. are II'ft1l.able 1t

,/'

un be 4~rated thst one of tMse meana is the 1IOst prudent,
~

one.

am

01"

the

onl.7

choice. ADd 80 he doe. not attack Simon'8 contention tluItt unan1mi'bf

would be preu.r10U8 in auob • •~tuatlon, that no single
deMoutrated u

metm8

could be

beat. What he doe. attack ia the un whioh Simon 1l18kea of

aftect1ve knowledp, in whioh the will . . .how . . . . to be

.ned

auhe\1tute to'¥: tbe 1DteUe"-. Btlt Simon -. theory deee not depelJd

lmrn4edae tor it.

in .. a
UpcIl

atteoU

IJUppOl'tJ afte.1ft 1motrledp tor 81aon 18 rather a !ltfNm8 of

achift'i.ng UJ18Jli1dt7 which goes into action when deft!onatratiol'l of a unique meane

18 1nconoluiYe, and tor which authority ia a substitute.

In Crowe'. argument,

authority would substitute tor understanding of the demoutratlon lIhea

19nora

or ill vU.1 PNftnted 1t. Now the undue intluence of an ill will on the
1.nt$1l.ee't 1. not tar remcwed trom lack of atfeetift knowledge, u far ..

prt.cti.oal coneeql8D0e8 are oonaerned, thouch the theoretical explanation of tbe

role of the will in the two cue. ia
b

n~

the

8_.

entlque of Fatber C:rowe ia thus important to Simon'a poe1tion on the

nat1&re of k.no\itedge, but deee not seriously attect his basio

~

tor

authorlty as the cauae of united action.

'1'0

mum to

the d1ecu810l'l of the relation between the two ordeN

ot

u6
truth (and S1Jrlon t s tenninology will o:>ntinue to be used here, despite the pref...

erence of the writer for

B

more unified concept of truth), theoretical knowledge

certainly attecta the prudential 3udgment, for a

MaD

who does nat have a firm

grasp f4 the facts cannot make a prudential judgment concerning them.
should be noted

It

that St. Thom. points out that prudence presuppose. specula-

ti.... 1cftO'P'!edge, i.e., knowledge of uniV'f.t1'8ale, and he list. JIIem.Ot'ia, ratio, and

inteUectua as cognoscitiV'8 integral parte of prudence.
•

Hia analysis ia

complex, on it is clear that tor st. Thomu, prudence ie detinitel7 dependent

upon speculative knowledge,
distinguish the two orders

8

conneotion which Simon, in his dea1re to

ot truth, does not. emphasise .e

soh 88 he might.)S

It i8 Dot 118--817, of CO'11'8e, that a pruderJt man have 8#quired OCI!tplete
knowledge of a subject by hi.

CMl

ftUonilll in order to uke a prudenUal

35~.!., II-II, u1 J 1, and 48, 1.

The application of this study of

pruc1eDce to modern situations would enhance a complete theoX7 of authority.
Simon by no _ana denies this analysie, aad declares that the prudenUal 3ud.sment must be preceded b7 an investigation of the real d1eposi tiona and
possibilities of the p!rsans and things concerned 't.1.th the decision to be made
(Nat\U'8 and Functions, p. 27). But be does nat. point out that such an
ilmtiilgatI"on cannot even 1::-. . begun 'Wi t.hout. a minimal theoretical 'knowledge of
the mat.ter at band, and apart from this single instance does not deal with the
relationship of speculative and praotical 1ntellect. This is most probably due
to hie theoJr of the practical judgment. just noted. and hie method of arguJD8nta...
tion, which is to concede the field of specul.aUve truth to his adversaries
while concentrating on the practical order to ]ll'OV'e the necessity of authority.
st. Thoma., on the other hand, mak•• the virtue of prudence the link between
speculative truth and praotical ju.cgl'llent. For him, prudence, wbUe belonging
to the practical intellect, is a compoe1te virtue made up of three integral
partau cO\.del (ebulla), judgment (~Si.)J and commmd (~). Counae1 and
judgment reside in 'Efii specula tift ifi!e'Ct J only the elemiirE'"Of command
resides in the practical intellect. .All three operate together to provide
prudence. (cr. S.T., I-II, S7, 6J 6S, 1f 66, 1.)

--

, I

Ii

I.

I':

111
judgment about it.

He mq accept the advice

am

conclusions of others to help
But to

him decide, tima accepting their subatitutional. theoretical authority.

do 10 intelligently, he must be able to understand enough of the subject to male
a prudential jucgmemt

88

to the competence ot theee others. In short, he must

be at lean expert enough to comprehend the practical ..,pllcationa

ot specula-

tive trutbe.
!b1a necessity

eeel!I8

to argue for an increase in the authority of experts

in the practical order, due to the spec1alintion demanded b,- the en1arpd
bOt.1Diariea at !mowledp.

The ir.diridual

Il8Il

will not. be capable of emm

part1allf apert lmowledge in all tielda I he Mll have to :rely on othenJ better
tftlned. to make praotical d ••Ud._ whioh demand thia !!I!rtis. u a prerequ1lliile. fbi. dependence will prcmt all the more n. . .88l.7 u

goftnJIBrrte

are

faced by preble_ of a corsplex aDd difficult nature, such 8C1entit1c and
technological problema, lor example,'u

".8t

financial operatiOns to control

inflation, muslear dfJ'Nlopment, and the exploration of outer apace.

It does

not mea that the people !Bed lose their .demooratic cont'l'Ol over the.. aperte J

nor does it __ t.hat prudent men without specialised skUla cannot be chosen
to superriee the 'Various project. of the expert functionaries.
MIiIn

But it dees

that unanimit7 wJ.11 beooa more difficult, that the c:1rele of tho_

~

to

make practical deo:l8iom1 in the. . _ttera will neoealll"11y grow

muller.
It wmllrl be a mistake, however, to conclude 1mediately that as prudent!
capacities become
autborl.\)'

or

JIlOr8

cd more the prerogative of experts, substitutional

the £~temal

t.n"* (in Simon's sense) must therefore increase in t

practical order) that because the . . . of l'fttn are

S! facto

deficient in

118
knowledee and prudence regarding ctftplex decisions, they JlUSt be governed paternall)", 11lce children.

The temptation is great to treat tbe .tate like the

.tamU)", mere, as Simon sqa, the distinction between individual and c(lI'Jmon
good is otten blurred •.36 But it mast be NIIItBlbered. that tor Simon, pate1"ft8l

authority at",.. aims at the l!!'2E!r, the fndividual good of the mil'101", not t_
common good of the aoc1.ety to which the miner belong••)? The onlf' ~ in which
08D

enter tbe polit.1ca1 see_ in his theol'1 is 1Iben the m:1mJr i .

p49HOt1.

or group unable to rule itaelfs a eolOt17, a au'tmterged olue

patemalism

either a

within sGC1ety, or a smaller gonrnmental unit-.OBIt kin:! of individual 'Wd.t or
oolleotivi\)" which has

Ii

distinct individual ~good of its

0V1 'Which

1t carmot

atte1n 1d.\bcNt ext.n_ic, paternal usiatanoe. U this paternal autbori.tJ 18

unnecaaaaJ'1, not terminal or not pe4agogicel, then the :result i8

~,

art1stocracy, or totalitarian central1ut1on in a monolithic state. If,
howeYer, it i. neceaaaJ7, terminal and pedagogical, then. the paternal eutborlqr

38

ie les1timlte, provided it look. to the proper good of the suller urdt.

"'11. though an increuing degree of authority be g1Yen to

There tore ,

ex:perta, if thia
SiaoDt,

_stem,

i8

demanded by the

CODl'l\on
I
Ut

good then it i, not paternalism 1n

but rather a dentlopmem. perta1ning to the

"Gonc!

tion of authority, the question of who shall rule, or tb! tom ot
be chaum.
,

gov'e:rrll8m.

Aa such, it does not seem to concern Simon's theory direO'tJ.1 in

.
~atio Government,

-

great que..

pp • .302-30).

37Ib1d.., p. 8. Simon is clear on this point.

)8~., pp. 10-15.

to

119

ita phU08oph1cal foundations, for

~his

deals with the need tor authoriV in

geMral, not. the problem of loilere 1n 80ctety or the state authority ebould be

loeateet.
H~r,

to call such authority of

uperta substitut10Ml or paternal

(in the non-Simonian sense) 18 so CO'lmlOnly aocepted.39 and natural--beeauae the
or philosopher king, or velfare state, to use
•
diftereftt te:nn1nolog) dou elIBrei_ an ability tor deoisiona in which the
expert, (or sol'U8

idOMUS,

-

_ _a are detlc1ent (prudential knowledge)-that Simon'. theOIy will ve17

l1kel.7 mn

the penmniall"1ak of being m1swrienstocd on this point.

using the te:rm !;!temal in a restr1otec1 88tl8V, . . deaoribi.tbat

Simon is

authortv

'Which ai_ at an individual gocd of • miner person or group, whereas the tem

can alao ret.. to authori"Yearc1eed. to achieve the

who
lUte

8.l'8

minon in that

CO!!I1lOf)

good of a people

th..,. are not capable of a form of gcnrernment more prcxi-

to pure demean.,. in their un1.ficatlon ot action for the common

good.

Confusion can eu1l)r ari8tJ i f one 18 not careful to _ke thi. dl.t1net.ion

(ftluable in itself) and apply the reetr10ted .enae .en reading Simon.

who rules tor the common good is exercising paternel. author!ty 11 he is

120
considered ae outside the COlm'lunitj: .. en extrinsic agent, in the 't><q that the
arl.etocraUc tft in the theory of Alexander Hamilton make up
extrinsic to the mass of men.

40

Ii ~1t7

Tbia se. . to the writer to be a very tine

distinction, even hanier to make tben that between an ind!vidual and a ccamon
good in the family.

112deed, it seems rather a manner of 'V'1ev1ng the situation,

without my ....
.fund
.............8!l'l.
....e:t1
.........t..
um
.... !!!!!*

It _ _ that Simon should aay that the

...pu"". author.1:ty is alway. paternal, 8hou1d alwaya be terminal, pedagogical,

etc..

aim:i.r.tg

at 1 te own disappearance

when

the maea at

_1'1 are ree.d7 for

part;j.c1pation in dM1s1ona-eTen it that dq JJII'Ver arri"IM.

uaiftg the tem 'tIlOuld make it apply to the

q~on

'this mener

ot

or tome of gwemlllllnt u

vell as to the functions of authori.\7, and extend I!ternal to include a COMmOn
goa1 as

ita

speake this

cbject.

war

At one point in b1a section on paternal authority, Simon

h1mselt. He i8 dieeusa1n,g demccraay, and. atate. I

"'!here are

e1:reumetan. . in which pstenutlist1c govemrmmt alone can rar.ove both anareh')'
and. ~mvJ 8uch . . . . to be the cue, inevitably, liheNftJ" iporence i8 8'0

pl'e'Y'alent .. to render election by universal. suffrage nonsensical.,.4l

40~!9r8tiHc

In the

G~rmant, pp. 1$-16.

4lIbici., p. 16. The role of substitutional authority in suab a e1tWl:t1onJ
and Simtiits d:>acurity on the point, are noted by Mortimer Adler and 't-!alwr
Farl"ell, C.P., in one of tbeir article. on democracy. They make use of S1mon' s
tema eubetituUonal 8I'ld ....nt1al, but remark tb&t "he is not at all clear 011
the question 'WIieGr, in a aM ~tr, the authority of a royal regime
(which he call. tdeapotdc' but dou not tNireb)r Man 'unjust') iI rmbatituticmal in the $ • • senee •• that ot penmt.al gofttftIIlent. ft They then point out that
11'1 tba former situation royal gOftftRtnt ia primar.i.ly for the cc:mJmtm .good,
eubjeet8 are adult l'8Iard.ing their private aflu"" but politi call,. ilmllature
regard1ng the ccmaon good. "Hence to this extent, the rOf&l author! ty resides
in the superior virtue of one or a In man. 'fo thi.s extent it i. 'substituMono
Gl. author! ty,' but :1.t 1.8 not entirei!!!1 because wherever the cortnOn good is
thep-:lma17 end (.. Ii iWt""l.1i8 cue n t.he relation of parent and Child), there

121
oontex.t, this uee of ewrnaliat.ic 11 bewildering indeed, oonei(lering t18

previous restriction placed upon the term.
ternal

CtI1

One begins to suspect that

E!-

Nter to a common good, and that the principles laid down prev1oU$ly

l1ndting this funation 1ltUSt flow directly into a theory ot democracy as the
best ton of goverD'l8nt-in *'hioh cue the distinction between the t., great

questions of author.lty is not

80

bard

ala

fast after all.

'!'be suspicion 18

reinforced when it is nt'1bGd tbet tbe _re questLon ot whether the expert 18 co
e1dered .. inside or outside the 1Ol'a'W11t.y determines whether the particular

situation is to be viewed as • problem of tonus alone or a probl_ of paternal
tunc:rtlon ae such.

Ce~

olarit1oat1on in

~hie

area would be a great

adt'antage to the theory .. a whole, and it ia to be bop_ that Simon will take
up the quest.ion in future 1nvestigat1ona.

It 11 thua not clear that more substitutional autbor1't7 1n the tbaoretl
0ftIer 1d.11 result 1n more paternal authority in the practical order, u tar ae
S1mon's system 18 concarned, i t the pod aimed. at is a

CKlS'IImOft

good and

nat the

proper, ind1v1dual good of an ind1'f1dual or collective group achieved by an
edrirud.o agent. But i f thi. good is indiv1dul, then modem pn>greu arid
gcmn-n.meDt by apert. can af'tect Simon's theory e1gni.f1oantl.7.
that of a

central

goft:l'l1lt8nt

mo_ aperta

ant

An u:aMple 18

now exercising authority

C'\fW
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individuals amemeller politieal units to attain goode formerly achieved

theee 1ndi'Y1duals and smaller unita,

bJ

the geod is individual (at least it w..

f01"1l1er17) and the authority is aercised ~. an extrinsic agent, an agent on
another level of the hierarchy

ot author!ty.

This a1tuation results from maiem progress. Advances in learning lead
to spec1al1sation am the need. for eJlperW. These do not exist in auft1cient
supply to be .fu:rn1ahed. to all leYe18 of

goYe~nt J

tnUOh len

al. Technological progrees, in addition, baa increasec1 the
drau:I. pl'errious17

~ted

to eaob individu-

~ty

of life,

areu together through imprond oommunioatio!lCS,

extended mar.te, promoted r.1ObUit,. of all t,pea-....o that problems ·exist at

til

}-\j.gher lwel than formerl),_

Thi. result Me been a tendency townnl 08fttrali...

tion 8I'1d general inoreue in

love~al

activity.

Individuals

am

emall_

units haw beCOJl1e defic1tmt in many taSks once vithin their powers, henae
govel"nll'!ent" has bad
!h$

to inte:t"MDlt.

question for Simon's theol"Y is this:

18 not !':odern progt'8fJs

ing the c1eticilmcie. of individuals and ..:1.181'" units and thus

1~

i~tbe

eubatit;utional. prltemal authority of a clearly extrinsic authority?
DOt an increue of

"b1c

Is thia

paternal anthontoy in the guise o£ a shift or author! ty to

ever higher level.a,42

42simon establishes .. c:r1tericn far paternal authority with his tw1D
principle. of aut~ and authority. Then prO'dde tor a bierarcl.'i)' of authoriV and ~ _~ to the principle or sube1die.r1ty function. J. t1euner
deHri'bea this pnnOiple as tollowe. "No social. authority • • • hu .. rl.abt to
1ntert"eft 'Wit.h actiTitiea tor individual and soolal 8.,,4. so long u thee. .
~ble ter theM e!lda aT8 abllJ am willing to cope with them • • •• The
principle of eub81diarity tunation sareprdlr the indind.ual in hi. relation to
socieiV, ard tba leQ8:r ~tie. in their T8at1on to the great aoo!ety ••
•• It proteote the right ot ~t!e. to selt-government or autOflOllf\V, 1I<"hiob
bel,cmga \0 local co=:u.',utiee m! oceu'Plr~1onal groups aa vell as the fam1lJ."-
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Simon answers the question, for it is really the same dilemma which he
describes in the first page. at PhUosopby

~

Democratic Gaverr:unent:

the

proponel1ts of the deficiency theor,y, the modern liberals, find themselves
trapped into a demand for more government.

Simon •s answer is that though "we

feel that some things have become 'WOrse, and we have developed
see

~

1m

ability to

shortComings that used to pass almost unnoticed • • • there are not a

tor more gove:rnment activity seems to
43

few circumstances in which the call

result from unqualified progress."

Be then shows, in his first chapter, that

it is a growth of the essential functions of authority Which is call.ad for by

true progress, l10t a growth of substitutional; functions.
Thus Simon answers the question; but not tully, for he does not treat of
the deficiencies brought about by progress.

He is certainly correct concerning

pl'Ogr888 in the abstract and the growth of essential functiOns, but it seems to

the wr1tel' that in te:ms of Simon·s own theory and especially considering his
views on dembcraey in subsequent ehapters of Philo80R

2! Democratic

Gov'ern-

ment, his position ooncerning progress in the concrete and the growtb of
apparel1tly paternal functions in modern soolety needs additional development.

Simon

d08S

nab seem to take into his theory the facts of centralization and

Social Ethi.~, pp_ 196-197. MesslWr then gives three criteria for determining
;&;\lier a soCiety conforms to the right order demanded by sUbsidiarity: whether
individuals serve the common good while aerving their own interests, the extent
of decentraiization, and the principle of ad much liberty as possible with as
much state interference as necesBU"'T (Ibid., pp. 197-198). Simon is in perfect
accord with this doctrine, so th8t'wha~being discussed here is rea1l7 the
relAtion of subsidiarity to modern progress, as connected with Simon t s concept
of defic1enoy.
4lnemocra:tic Qovernment .. p. 6. Sim.onts point is that an inorease or
better awareness C€ evll is not the only ground for more governmental activity.

12h
il'lClWaaed aot.1vity of govern.-nent wh1ch, at first sight, seem

evell

to contrad1o\

h18 apectation of 'What progress should bring.

To illustrate theBe contentiona, it

ll'i:~gbt

be noted ttult Simon hi_elf

• .ems to tenc1 toward a Jeftersonian vi_ of gCNermaenii and. authoriV,Wt. and
W8l"l'US

against the ever present temptation experiences by all powers to encroaoh

u.pon functions better left to smaller unita, a temptation to 'Which state. l'umJ
cona18tentl7 auecumbed.16 Adm1tUng that the modem eOOllOl'lO"

transfer o! tasks to higher levels, he
most precious valuea, far any

-..YU"n,8

inet1~ution

!II..,. indicate •

that concentration jeopardi... the

\!hi_ 18 designed to eentl"8li.

deliberation, deo1a1on and command "tend. to bring subordinate

p8X'11Ol'lB

the level of the slave, as deaor1bed by Ar1atotle.J+6 Because of

dmm to

~~

of men for power, he state., '*the state ougbt. to be t:reated .. a ldnd of

pemanetlt aggressor that cont1nuall7 threa1ilena tbe veJ7 substance of eooiet7.,p'"
And. of couree, bis 1na1atenoe on the D88Cl for an ab'\D:!8l1ce of &-'1'11.,. at
l~~r

levels ie clearly one of the principal arguments ten: the

moa~

.eeential

tnnction.48 Simon pointe out. the difficult,. of recognhing the 'beet 10000000ns
peraonnel, mUng that ,,~ definition oalculat.ed to procure unmiatakable
recogn:S:t1on of the beet 18 11kely to be at variance l1.ltb the tna . . . . of

pol1tioal.

...nence•..49

He 111818_ thai 1\ 18 desirable that the leaden of •

F.Lb

44Ne.ture

!!!! ~"iOn8,

p. 48, quotation from JeUerson.

~t~c gove~1 pp. 131...132.

-

46n.1d.

J

-

pp. 1)0-131.

41Ibi4.,Pe

-

135.

h8lbid., pp. 129-130.

49Ibu..

p. 2l. o.

democrllO'yJ l10ft of the tb8, should be l'l'lDbere of the lar;;er cl.888, l:~use

ttw,

have intentional ccumunion with it.SO AfWl although he admits that on somlt

oceaaiona.

m<r8

aocieti_.

frequent in t.eebne1og1call,' adVanced

a leader

attain,

need sene expertness, he boldlJ that in an entireq nonul state of

leadership

belon~",

~

to prudence, net to expertmesa--adding that a8 a result of

technology, the expert hal 'beCORe an inetrnment 80 hefrVY a8 otten to pi, ou\ ot
oontrol.Sl And, lastly, Simon

d._

exalt the tra41tional raral nnuea al'Id tbeJ

goai8 obtained on the fad17 tam in his chapter on deJI1ocra81 aDd tnbncd0£7.

although he 1. certainly no unrealistio proponent ot

1\

general motr. .nt baak to

the land.sa
!be quotations and eitations from later obaptere olS1mon', aeconcl book

are not inten4e4 to give a balanced rep:reaentation
They

are taken out of context, tor

t'I'Jlit tbing,

ot

hi. thought,

b7 8lV meana.

and could eui.l,. lend

~'V'. .

to a cario..:tu:e of hi. truly perceptive and balanced view of modern pelttical
and eod.al probletd. The .. citation. aM re:t.her presented here in ot'Cer \0

-

Uluatrate one tendency in Simon'. thought, that tendanc;' towanl

~ CJ"

toward wbat mak_ up diatributUm in the OMstertcmian ..nee', a pohrl••Uon

towe1'd tbe principle

ot~.

There 18 the other

t~

in. hi. tbcugl'lt.

towfml authority, oooperatlve efto,"" a:pnreaiation of modern teebnol0O', •

-

SOxbid.,

p. 222.
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polar1~ation

tho~~ht,

towaro the principle at authority_ The writer linda that Sbtt)n t •

l1ke authorlty itH1f, cannot be underetood Without the recognition of

that tension which 18 inherent to ita development. The one tendency hu been
U1U8trated hen. in order to

b.1ghl~

the problem of eent.ra1izat1on 1n modern

8001. . .

A l'l'ION developecl answer to t.he

~.a

of ciefiaienciea on the

pan

of

individuals and smaller units . . . . to the writer to 11e 1n an expanaion of the
OOftcepU of de.t1c1em:r,y and eubet1tutlon and of the prinoiples of authority and
~.

U tt. •• oonce-pt. and principles are given sufficient e1utic1ty to

aeeount for modem progren J then Simon.,. theor;y 18 not ooniiradict.ed

b:

eontemporer.r developments, it they 8N nat" then modern progress, u . . know 1t
J!'JWri;

mean an im:m!laae :1.n paternral. authority.
But a Bhift of' a:u.tchorl. ty to higher lcwele need not be _n "'«l neeeeaar1l)"

resulting lroI\ 1ncl'eaaed det1c1.na1es at the lower level4.

It the vary nature

of modem lite no long.,. reDden 1t feasible tor a amaller social un1t to
perf01'll'l aatistMtorl.q a tulc hitherto carried out with ...., then it 18 not a

<iefi• •mJ)" in that un1t. wn1•

...,.1tatea int,el"t'entt1on from above. Rather the

task in question baa oeued to be the proper GOncern of the -.ell.r unit, and
inability 1#0 perform it is no longer a deficiency. ThwI the larger unit 18 not
tJouly' IJUbet.1tutinl paternally

task baa changed.1

'b7

adua:i.na the

task, Since the nature of \he

it hal beoo_ " ,ood proper to tba't larger unitt a

goed of the larger unit lIo-1tb reepeei to the _• .118r.

~on

Simon's prineiplea are

tn, and one of them prcrr1de8 that the larger unit mat function when the
8'l!'Illler cannot. Th'U hie the0J7 ct authority in ita philosophical foundaticme
1anot v.101ated by the modem trerd .. long u progrua baa really ehtmged the
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nature

tun by

of the

making thea J>roper to the larger unite of 8001..."..

There i8 here a parallel

b~

the two ordera of truth.

tack of

.U1ty to perform a function NIJ be celled a det1c1eDC)" in a vide sena, it
<me coneidens only the ~ and the tuk in abstracto, preseinding ~ any
....

eoc1al

~nt

,

I(

'Whereb,- take are properl7' ullisnecl to vericrua unite. In

the same 'W'O'. the le. of ability to untiel"8tand a demonstration in the t.beoret-

teal o.rder ia,

!:! abat~,. defio1eD.q.

In both cuu the det1cd.ene',y ill

defined Bimp17 by :reterence to a taoulty and ita object. l3\tt i t the JtUl'Stdt ot
good (1n the practical order) ed of truth (in the theonttical order) aM

sooial
, .tf01"t.l, and ethel" JI!lenbera and unite o:t soc1etl are ..signed. to perform.
a fune\ion or urlieratand a piece of 89'1d8nce, then it s. . . to this 'Writer that

there :i8 no longer any question of etrict d.ef1c1enc;y as long as HOb JRII!IIlber or
• ••
unit ls capable of lta ~ usignad tak, a task which 1.8 pQrt of a common

-

good, one in whioh the smaller unit or !TlI!Rber i8 not c!efic1....
lrlhat YU onoe a detic1erlq, therefore, may no longer be one) what

once en exeroiM of paternal author1ty may now be the eseroUe of

III

wu

es..ntial

function. The concepte of de.f'1c181'107 and aubat1tut10n are \hue more camplex
than'tibey first appeared, bMw•• they fawtt deal w1th changing .it_tiona in a
world of

oont~,

with goode which can move up the

8CIle,

U

it wre, frc1Il

being goods proper to smaller units to goode proper to larger onee.
con_pta ther1SlUftS, as formal principles, remain, but the mat1ier

embrace, the mterial .lement) i8 changeable.
view, it need not be
beCSUH

it

18

co~

\>\:1th

!be

~lich

they

such a flexible anel elaat1c

that modem progress i8 encouraging pateJ'!'l.alia

encouraging central1sa:t#1on.

This analysis by the lrriter should not obscure Simon's point concerning

progreu and the growth of

~~eent1al.

.fUnctions. Not only dog walt.h 1no"..._

the ohoice of Mana, but the incntUe of specialization reeult1ng tl'<lfl
th~cal

detie1enc1ee (in Simon's sense of the tem) make 1t leu likely

than ever that a

un1q~

determined meana to the C(DMon good should be

reoopiced u :suoh by all educated men. Here
t.heoretica1 order.

a

another parallel with tbe

as material w"",alth incre.... the vari,,- of _an. to an

end, to elim:bmte the unique. . . of a mean., eo walth of knowledge t.ncls to

inc::reue speo1aliut:1oft and make :1t 1mpou1ble tor 4n7 man to man.er the vilele
of human learning and thus be qualified to recognize a unique meane.

Renee

unan1m:1. will not inereue, but be made more difficult b7 plen1t.ude of
lmowl.8clp.

'lbe essential .f'uneticn Will be more necen8l7 than fJ'9'er.

PU:rthermore, an increase in specializat10n will cause a

~ritu.ca1

tendency among spec1alin. . . . each 1"Utriet8 hie vi_ to at pn:rtioular field.

Thie ldll make the t"ff81"-all d:1reot.1oft of

eacut.lft all the more neoeull7.
who abare in authorit)'.

~n

soo1e't7

68peci~

bj: the rum-apee1aUsing

u exerc1aed over the tunotionarie.1

'rhi. i.e pure Simonian theOl'Y of the vcl:U;ion of the

godl.Sl But; 1t should be noted that it 1s an increase in theONt.1oal

deficiencie. (S1mon t s "nite) wbieb l1e. at the root, of t.he whole proeull

!t ..taoto
............. inOORlNDicable

more

judgmeDta, to more tIJlMial1zation. to more ooord1nat1ng
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somewhat. geographical sense and a

8$l'l8e

referring to the hiel"$rcby of unite of

S4

t1llthortty. This usage l.e in teJ"lU8 of \;hat Simon calla the homestead.

Fbil.

I t ' (

mcdem p:mgreas baa increased cerrt.ralisation with respect to the homestead, l '
baa had. the opposite tendency 'k'ith regard

to the f'unet1on,
,
.. tor it bas tended

1;0

ditfuse autbority anone experts. Just as in the theoretical order knowledge

waa f O1"'XIm"ly

more in the handa of eaoh ind1v1dual (homestead), tut i8 now

ant·reel by spec1al1sta (functions),

80

authority haa been

oent~lu_

in

0.-

regard ami deeentralised in the other. 'lbe l.Titer detects an inverse propot"ticn between ht'll'llstead. and function in thia area.
this valuable distinction,

80

Simon d_ft'S'ft8 credit for

neoesaary in 8J'J7 1rrvest1gstion of authority and

'lbe pul'P08e of this lengthy critique at the concept. of dAtt1e1!!C1 and
subet1\ltt1onal bu been to aam1ne tbe relation of tba two orden of truth more
c1CHl.f and to reoonoile modem trends 'td:tb Simon'a principles of authority and
a~.

In conolwdon, attention ebould be called to .. key 'Word. in the phra-

sing of thee. pr.Lno1p1es as given in

sa;ya that tI'U8

pro~

ph112!<J?!J::!!! Democrat1~

~~.

SimoI

of soo1ety Ind l1be1"'tor &mande that "at every given

momerl't in the evolution of a

~t7

the greatest poaa1ble m:art'ber of task.

should be direotJ.y Mnaged b)' individuals and smaller units, the smallest

~ t.erme borIIHteadand ,funetion first appear on p. 56 of Demoo.rat1;o
G~. There, §Gon explAins that the finlt deals '$~i ttl a pllrtlcUIar gOod
as' 2nra~. tbe second with a particular go«i as s~al.

1)0

possible :m:tlIber by the greater wttta... gS The kq word is, of course, the VON
22!a1~~.

It 'WOuld seelll that the nature of knoWledge as a social e1'for\, end

the nature of technological progresS with all ita conaequenoe., do

plaJ' a

signU'icant role in determ1n1ng just wat this posaibillV in arq gi.,.n 81tua-

tion J1tIIJ:/f pl"O'VG to be.
Another instance of lack of clarity in Sunon'. theOl7 occurs in his de-

ecription of 1'b.e ideal socieV vhicll. he pos1ts in order to shOW' tna" authonty
baa essential tunc\1ona.

In

his first. book, he state. that the

ben..,. of

determining whether author! t7 hal an essential 1\mct.1on is to oonaideJl

ft.

cowmn1vof adults, 1ntel.ligen\ and of perfect good vUlt and to inqu1ft into
the

:equi~ of

the comaon life of that

~ty.pS6 In his later

work,

he aeke tb.e :reader to bear in mind "the picture of a aoc1e14Y made a.clllSiftl¥

of cl.evel" and 'rirtuou8 persona." &ddine that. web a picture is not un:real 11

reatr1cted to Wl7

..u 1IOO16tl8l,

restates the quaRton as toll.ow8&

aucb

as a man and his wite. he

them

"The question 18 whether unanimity can ba

established in better Wn casual. fashion amo:ng the pertectl3 clever and
intentioned mf8bera of a society wh10b ill, b7

~.i.,

.n-

tree f100lIl det1e1en-

ciee. ttS7 Later in the same book, be po31ta a group of persona 1110 are all
v1J:'tuows and enligb toned, no ignorance or illusion interfering w.t tn t.l1e1l"
•• J
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&billi:,' to detemne the proper . . . to the end.

S8

At

s"111 another point,

he

apeaks of a "cde. composed of Itgood and enlightened people," who spontaneoue-

l¥

intend the

COI'IIIlOn {,fOod

and

men

to subordinate their private advantages to

1t.S9 tast:Qr, he 881'8 1hat two comlnOn mistaku contrlbute to the Mae belief
that g<WerrJment would be

ut'D'l&C8888l'y'

"in a society made of perfect people," and

uses the phrase 'tideal.ly perfect people" twice in the

samet

part of the

cbapter.60

The qu8et1on to be asked 58 \\bat preciae:q Simon means by
James R.

~

l!rfe~

E!021e.

of the Un1:vemty of \1:d.clil€p, in a doctoral. dis:sertation W1:tch

criticize.• S!mon BItVe~ on

thia and ot.ber pGinta, has insistad that Simon

means that the members of this ideal socie. baft reached absolute moral

perteot.1on (heroi.c Yirt_) and complete enliFtenment. In Flpn's View, S1mo
in h1$ desire to refute the classical

til80:t"y'

that detic1enc1es and lack of

political. prudence among nol"ll81 mn lUke gover.nment necetJaa17.....cae posited ..

na:te of perfection in 'Which all men acting in their publ:1e capac!V as JMlIIDbers
of the goveming perSonnel must be per:tect to the point ot being ccmple1leq
~91:!!J.

in v1rtue and knowledge, reactd.ng

baving the same identical view

hypotheaia gives

-

~

ot the

-

dec1aions on e'Ve17 point and.

cCIIDOn good.61 This 8stimnte of Simon's

a handle for all sorts of objectiona, of couree, each

>9lbid., p. 31.

&lzb1d.,

~s

pp. 69-70, p. 67, p. 69.

leading up to theoonclumon that 1n sudl
there 'WOUld be no need

£01"

of

~8

~

av..ree

aoo:fst\r of

1d.nti~

pertect men

e:uthonty. 62

To cite a few a£ these objections,.
xnen would

II;

una.n1moua~

~

argms that idantioall;y perfect

on the best m.eans to an end, and 1.1' a number

valid _ana were available, then they would all consent to a chance

l'IJOde of decillion,

sum

.s the .tJ.1p 0.1' a eoi~ich is not (tor ~) obeying

auth0l"1v.6l Also .. be continu.ea, Simon makes obedience when in the m..tnonty

the prool of respect tor authorlVJ yet there would be no

JTdnor1t~.

in a

soc1etq ot perfect men.64
But it is to Simon'. t\l'IW:ant bued on tbM '¥Olit1on of the COml!X)n good the

Y.b'nn d:l.l'ecta his principal attack. Bis contention

is 1"Jlat Sblon has po81tec1

an ideal socia. 1n Vl1dl _1'1 in their er1vate capaciV are merel¥

~ll

drtu.ou8 as th8)" intend their own particular goods, but who in their

oapai1r as
virtue.

65

~

m,.,l1c

of tbe governing peraonnel must be endowed wi... buoic
. a.

\\ba.t happens, he asks,

it the

mt. ot a

murderer wo

~tes

in government? She cannot in good conscience defend her private good (the

liberation of her hueba.nd), s1me in her state of ~te enli~terJ!llmt I'he
sees that this would barJa the eommon good. She must JIBke an heroic "f.'Jl"1t1ce,
or be gnU. of moral fault.
M,

--

.HI

62Ib1d. J p.

65.

63Ib1d., pp. ST, 199.

-

6$Ibld. j p. 66.

In the au:lI

~. F~

asks J bOW' can atG" man urge

his mm intarresta ar,ainst the

00_
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good i f he know. that, as a mmber of t.b.e

gmrerntng aasembll'. he must join in OPPOSi!'« his own 11€ht 'When the COJmIW\i tu

reconvene.?

For~,

this division of capacities wh1cb S1mon1ntrodllcefJ in

the individual resembles the

two w1lls or Roue.au, and asks the normal

individual (u private c1t:t.n) to make repeated heroic aeor1fices. t!K.IQethins

~a

sp1.lJi1ous

common good would ever 00.66

According tD

~,

S1z';ton shoulA not haw attempted _ COll8tnlct an ideal.

state using a le'vel of heroic virtue and complete enligb.temnent., for such a
l.eTel 18 impo8,ibJa of attainm.ent by man and 18 thus "inappropriate to the

conctuat of an inquU7 into the . . .nt.ia1 func1d.on. of authonty.n67 What S:laon
should haft posited, he declares, 18 an :f.deel 8Oc1• • in 'IIilich men are

S!1te Virtuous and enligb:tened, in wbich all men are mont t.bAn

-ntlT

~

endowed

with the virtue of political prudence am fU'e tib.ue abls to rule, yet one in
wh1.ch men are

~ identical.68

If Simon bad 1"88tr1Cted bis

neoes.ito" of authority to such a soe1e\v,

FlFIm states

a~

tor the

that hemuld be in

perfect agxeement, fbr in such a aoe1eV tb.ere wuld be tnequalities (as in the

.tate of innOcence according to St. 1:h.om9s), and differences of opinion concerning _ens to an end and the demands or 1rheecnmon good could still ari.. d'u8 to
the different backgrounds, experience, and degrees

66l.2ii.,

w.

65..67.. 82.

67Ib1,d., pp. 93-94.

-

68Ibid., p. lJ~O.

ot Tirtue

and knowledge 1n

oit1aena. Tht.l8 the w.lfe of the coDd..,. man would truly believe the common
goal better served by be r lm.aband' 8 lU1eration, because of ber unique relation

to him, end do
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without moral fault, nor 'WOuld the 3udge, bolding an

opposite view, be at faul.t either.69
SUch, in

SU1tIma!'y,

are the ligniflcant ob3ections proposed. by F:qnn.

i'he writer has reproducecl them here not only because thq constitute the single

lengthy and liwly arltieicm of Simon's tbe0r7 which he has been able to

dUOO'ftr, but prlM@r:l.ly because they illustrate hew Simon·s
C8Jl

'Il8e of

tenntnolog-

The writer

cause misunderstanding of M. theol"1 in aome mirJie.

b:i....u

re3eetas flynn'. interpretation of Simon aJKl the ob3ections based upon it, tar
it. is quite 01••1" that Simon did not intend hie pertecrt people to be 6so1\ltel.7

perfect, mob len identical. For one thing, Simon usee st. Thamaa t • etate-

mente concerning the state ot innocence to develop hie

th.o~

of perfect!"

authori ~', ani in this state Simon Gles:rl,. recogniMe that t.here woul,d haw

69:rb.td.,

_e

pp. 166-168. For 1i'l1nn, the witeta action would ariM troa
st. Thana. to
that the w1.f'e is
merely norJlltal, not perfect, in thet she 18 incapable of perfect. apprehension
or the l\hole matter of the COII'lmon good (p. 70). Thi8 ie opposed to Simon'.
interpretation, which is that her ...'1.11 i8 good and oontomed to the divine will
because shl is willing what the canmon good want.8 bel' to nll-the good of the
ftlll'flilf \i'deh ia her props r c::oncem. It woUld 188m tbst Flynn thinks it
neceasa%y to posit a deficiency 88 the catse ot the apparent conflict ot willa
because be doee net understand Simon' 8 araument. and thus maintains thet every
citizen, to be virtuous, muet will the eom!1on good :r.aterla1l:y at times,. i.e., 1:
there is ever an)' cantliet w.tth his particular good. Simon adr:\ita tUs .a
neceaaoxy only when the structure ot soc1e1Q baa broken down, as in the oan of
the mUitax'!t com.ander who realizes that headquarters is ignorant of the true
situation or cannot be reached (Democratic GovemJt'lent, p. hL.). ThiI possibility 'WOnld have to 1)8 eliminated from an ideal soCiety, in the writer." opinion.
defect1vi""1m01d edge, m:1C1 be interprets

llS
Ibeen iMqualitiuf tor perfective authority dependa upon tba.

70

secondly,

Simon's intense concern tor the value of spontaneous, individual enerc1- in
the willing of partioular goods 1a diametrically oppoaed to CO" suob 1nbumtm

um.tom1ty, nor doee be favor it in the willing of the common good materiany,

u his oritlo1a of Plato-s ideal etate makea vel"f clear.7l Thirdly, the
example of a buaband and. wUe COJaunity, cited b)' SiMon

8S

an euI!!ple of what

he meens, 18 hardly a eociet1 male up of abaolutely and identically JB rie'"

Laetl1, Siaon t e ideal soo1ety is obviousl7 a teohn1que devieed tor the

people"
~

of diacover1n8 what authority would be esnnt1al to mankind in a

state

fl'M Irs deficiencies, a state of nature-fox- Simon sa,. that deticienq

"alwy8 sign1.fiee the leak of a perfection that. subject ehould. poe.... in

order to eatia.f)r ful17 the demand. of ita nature, .72 and Simon dces not hold
that _n are

b7 nature iden1iioal.

'1'he te:r1ptation is strong to ....pect that Simon t s theo17 .... not read. care-

tully by

fl7m1. At le.at n,.nn

aspects,

tor hie interpretation borden on a caricature.

dOH

not . . . to haft cona1dered it in anita
.And yet it lUJ be

adm1tted that Simon'. word., if taken literally, open the door to milJU!Jderstancl1Dg, the pa.agee alreadJ cited from Simon are nidenoe for th1a.

-

12n>1d., p. 8.

~~~
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the temptation to which Fl)'m1 aucoumbecl 18 strong in the human mind, naMl7 to
suppose tmt. if ell mn are pertect they must be identical, that perfection is

canplete17 uni't'OOal term for !!!. this- SUlen might -117 have obviated

Il

thie d1tficulty, but be d1d not, perhape, think it nece••a17_
Another factor which may haft led It"17M

<and.

pc88ibly other reaN)

utray, 1s the comment l:>y r·ferit&in in lUIS l"8"riew of Simon's riiarquette lecture,
c:pot.e4 at length in PhilOBOJ?&

2! DelI'!OOrat.1~

Government.

Here Mar1ta1n

fNIII8 up

Simon's position (ev1dentlyld.th the latter t • approval) in then 'WOrds.
US

nppon ••• a CClJITlUnity _de up at

2.erf~lintel1iea

v:l.Mi1I.oUe
human beings. ff Ffe then goel on to atld h1a own
I

noll is 1ntallible. therefore, if ..
well-informec1

!!E. V~UOWl.

tJUppOSe

and

~rrt.

"Let

I!rf"ot!z;
"P.rudtmoe_

tul Ren perfectly intelligent,

placed in the same Cil:'CUYlt8tance8, 1dll not the

prudent1a1. judpent of thes. two men ne0888arily be the __• since in bath of

them it 18 taken in contemit)' wi tb an appetite that p!trfect virtue. cause to b.
right toward. tt. end?"T' Simon risbtl'y reat.r1ata this sameness at judgment to
the cue where the _ana 18 uniquely determined

al.Joead1, but even at that,

by

sanctioning both Maritain'e uae of the terma E!rfectly intell.ient and

£!rtectll virt!!!!* as ...11 as the coDCluaion regarding :identical judpeut.e,
Simon wnt ~ond the bypatheais

!9!!tit.Z of virtue.

ot the atate 01 innocence and posited an

He tbue left the va,. open tt1l' an extreme interpretation by

not dispelling that illusion from the start.
In the writer's opinion, theretore, Simon do. not clear17 eatablish what
•

d

TlMaritain, Review ot Politi., pp. 2$0-2$4, cited in Democratic
Gov8lT1lltmlf,
p.
I
1
j

2S,

n.

15.

'ftle i t&llies are in the original.
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he _ e by Eartect i!0Ele in his ideal society.

be using the

etate

On the OM bend, he . . . .

to

of innocence d1ecuaaed by st. Thomas) where man bad

supernatural and preternatural gitteJ on the other hand, he seems at times 'to

be speaking of what theologians call the etate of pu:e nature, a bJpotheUoal
I'tate ot uan created. wi tbou1f theee gUts, since he us.. the term e8Mt'lt1al
4' n"
•

1'u:nctiona, in l1PI*rent :reterenoa to _n'a euenee or natore. There 18 anotb&r
anldgui1iy.

Sim.on S8J8 that his 1deal society is free tl'OJl detio1envi•••

Tu

'While in certain other writings apart. trom bia tw _in l-lOM on authority he

-

holds that t:reedom itom def1ciencies 1.8 not to be found in a nate of

nBture. 7S

And so the question remaine

.

1'>Ul9

~red. fl7nn s solution to tba
t

1Scomm.mt. of t.he Free, trana. ":illn'd R. Trask (New York. 1947), pp.
IQ9-U2. • srrcfiaPter of this book, entitled "PessWsm and the Phil08~
of Pr'agreu," 18 an exoellent studJ of various theories of progress and bring.
out Simonts mm. views very clearly. S1mm\ prefers to oall hi.elf a peaaimi8t
concem1nc human nature, and .phaa1... the tact. that death, di_ _ , and
1rksaeM88 of labor would haft existed In the state of pure nature. Thia view
he cpposes to that at Pascal (Wt088 eal-ted new of uncorrupted nature JUde him
bl_ 8in tor much that 1s really in nature and thus tom an extrema ut1Jllate
of man's natural pouibU1t1_), am to the confident optimism of those who
81.,. . . utopia in the near future. SiMon holds that a realin1c ~
enable. U8 to ... that Juet!ce 1s not absent from. hiStory, that the struggle
for it is not dOOMd to defeat-it 18 only extremely cl1ft1ou.1t. He develope
the " . . 1deu further in "Christian HtlmanitnlU A i:i~ to 'World Orcler,· in From
Disorder to "'orid Order, Papers nellvel'0d at }{~tte University's 1;th XMtw'diftiY dO'ii!'erence (MUliaukee, l?;6), pp. 185-208. If it 11 true that to
unierstand a polltical th1nker one must knew his position on original stn--a.'t1d
tl» writer 't-eliewl that it is-tben thee. two wrka provide an important
insight into those theological postulates which influence Simon's political
philosophy.
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problem, that such a aoaiety ehould be made up of men more than normally rifted

in political :prudence but unequa1l1'l talents and virtue, . . . . a ruaoneble
~the«iat J

provided that det1ct.ncie. in tbe practical order be eliminated.

It ae_ to the w.r1ter, however, that acme introduction of

t~

problema of

8P'o1aliB:"tim due to theoretical deficiencies diacussed in an earlier part. of
thie critique l'Idght make the
in the demomtrat1on.

not

In

~heaia

leee utopian and give it added ooprlC7

Tlw probl_ of vbat constitutes perteotion is c8l"\a1nl;y

easy one to solTe, hence the hypothesi. must be

88

realistic .. pontble

vithout positing detio1encie., and as ideal .. po8s1ble 'Without dUtorting the
nature of man. As a meimodolog1eal tool, tlUmtfore, it hal ite I1M1tat1oblf

a1 ong 'td th i te utU1ty.
In conclusion, this lack of elarlty on Simon'. part does

n~ ~

hi.

tbeo", but it does indicate a walcnt&ee Wbieh should be corrected it hi.
demt'>nstration is to ach1eTe ita

em \lith m£dmum

8UOCU8.

Simon t S Cl'fer-all treatment of the p$renn1al problem. of the relation of

the

OClllllMm ami

the ind1rldual gcod 18 mu.eh more implicit thlm explicit.

Actually t in his 1IIOrke on aut.hor11q· he 18 rather supposing a mooerate vi."
the pt"'bltoy of the OCJI.IIOOn good.
Kon1nok t a book,

1hi. 11

oo~ by

ot

his roYe1w of CharI. De

B!!.!. t;r:i.ma11t.e oS!!!!! ~oontre l!.!. 2!raonal18w,

in

'.4hioh he declared that tie Koninok (whose position he neatl)" eW!'lm4rised) bad

"outl1:r".ed, t4th unusual pro.tund1t;y and
of the

~

goed. • • ••

,~.

.~,

the main aspect. of a theory

do f1nd in it a moat valuable contrlbu1;ioll to

13'
the det'in1tton of the common good. end. to the vindication of ita pnmaoy. ,,76
~hat

Simon might well do 18 tOintet.'1"ate this doctrine on the

pr1.Dta.o7 or

the caranon good 1d.th his own theory of authority, not only tor the sake of
emp).eteNHNI, but elso eo that no doubt can possibly 1"'el'l&in in the reader's
mind thnt hi. emphatio statements concerning the need

looGa are DOt

at

tor volition of parUoula

roundabout way ot minbdrd.ng the demand. of the

00l'fW0n

good.

Th18 writer, at leut, felt wch a suapio1on mounting at times, until be

retlected. upon the general17 balanced tenor
develop!l1&nt of the example provided b)r

st.

~

Simon's tbeol'1.

A mortt exterxled

Thomas (the wite ot the thief and

the judge) auggeats itHlt u a suitabl. _tliod of punruinc the inveatigation,

tor thia

intrigui~

problem rai_ Nl1J more queetiona than Simon hae answered

in his treatRent of 1t.77 Simon d.uenu credit tor applying the example to
authority, but it i8 to be hoped that he 1411 lIe able to use it more tully in
farther inveatigationa.

16"Ott the COImtlOl'l Good, tt RfW1ev of Polities, VI (October 1944), $30.
Simon praised the positive aapecw ~ !onLiOkfs book eftn thO'Qlh be realiud
that much of it could be taken u 1ft attaOk on ll.ar1tain, to wan Simon b..
alwa:ya been very close. For the ator;y ot the controw%'87 which De Kon1nok
et1ned up, see .1 __ I,. Anderson, S.J., "! Recent ControvenI7 on the CQPI1'iOn
Goal," Unpublisbed Muter's Thesis (Loyola University, ChiCl)gO, 1957). It 1.
intel"88'tirJl to not. tbat Simon published an artcic1e in the personaliat magaaine
~r1t. !'Notes aur 1e fed.eraliame proudonient" in 1931, which l1as pra1,ed. l:w
, tiin in S,dlolaaticl.em !!!!. Politi_. pp. tn-88. The pus. quot.ed by
Marl.ta.1.n is a
8\l1r1llal'f Cl m:;o;*. principles of aut.onollt'· and authoriV.

oonars.

77For exanple, Wlat ot the objection adumbrated by F1Jnn (p. 65), that it
the wife were also the judge she 'WOuld. be forced to tdll materially both the
CQIlI!1OJl and the particular good at t.he .au tirae? "bat~"' the limits to which
A pe:nton can wln a particular goed without inveatigat:1na tbe pceaibillty of
bani to the common tJ)od materially eonaidere4' How much does the fom of
government. influence the situation' !he list could be extended almost
ind.efin1tely starting from t';18 8ilW1e exI!l'Iple.
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So much for the criticisms of Simon's theory which the ...Titer has
intended. to discuss in this thesis.

ways.

They are far from being complete, in three

First, only a few problema have been selected for discussion fran among

a large nunber of thought-provoking statements made b;y Simon.

Thi. . . made

necessary by considerations of time and apace, as well as of, the relative intrineic connection of each problem with the central argument. of Simon's
philosophical theory of authority.

The writer believes that the most important

critic1_ have been presented, but admits that O!Itiasiona haft, unfortunately.

been neoe••ar.v. 78 ,
,

Seoondly, ,the cri ticisma- offered haw uridoubtedly not been •• accurate and

profound

88

they should be, end for this the writer takes full responsibllit7.

Third, the approach has been predominantly negative, and has thus not best01il8d
sufficient praise upon a theory which so richly deSeI"ftl8 it.

Simon's investi...

gation, however, is it. own best advertisement, end the brief summa1'7 ot ita
:merits at the end of this chapter vill, the writer hope., serve to atone in part
far thi. 1arge~ ofleo!"sidad evaluation.

What can be said, then,

authority?

tor the merits of Simon's philosophical theoI7 of

In a general. way, the theory i. valuable primarily because it

18SUch, tor example, is the criticiSM of Simon's use of the term d!!Potic
offered by Mortimer Adler and "'alter Farrell, O.P. in their article, nS
Tbeo17 of Democracy, IV,- The Tham1et, IV (July 1942), pp. 481-492. In
summary, they claim that sIiiiOn suGUOtuted de!totiC for r07&l in hie analysis
of types of regimes, thus departing from both rtstotle ~t. Thomas. Their
analysis seems solid to the writer, but since the question does not &fleet
Simon's theory to any great degree, it was omitted from consideration in the
critical evaluation.

accomplishes 'RH,t it set out to dOJ it proves that autority is eaentiall7
good, that it is not opposed

to liberty, that it d.oe. not arise solely from

defiCiencies, but from the nature of man.

Second1)"

the theOl")" establishes

principles for the proper emplO1!l8nt. at the functions of authortt)", principles
which tmeUre tile right cOll'lb:1.nat1on of the foroee of liberty and authority.

Third, the theory 18 not stati.c, bUt dy.namic, in that it taka. progreea into

aceoUJ'lt. Fou.!'th.. Simon's theory tdtnenes to the Yital1t,. of the perennial
philoaophy in

deal~nl

with modern probleman . Simon can legitimately take hie

place among thoM present-day
beyond the

~our1l8r1.. _

E~:rponent8

of ThClll'liam who have not teared to go

b,y their precIeoe8eOft"79 while he yet remains ..

follower of st. Thamu in the baaiO approach 1Ibioh he takes to the nature of
~

and the nature of author1 ty •

theory

Hi.. theo:r.r deael'Ws to be oelled a Thomistic

or authOrity, despite any reaervationa

which one mq haft ooncerning bis

j.nterpmatton of St. Thomas on the nature ot practical intellect. l,utly (but

.

this enumeration t:4 v1rtuu dooe not pretend to be uhall8tive), Simon's woric 18
a striJdnglJ' orl.g1na1

appr~ch. to

the em.gma of author! ty by 'W81

or its £!a!-

tiona, an approach made poesible b)r the distinction between the t1m great.

questions of 8.11thmty and between authority am!ts

inat~nt8

and f'01"Pt8 •

.This is an approach which baa never (to the writer' 8 knowledge) been attempted

79The wr1ter is thinking

of Har1tain, of course, with whom Simon shares
view of tt"8edon, authority" practical tntellect. anci the volition of
the cGmIOn gem. '!'be reader of. !·1ar1.ta1n f ,. Scnolutioiam and P,ol1tio,e as Man
aad tbe State,. tor example, cannot fa:tl to note '£fii atnn!f,y Eet"'...n \hes.-S;O
!1i'&Iit pclltic81 thinkers aKi their vlllingness to strike out into fresh areas
of 1:rN"e8tigation.

e.

~O!1
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before or since.

80

!.1ore in psrticull'.r, the wrlter feels that be
Profanor Simon for certai.'Y1 valuable insights:

owu a debt of gratitude to

the utU1ty of a:pprooching

authority frQ'll the standpoint of conditions for ulUmiJdty. the extreme

i.rnportsnee ot the virtue of prudence to any discussion of authorit:- and
government, the disUnct10n between willing the common gexxi romall;: and
materially, and the l'lMfl tor life and apontaneoua energie.

at lower level. as

a basis far a hierarchy of authority wich make. autonomy possible.

Pinelly, it should be noted that SiMon'S delightful am readable Ityle
and h1I talent for apt exaMpleS (part1cular~ in his later book) play 110 small

part in convincing his reader.

And although cr:1tic1em baa been leveled at hiB

use of terms, a good deal d hi. original nomenclature (such as substitutional,
, 11

.Nent:1al,

deti~en!l

I

theo;g', coacb-drivel" theo:z) des.rres a permanent place :1

pollt,:1eel theory.

In short, Simon's work is an extre»ely valuable contribution to the stud,of a:uthorltyJ the tbeol") ia not exhaustive or 1mnnme from cr1t1cip and 1mp.. ",.v-

_nt, but

tor ita origlD&1.:1t7 aJI1 general exoellenoe 1t due"" high

COIIr..end.ation•
• J

~:orka dealing "Irlith authority in the scholut1c tradition generally
treat the problem of the transmission ot author1~ or its moral POWI' to
obligate j.n conscience. !,ton modem work. not in this tradition tend to
examine authQrity from historical or P8Ychologic8~ persrsctives, or in terma ot
partioular a.ttlnge. NOQe has adopted Simon's approach. This is the CODelusion or tlB wr1tel' attar exard.n1ng the writs lined. in the b1bl1ogr8};>Dy and
others as well. S1JIcm's im'e.tiption remains \udque.
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